CHAPTER I

PRIMITIVE BUDDHISM SEEN FROM THE STANDPOINT OF INDIAN BUDDHISM IN GENERAL

1. Name and Date of Primitive Buddhism

The term 'Primitive Buddhism' refers to the Indian Buddhism of early days. If we classify Indian Buddhism by characteristics, we get: 1) Primitive Buddhism, 2) Abhidharma (Hīnayāna) Buddhism, 3) Early Mahāyāna (Buddhism in which Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna stood side by side), 4) Mid Mahāyāna (the scholastic Buddhism made up of both the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna doctrine), and Late Mahāyāna (Shingon Mysticism). We will roughly dwell on the characteristics of each period as this will clarify the nature and characteristics of Primitive Buddhism.

To begin with, the question of the date of Primitive Buddhism is to be considered. This covers a period of roughly 200 years, from the time of the Buddha's first sermon by which his life of preaching began, down to more than 100 years after his death when Buddhism broke up into schools. This covers the period from the day of the Buddha down to that of King Aśoka. If we take the Southern tradition and place the birth of King Aśoka at about 200 years or more after the Buddha's death, the day of Primitive Buddhism may cover a period of some 250 years. But if we take the Northern tradition and make it that King Aśoka lived around 100 years or more after the Buddha's death, the day of Primitive Buddhism will be a matter of 150 years or so. But what

concerns us is the characteristics and the intrinsic nature of Primitive Buddhism. So, it matters little if the historical length of time is a hundred years more or less. Whatever the case, up to the time when the Buddha's teaching broke up into schools, the Buddhism of early days existed as a single body. We call the Buddhism of this period 'Primitive Buddhism'.

So far we have roughly established the date. But there are cases in which scholars, even following this classification, see things more in detail and divide the Buddhism of this period into two, naming that of the day of the Buddha and his direct disciples 'Original Buddhism' ('Konpon-Bukkyō', Jap.) and that of later days 'Primitive Buddhism' in a narrower sense.[1] This comes from the fact that what was most basic was the Buddhism preached by the Buddha and his direct disciples; and that later understanding and expression had lowered down, so that in the end gradually the formalism of Abhidharma Buddhism grew up. It is, therefore, nearer to historical facts, if we are to be more strict to the content of the doctrine, to classify the Primitive Buddhism in its larger sense of the term into the two of 'Original Buddhism' and the 'Primitive Buddhism' in a narrower sense. It is right, no doubt, thus to make this classification. But from the standpoint of the materials of study at hand, what we can truly say is that we do not even have those that can tell us about the doctrine of Primitive Buddhism in its

1) The idea to classify Primitive Buddhism further into the two of 'Original' and 'Primitive' came out to be since the days of Dr. Ui. See Hakuju Ui: *A Study of Indian Buddhism* (*Indotetsugaku-Kenkyū*), Vol. II, 1926, pp. 125 ff. Previous to this, Dr. Anezaki called Primitive Buddhism 'Original Buddhism'. See Masaharu Anezaki: *Original Buddhism* (*Konponbukkyō*), 1910. Other scholars simply say 'Primitive Buddhism'. See Taiken Kimura: *A Study into the Thought of Primitive Buddhism* (*Genshibukkyō-Shisōron*); Tetsurō Watsuji: *Practical Philosophy of Primitive Buddhism* (*Genshibukkyō-no-Jissentetsugaku*), etc.

larger category itself. What we can do is only to look into Primitive Buddhism through the materials left behind by Abhidharma Buddhism. Thus, there is no standard, as far as the materials of study are concerned, with which we may, in a strict sense, classify and say this is Original Buddhism and this the Primitive Buddhism in a narrower sense.

Only Original Buddhism can be gleaned through what has been understood by scholars and by referring to the thought of later Mahāyāna Buddhism and by guessing out that probably the Buddha's original teaching must have been thus. But here we will not be so particular as to classify things in such a strict way, but regard all the Buddhist thoughts of early days under the single category of Primitive Buddhism.

We said that the materials of study of Primitive Buddhism were to be found in the Abhidharmic (Hīnayāna) documents. To be concrete, these are the *Vinaya-piṭaka* (*Ritsuzō*, Jap.) and the *Āgama* (*Agongyō*, Jap.), both of which exist as living materials in Pāli and in Chinese translations.

The ***Vinaya*** and ***Āgama*** documents of Abhidharma Buddhism extant are as the following:

Vinaya-piṭaka:

1) The *Vinaya in Pāli*, of the Theravāda school of the South
2) The *Gobunritsu*, 30 vols., of the Mahīśāsaka school (Kejibu, Jap.)
3) The *Shibunritsu*, 60 vols., of the Dharmagupta school (Hōzōbu, Jap.)
4) The *Makasōgiritsu*, 40 vols., of the Mahāsaṁghika school (Daishubu, Jap.)
5) The *Jūjuritsu*, 61 vols., of the Sarvāstivāda school (Setsuissaiubu, Jap.)=The *Ubukoritsu*
6) The *Ubu-ritsu* (*New Vinaya of the Sarvāstivāda* school), over 170 vols., of the Mūla-Sarvāstivāda school
7) The *Vinaya in Tibetan translations*, of the Mūla-Sarvāstivāda school. Almost the same as 6). Against the fact that 6) is an

incomplete set of translations, 7) is one which is complete.

The ***Vinaya*** literatures quoted above belong to a group called '*Kōritsu*' (Jap.), the '*Complete Vinaya*'. Other than the above, there are some in Chinese translations which are but parts. Now, the '*Complete Vinaya*', in the case of the *Vinaya-piṭaka in Pāli*, contains: 1) *Sutta-vibhaṅga* (*Kyō-funbetsu*, Jap.), 2) *Khandhaka* (*Kendobu*, Jap.), and 3) *Parivāra* (*Fuzui*, Jap.). The ***Sutta-vibhaṅga*** contains such 'prohibitive items' (kaijō or kaikyō, Jap.) to bhikṣus and bhikṣuṇīs as 250 or 350 śīlas,[1] and the commentaries and explanations to these. The ***Khandhaka*** contains such formalities of the priestly sangha as, for example, those required of them when they receive the upasampadā (gusokukai, Jap.), or the ritualistic items observed on occasion of the uposatha[2] (fusatsu, Jap.), which was held twice a month in order to purify the Buddhist sangha, the items observed during the three months of the vārṣika (ango, Jap.) in the rainy season, and further some twenty stipulations relating to clothing, food, living, and medicine, that pertain to the life of the priestly sangha, and their explanations. '***Parivāra***' means 'supplement', a thing complementary in nature. Against the fact that the preceding two of the *Sutta-vibhaṅga* and the *Khandhaka* are generally similar throughout all the *Vinayas* of all schools, the supplementary part varies by school, possibly having come into form after the schools arose. This being the case, the older of the *Vinaya* are the first two parts and these can serve as materials for studying Primitive Buddhism. Here all the circumstances under which the prohibitive items and the forms of behavior stipulated by the Buddha are minutely entered into, so that these may well serve as materials as to the routine and social life of the Buddha and his disciples. Needless to say, differences are noticeable to some extent by school. This means that additions and alterations took place as time went on.

Sutta-piṭaka There are the sutta-piṭaka in Pāli and the same in Chinese translations. The one in Pāli is a complete set of a single school, whereas the same in Chinese is one mixed, compiled out of the materials of several schools. There is no complete work of the sutta-piṭaka of a single school done in the Chinese language. Each of the *Four Āgamas* (*Shiagon*, Jap.) belongs to a different school. And these four of different schools are coincidentally rendered into Chinese and form one complete whole of the *Four Āgamas* and remain

1) Sīla (P.) (Tr.).
2) Upoṣadha* (Skt.).→p. 24, note (Tr.).

so to this day. In Pāli, there is yet, other than the four, a fifth collection known as *Khuddaka-nikāya* (*Shōbukyō*, Jap.), which is made up of small pieces and which also remains to this day in its original form.

Four Āgamas in Pāli	*Four Āgamas* in Chinese
Dīgha-nikāya, 34 suttas	*Jō-agon*, 22 vols., or 30 suttas of the Hōzōbu (Dharmagupta)
Majjhima-nikāya, 152 suttas	*Chū-agon*, 60 vols., or 222 suttas of the Ubu (Sarvāstivāda) line
Saṁyutta-nikāya, 56 saṁyuttas	*Zō-agon*, 50 vols., of the Ubu
Aṅguttara-nikāya, 1–11 dhammas	*Zōichi-agon*, 51 vols., 1–11 dhammas of the Daishubu (Mahāsaṁghika)

Of these, the *Dīgha-nikāya* is one which contains longer sūtras. The *Majihima-nikāya* is one which contains middle-size sūtras; the other two āgamas contain many smaller ones. The *Saṁyutta-nikāya* contains sermons classified by categories and the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* those the dharmas of which are classified in the numerical order, as from one to eleven. The *Four Āgamas* in Pāli and the *Shi-agon* (*Four Āgamas*) of the Chinese translations are generally similar in content and agree, because these are all the sermons of the Buddha. Further, the Chinese translations contain, other than those of the above-said *Four Āgamas*, a fairly good number of fragmentary pieces and independent sūtras. Also, among the fragmentary pieces in Sanskrit found in Chinese Turkestan are some independent sūtras. Some few such are also found even in Tibetan translations. But all these mean little compared with the *Four Āgama* texts the number of which go over thousands or even ten thousands and more.

The ***Fifth Āgama*** in Pāli, which is the ***Khuddaka-nikāya***, is made up of the following:

1) *Khuddaka-pāṭha* (*Shōjukyō*, Jap.), 2) *Dhammapada* (*Hokkugyō*, Jap.), 3) *Udāna* (*Jisetsukyō*, Jap.), 4) *Itivuttaka* (*Nyozegokyō*, Jap.), 5) *Sutta-nipāta* (*Kyōshū*, Jap.), 6) *Vimāna-vatthu* (*Tengūji*, Jap.), 7) *Peta-vatthu* (*Gakiji*, Jap.), 8) *Thera-gāthā* (*Chōrōge*, Jap.), 9) *Therī-gāthā* (*Chōrōnige*, Jap.), 10) *Jātaka* (*Honjōkyō*, Jap.), 11) *Niddesa* (*Gishaku*, Jap.), 12) *Paṭisambhidā-magga* (*Mugegedō*, Jap.), 13) *Apadāna* (*Hiyukyō*, Jap.), 14) *Buddha-vaṁsa* (*Busshushōkyō*, Jap.), 15) *Cariyā-piṭaka* (*Gyōzōkyō*, Jap.)

Among these are works of varying nature which could not rightly be classified under the category of the above-said *Four Āgamas*. Against the fact that generally unity is seen in the contents of the *Four Āgamas* of all schools, this *Fifth Āgama* seems to show great differences by school. What remain to this day are those in Pāli; the Chinese translations contain but parts. The above-quoted fifteen in Pāli are of varying contents and the dates of the materials too vary; those most old and those most new are mixedly put together. Among the older texts, there are some which are older than the *Four Āgamas*, having already been in the form of sūtras in the days of the Buddha, which were being recited by his disciples. We find these quoted even in the older texts of the *Four Āgamas*. The sūtras old in this sense are such as the *Sutta-nipāta* and the *Dhammapada*. Further, the *Udāna*, the *Theragāthā*, the *Therīgāthā*, and the *Jātaka* are no less older than the *Four Āgamas*. The case being thus, some of the old sūtras of this group are at times much more important in the study of Primitive Buddhism than the *Four Āgamas*. And among the sūtras in Chinese translations we see some which correspond to the old sūtras of this class. Further, the vinayas and sūtras in Pāli are all rendered into Japanese and included in the *Nandendaizōkyō*,[1] so that these are all within easy approach.

As the *Vinayas* and the *Āgamas* that we now have are those which had been finally compiled in the days of Abhidharma Buddhism by some schools, we see here the characteristics of each school and also some differences. But all these differences arose out of the sources traceable back to the days of Śākyamuni Buddha.

The *Vinaya* refers to the moral precepts to be observed by the priestly sangha and the circumstances under which these were instituted. The *Āgama* is a collection of the sermons delivered by the Buddha himself as occasions arose during the 45 years after his attaining Enlightenment. Although the *Vinaya* and *Āgama* contain in them, to some extent, matters that refer to what took place after the Buddha's death, the

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1) A complete set of the Jap. trsl. of the *Pāli Tripiṭaka*. Done in the years 1935–41. 70 vols. Contains also works other than those of the *Tripiṭaka* itself (Tr.).

main part deals with the Buddha's days. So, these are the only materials by which we may know of the period. We are told that the best-selected 500 disciples met together soon after the Buddha's death and compiled the 'dhamma' (dharma, Skt.) and the 'vinaya'. Of these, the 'dhamma' is the Buddha's sermons, which is the *Āgamas* of later days; the 'vinaya' is what we now call the *Vinaya-piṭaka* (*ritsuzō*, Jap.).

As time went, it is possible that the contents of the 'dhamma' and 'vinaya' may have undergone changes and a hundred or more years at least must have elapsed before we get the structures and styles that we now have. But judged from the fact that the present vinaya and āgama that we now have generally possess like structures and styles and that the contents are fairly much the same, we may conclude that all these are from the same source and that, before the split into Abhidharmic schools, Buddhism as a whole had but a single kind of vinaya or āgama. Thus, the Buddhism stated in the vinaya and āgama of the days previous to the split that had unity is called 'Primitive Buddhism'.

But we have no original vinaya or āgama of the days previous to the split. Only by comparing the various vinayas and āgamas of all schools can we arrive at a common property. This may for the time being be called Primitive Buddhism. Even then, parts only, even of the texts of Abhidharma Buddhism itself, remain to this day: much is lost. So, the common property gained from the texts extant can never be the teaching of Śākyamuni Buddha himself. Even if the texts of Abhidharma Buddhism remained intact, what we get from them could, at most, be the things common to all schools just before the days of the split. And these were already as late as more than 100 years after the Buddda's death.

Were the Buddha's sermons directly set down in letters

by the Buddha himself or preserved in phonograph records, we might well regard these to be the Buddha's sermons themselves. But in those days the Buddha's sermons directly or indirectly heard were committed to memory and handed down, generation by generation, through recitation. It is, therefore, already doubtful if what were first memorized were the Buddha's sermons themselves. Especially when matters concern philosophical matters or doctrines, acceptation must divide by the intellectual abilities of the persons concerned. Even today, the case will be the same. For example, a famous person delivers a lecture on any theoretical or philosophical matter and its reproduction is done through the memory of the listener. What is possible is that even directly after the lecture, it cannot be the exact facsimile of what has been said.

So, what was memorized by the Buddha's disciples cannot exactly be what was said by the Buddha himself in whole. Hundreds of years had already passed since the day of the Buddha's death, and during this time memory had to be relied upon to hand things down. As the intellectual abilities of those transmitting things down became inferior, the contents of what were held in memory could have been less and less reliable. Thus, with what we have today, it is possible that fairly much of what the Buddha had truly said must have been lost.

One thing more. The *Vinayas* and the *Agongyō* possess defects as materials for the study of Primitive Buddhism, because these are but things handed down by a priestly Buddhism called 'Abhidharma Buddhism'. So, the vinayas (moral rules) themselves are only those for the priestly sangha. Even the *Āgama* (*Agongyō*, Jap.) itself is a collection of the sermons delivered for the most part to the world-fleeing specialists, though, needless to say, there are among them some

addressed to laymen. But the Buddha could not have particularly addressed such specialists as the world-fleeing ones only: rather, the lay, the greater mass, must have been the object of his preaching. Against this, almost 80–90% of the scriptures extant refer but to the world-fleeing class. This comes from the fact that since the latter days of Primitive Buddhism the central pivot of his teaching had shifted over to the life of the world-fleeing priestly class, especially in the days of Abhidharma Buddhism, that what was looked up to was the moral precepts and the learning and practice needed for those of the priestly sangha, and that the preaching in general for the populace was not of primary concern. That is why, try as we might to find out from the Buddha's words, few are the sūtras that could fit in well with the needs of the people in general. This so comes from the fact stated above. Herein lies the reason why we may well assume that there must be a good number of sermons which the Buddha must have actually delivered and which are now lost.

Unless we look into the texts of Primitive Buddhism with full consideration of the facts stated above, the possibility is strong that we misunderstand what the Buddha had truly said.

2. Abhidharma Buddhism

It is not clear when Abhidharma Buddhism took start. Roughly it was around the time of King Aśoka. Pāli Buddhism tells us that all schools had existed in Aśoka's days. This may or may not have been so. But from the fact that the schools differ in statements concerning the life of King Aśoka and since only Pāli Buddhism refers to the third synod that took place in Aśoka's days, whereas other schools say nothing about this, we may gather that already at the time of King Aśoka there

were already in existence some schools.

There are generally two references made in regard to the life of King Aśoka: one in the Pāli literature of the Theravāda school of the South, and the other that of the Sarvāstivāda of the North. The Southern tradition has it that King Aśoka was crowned 218 years after the death of the Buddha, whereas the Northern makes it that it took place over 100 years after. We see here a difference of some 100 years in the date between the South and the North. Facts are fairly divided between the two concerning the life of King Aśoka. Cases are in which what the Northern tradition says is attested by the Buddhist remains that we have today. But, generally, the Northern tradition concerns itself with the legendary stories, whereas that of the South refers to the dates of events that took place after the crowning of King Aśoka and contains much historical facts. As to the fact that King Aśoka sent out emissaries to all quarters, the statements in Aśoka epigrams and those in Pāli documents generally agree. In recent years the bones of one of the emissaries to whom allusion is made in Pāli documents, were found; the bones of one highest in position in Pāli Buddhism and one who was the teacher of King Aśoka too were found. All this speaks much for the historical value of what is handed down in the South. What is possible is that King Aśoka mainly believed in Pāli Buddhism. He first drove away the Sarvāstivādins of the Northern tradition to Northwest India. But he seems to have later shown goodwill to this school too. What is possible is that the South and the North each put on record the life events of King Aśoka from the angle that concerned them, so that the two became almost different things. The name of the highest priest (thera) differs between the two schools. This may mean that both did not know each other well.

Be this as it may, it is possible that the period when all the 18 or 20 schools[1] had finally emerged must be just before or after the Christian era.[2]

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1) By 20 is meant the two larger schools of the Mahāsaṁghika and the Theravāda and the 18 sub-schools which these two have. The category is totally Indian. This is what goes in the *Ibushūrinron* (*Samayabhedoparacana-cakra*, Skt.), handed down by the Northern Buddhists (Tr.).

2) Several documents exist in both the South and the North that→

But on what basis can we say that a school has been founded? This we can do by the fact of the completion of the *Tripiṭaka*, which consists of sūtras, vinayas, and abhidharmas. Of the three, the sūtra-piṭaka and the vinaya-piṭaka had roughly their prototypes in the days before the split, i.e. in the days of Primitive Buddhism. Only in those of Abhidharma Buddhism may additions or elisions have been caused, consciously or unconsciously, from the specific standpoint of each school.

Against this, in regard to the third *Adhidharama-piṭaka* (*ronzō*, Jap.), what we can say is that though the beginnings may have been seen in the days of Primitive Buddhism, it was in the days of Abhidharma Buddhism that the *Abhidharma-piṭaka* itself took a fixed literary form, independent of the sūtras and vinayas. Viewed thus from the standpoint of the three piṭakas, the characteristics of Abhidharma Buddhism lay rather in abhidharma itself than in sūtra or vinaya. No doubt, we detect in the doctrinal explanations of the sūtras and in the moral rules of the vinayas of Primitive Buddhism some abhidharmic characteristics, but we do not yet come across in them any such great discordances in respect to the doctrine as in the *Abhidharma-piṭaka*.

'Abhidharma' (abhidhamma, P.; abidatsuma, Jap.) is at times shown as 'taihō' in Jap., which means 'explanation' or 'commentary' 'against' ('abhi') the dharma which represents the Buddha's teaching. It is the business of abhidharma to comment upon the difficult terms one comes across in sūtras, to expound or explain some simple sūtras themselves, to col-

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(Cont. from p. 12, note)
allude to the split of the Buddha's teaching into Abhidharmic schools. But all put the first split as late as about 100 years after the Buddha's death, making the last as later than 300 or around 400 years. This will mean around the first century B.C. As to the schools other than the 20, the dates reported are even later than this.

lect fragmentary teachings found here and there in various sūtras, or to weave out a doctrinal system. This is 'abhidharma'.

This is necessary because the Buddha had delivered his sermons in relation to the ability of understanding of the person whom he addressed, considering always the situations or circumstances of place and time, and the amount needed for the person who came to him. So, each sermon differs by audience, time, and circumstance. That is why we come across in the sūtras almost nothing which refers to the doctrine as a whole, or any systematized philosophical expositions. Be this as it may, we find that already in the days of the Buddha, his intellectual disciples had explained some of the sermons or recast or wove them into systems. Such explanations, comments, and organizations were called 'abhidharma'.

Therefore, the abhidharmic method of discussion and study was already fairly much in a developed state in the days of the Buddha and throughout the days of Primitive Buddhism. That is why we come across a good amount of abhidharmic sūtras in the *Sūtra-piṭaka* (kyōzō, Jap.). The fact that, especially in the *Sūtra-piṭaka* of Pāli Buddhism, we meet with sūtras that could well be classed under the head of *Abhidharma-piṭaka* can be thus explained.

The '*Niddesa*' (*gishaku*, Jap.) and the '*Paṭisambhidā-magga*' (*mugegedō*, Jap.) in the Pāli *Khuddaka-nikāya* (*shōbukyō*, Jap.) are those that sat essentially between the two of 'sutta' (sūtra) and 'abhidhamma'. The definitions and explanations of the technical terms contained in them are quite the same as those in abhidharmic works. Further, in the *Jōagon*[1] and the *Chūagon*,[2] we come across things that show abhidharmic inclinations. That is why we have the *Shūimonron*,[3] a work that had grown up from the *Jōagonshushūkyō*.[4]

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1) Almost the facsimile of the *Dīgha-nikāya* in P. (Tr.).
2) Almost the facsimile of the *Majjhima-nikāya* in P. (Tr.). →

But as this tendency became more specialized, the way of explanation became totally different from what the sūtras were meant to have. The result was that it could now no more hold its place in the sūtra-piṭaka and had to separate itself into a different literary form under the head 'abhidharma'. It seems that this kind of literary form came to be established roughly around the beginning of the split into Abhidharmic schools.

As schools became independent, the abhidharmic system showed greater evolution, and within the following 2–300 years *Abhidharma* literature became complete. The one extant in Pāli Buddhism and that of the Sarvāstivāda school are made up of seven literary documents, showing development in the three periods of: 1) the early, 2) the middle, and 3) the last.

The *Abhidharmas* extant of all schools are: 1) the seven in Pāli, 2) the seven in Chinese translations of the Sarvāstivādins, and 3) the

Seven *Abhidharmas* in Pāli		Seven *Abhidharmas* of the Sarvāstivādins
1) *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (*Hōjūron*)	......early period.........	1) *Shūimonsokuron* (*Saṅgītiparyāya*)
2) *Vibhaṅga* (*Funbetsuron*)		2) *Hōunsokuron* (*Dharmaskandha*)
3) *Puggala-paññatti* (*Ninsesetsuron*)		3) *Sesetsusokuron* (*Prajñapti*)
4) *Kathā-vatthu* (*Ronji*)	......middle period......	4) *Shikishinsokuron* (*Vijñakāya*)
5) *Dhātu-kathā* (*Kaisetsuron*)		5) *Kaishinsokuron* (*Dhātukāya*)
6) *Yamaka* (*Sōron*)	......last period	6) *Honruisokuron* (*Prakaraṇa*)
7) *Paṭṭhāna* (*Hosshuron*)		7) *Hocchiron* (*Jñānaprasthāna*)

(Cont. from p. 14, note)
3) *Saṅgītiparyāya;* lacks the text in Skt. and Tib. The Chin. trsl. by Hsüan-chuang only remains to this day. →BKD, I, p. 31 (Tr.).
4) *Saṅgīti-sūtra;* also called *Shushūkyō.* MBD, I, p. 54 (Tr.).

Sharibotsuabidonron (*Śāriputrābhidharma*) in Chinese, the school of which is possibly Dharmaguptaka. This last is a single work, almost comparable to the seven works of other schools, but is mainly an abhidharmic work of the early and the middle period. The seven *Abhidharmas* in Pāli and Chinese are as follows: (→p. 15, table)

Of the above, the set of the seven *Abhidharmas* in Pāli is a complete work, the Japanese translation of which is the *Nandendaizōkyō*.* The fourth *Kathā-vatthu* (*ronji*, Jap) deals with the 217 departing doctrinal views of other schools. The greater part of the seven *Abhidharmas* of the Sarvāstivādins are in Chinese translations, some of which having the parts translated twice or more than twice. Of these, the third *Sesetsusokuron* in Chinese is an incomplete work. But there is a complete rendering in Tibetan. In Tibetan, this *Sesetsusokuron* (*Prajñapti*) only is translated.

And it seems that it was around the beginning of the Christian era that the last *Abhidharma* literature became established. With this we see the completion of the *Tripiṭaka*. This means also the completion of the Abhidharma schools.

Of the *Abhidharma* literature in the three stages of development, the first of it was the one which was established close after the split into schools. As this abhidharmic system of discussion and study existed before the days of the split, it contains much of what is common to all schools.[1] But as

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1) The *Vibhaṅga* (*Funbetsuron*) in P., the *Hōunsokuron* of the Sarvāstivādins, and the *Sharibotsuabidonron* contain things that refer to the same subjects; the *Puggala-paññatti* (*Ninsesetsuron*) in Pāli and the *Sharibotsuabidonron* too show the same trend. Regarding this point, see Benkyō Shiio: *The Completion of the Hōunsokuron* (*Hōunsokuron-no Seiritsu*, the *Shūkyōkai*, X,6,8); Taiken Kimura: *A Study of Abhidharma Literature* (*Abhidatsumaronsho-no-Kenkyū*, pp. 67 ff.).

Further, among the scholars of the West, there were those who had suggested that the seven *Abhidharmas* in Pāli and the seven of the Sarvāstivādins must be of the same category because the names are extremely similar. But this proposition was sheer guesswork, the author himself not having actually looked into the Chin. trsls. To correct this wrong view, the late Dr. Junjirō Takakusu wrote about the seven *Abhidharmas* of the Sarvāstivādins in a journal published in the West. (J. Takakusu: *Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins*, JPTS, 1905).

schools became separated, with mutual intercourse having been severed, we see here departure in the method of abhidharmic discussions and in the themes of study. In this way we come down from the mid-period *Abhidharmas* to those of the last period and see the gap between the schools becoming more and more apparent and the *Abhidharmas* finally breaking up into things totally different.

We are told that the split had originated from exegetic differences regarding moral rules or heresies referring to the doctrine.[1] Whatever the case, as Buddhism spread to wider regions and as the local sanghas had lost contact with each other, it was natural that, as time went, the moral stipulations and the doctrinal acceptations began to differ. Especially as moral rules concern the daily life of the sangha, necessary adaptations had to be resorted to, so as to fit in better with the climatic conditions and the difference in habits and customs. Here arose an unavoidable reason for changes to appear by schools regarding moral rules. Further, even in the doctrine, variations could emerge as a result from the differences in intelligence and understanding of the believers and by the level of local culture.

Thus, as Buddhism spread to all regions of India, changes resulted gradually in the moral rules and understanding of the doctrine. Further, as *Abhidharmic* literature grew up in each school, the characteristics of each school became more

1) The second synod that was called 100 years after the Buddha's death had to do with the 10 items of moral rules that were differently understood. It is thought that with this the split had come about, ending in the total separation of the Theravāda and the Mahāsaṁghika. It is so accepted in the South. But the tradition of the Sarvāstivādins of the North tells us that the split resulted from the Five Things (goji,* Jap.) said by Mahādeva (Daiten, Jap.), which were the heterodoxies regarding doctrinal items.

and more conspicuous, calling forth thus 18 or 20 schools.

Looking back to the areas where Buddhism flourished, we can say that the place where the Buddha was most active was the mid part of the river Ganges which was away from the centre of orthodox Brahmanism and where the newly-risen non-orthodox schools had flourished. It is possible that the Buddha's footsteps extended even somewhat to the upper tributaries of the Ganges and to the land between the Ganges and its tributary Jumnā (Yamunā, Skt.), the so-called 'Madhyadeśa', the Middle Country. But here the influence does not seem to have left acutely its mark. On the other hand, not a few of the Buddha's disciples were from the far Northwest, West, and South India. Especially such disciples of his as Kaccāyana (Kātyāyana, Skt.) and Puṇṇa (Pūrṇa, Skt), whose homes were in Avanti (Avantī, Skt.),[1] West India, and in the coastal place of Aparanta (Aparānta, Skt.), went back to their native places and converted the kings, ministers, and the people of the places. Therefore, Buddhism had spread, it would seem, fairly far to West India even in the days of the Buddha. This part was, so to say, an unbroken land, where there was no trace of either orthodox Brahmanic or non-Brahmanic thoughts. So, Buddhism could easily be disseminated.

In the days close after the Buddha's death, Buddhism for some time held a status quo and no further advance seems to have been made, because most of the Buddha's great disciples too must have been dead. In the mid-Gangetic region, other non-orthodox teachings were flourishing and ortho-

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1) The ancient name of the modern town of Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh, India (Tr.).
2) There are two Pūrṇas. This Pūrṇa is one known for oratory (Tr.).

dox Brahmanic teaching too had gradually stepped in. Because of this, Buddhism in that locality could not possibly enjoy a heyday as in the days of the Buddha. Instead, to the coastal regions of East India, Buddhism spread much more extensively than in the days when the Buddha was alive.

Compared with this, the Buddhism of West India had flourished and in the days following the 100 years after the Buddha's death, West India was the centre of Buddhism. This we see in the second synod which met with the object of compiling vinayas and sūtras. The elders holding important posts were those of the sanghas of Central and Western India and older Buddhist remains are also found mainly in Central India or even more in West India.

3. Geographical Boundary of Buddhism

For a religion to gain a foothold in any place, it must have an economic base. Unless a religion possesses a productive means of its own, it has to depend upon others who both produce and support. And how did Buddhism have its economic base?

Now, India is a country where it was a time-old custom for the faithful to support the economic life of the world-fleeing. Since of old, orthodox Brahmanism had a system of life called 'āśrama', which divided man's life into four periods. The first was that of a brahmacārin, the student. During this period, he lived in the teacher's home and studied the *Vedas* and others. The second period was that of a gṛhastha, the householder, which followed that of the student and in which one lived in one's own home, carrying on a married and productive life. The third was that of a vānaprastha, the anchorite, in which one abandoned home, lived in the forest, and pursued there a religious

and philosophic life. When the end was attained, one entered the fourth period, that of a saṁnyāsin, a life of wandering. Now old, one wandered homeless, never staying in one place, and supporting oneself only on alms. This was the life of a bhikṣu (biku, Jap.), one who lived on alms. He is the so-called 'kosshi' (Jap.), 'one who begs alms'. When later the 'śramaṇa' (samaṇa, P.; shamon, Jap.) form of life made its beginnings as that of a non-orthodox Way-goer, this śramaṇa adapted himself to the time-old Brahmanic custom of a life of wandering and became a bhikṣu.

Orthodox or non-orthodox, one whose study and practice of the Way were fully accomplished and who had a personal virtue not possessed by commoners, he was economically supported by the people. The custom seems to have existed since the day when the system of the four periods of life of a Brahmin began. There was current at the time, based on the karmic theory, a general belief that one who had offered food and clothing to one possessing great personal virtue would in turn be blessed with merit and gain birth in the heavens in the life to come, enjoying there a happy life. And if the one who had received the offering was the more virtuous, it was thought that the merit of offering would be the greater to the one who did the offering.

The *Shijūnishōgyō*[1)] refers to this as follows: 'The merit is greater as one does offering to a good man than to 100 common people. It is better to do offering to one who observes the pañca-śīlas than to 1,000 good men. The merit is greater as one does an offering to a srotāpanna, the lowest in the grade of the Buddhist sages, than to 10,000 of those who observe the

1) 1 vol. Said to be the first Buddhist sūtra brought to China. The general essence of the Buddha's teachings stated in 42 chapters (Tr.).

pañca-śīlas. It is better to do offering to a sakṛdāgāmin than to 1,000,000 srotāpannas. It is better to do offering to an anāgāmin than to 10,000,000 sakṛdāgāmins. It is better to do offering to an arhat, the highest of the sages among the disciples of the Buddha, than to 100,000,000 anāgāmins. It is better to do offering to a pratyekabuddha than to 1,000,000,000 arhats. The merit is greater if one does offering to the Right-Enlightened Buddha than to 10,000,000,000 pratyekabuddhas'. What has been said here may sound like an overstatement. But this kind of thought was possibly current in the India of those days.

In Buddhism, one most holy is called 'arhat' (Skt.) or 'arahan' (P.), which means 'one who is entitled to', 'one who is worth an offering being done'. He is 'one entitled to an offering being done by the faithful'. The word 'puñña-khetta' (P.; fukuden, Jap.) sometimes stands for 'arhat'. An arhat by receiving offerings from the faithful can be a kind of field which brings wealth to the faithful. If this field of wealth is given the fertilizer of clothing and food, one could expect a beautiful merit for it. So, if one who received the offering was greater in personal virtue, so much the better is he as a 'field of weal'. The receiving brings merit to one who does the offering. So, one who receives need not thank for the offering being done; instead, such a one bestows on the giver a merit or favour. Such an idea prevailed at the time. This custom is to be found in the South even today because of the thought of puñña-khetta carried down since of old, a custom that cannot easily gain ground in any other land. Here thus lies a basic difference between the economic life of the Buddhists of Japan and China and that of India and the South.

Besides, in the South, life is frugal and the question of food

is no problem. Added to this, cooked food has to be eaten the same day because of the heat. As food cannot be kept long, it can easily be given. This may also have been the reason why the custom to offer food has gained ground in the South. Here too, we see the difference between the Buddhist teachings of Japan and the South. Primitive and Abhidharma Buddhism could have sustained life under such an environment.

Under this economic structure, the Buddhist sangha exists in a dual form, made up of the priestly and the lay class. The priestly sangha carries on a serious life, observing rigid moral rules, by which they receive the greatest respect of the lay. But did there exist anything like the brotherhood of the lay? In regions of the South such as Ceylon, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, where Pāli Buddhism prevails, where the greater majority are Buddhists, and where the faithful give offerings to the extent they can, as a matter of form, the relation between the priestly and the lay goes on smoothly and idealistically. But was this so in the days of the Buddha or Primitive Buddhism?

Even in the days of the Buddha, Buddhism, as stated already, did not pervade the Middle Country (Madhyadeśa, Skt.), the home of the orthodox Brahman teaching. In this region, offerings may have been made to Brahman Way-seekers. But it is doubtful if respect was paid to non-Brahman śramaṇas. Against this, in the eastern newer regions where śramaṇas were active, the Brahmanic custom may not have been so widely prevailing as we might expect. It is possible that offerings were made to any possessing a high personal virtue, irrespective of śramaṇas or Brahmins. What we know is that the Buddha, in the days when he was yet a Way-seeker, had been carrying on in Magadha a life of alms-begging. Perhaps, in those days, any seeker of truth was given food just as a

matter of custom, with no consideration whether he belonged to any particular sect. So, it is doubtful whether a Buddhist lay group existed to support the sangha even in the days when Buddhist activities had already taken start. Needless to say, there were instances in which many a zealous faithful had openly claimed that they were Buddhists and thus had economically supported a good number of Buddhist bhikṣus. By the custom of the day, the world-fleeing group stayed in a single place during the three months of the rainy season. This made it necessary for them to receive food from some definite followers of the faith. Thus, for a priestly sangha to exist, it had to be backed economically by lay followers. It is not clear, however, if the lay were those of a single religion. Perhaps any one possessing a high personal virtue was supported, no matter to what sect he belonged.

There were many Brahmins and kings who became Buddhists after listening to the Buddha's sermons. But did those Brahmins and kings abandon their former faiths to believe but in the Buddhist teaching and live the way of a Buddhist, forsaking such Brahmanic customs as worshipping and praying to gods?

Regarding this point, we may say that things fairly dubious must have been going on. Buddhism did not implicitly require the lay followers to be Buddhists in every phase of life. The conditions for the lay were: to take refuge in the Three Treasures of the Buddha, the teaching (dharma), and the sangha; and to observe the 'five prohibitions' (pañca-śīlāni, Skt.; pañca-sīlāni, P.) against: 1) killing (prāṇātipāta, Skt.; sesshō, Jap.), 2) stealing (adattādāna, Skt.; chūtō, Jap.), 3) adultery (kāmamithyācāra, Skt.; jain, Jap.), 4) telling lies (mṛṣāvāda, Skt.; mōgo, Jap.), and 5) intoxicating drinks (surā-maireya-madya-pāna, Skt.; onju, Jap.). Even

for acting against the five prohibitions, no punishment was meted out, nor was one excommunicated. It is doubtful if the five prohibitions were strictly observed by the followers of the faith.

For zealous Buddhists, it was considered as more desirable, other than the Three Treasures and the five prohibitions, to observe the poṣadha[1] (BSkt.; fusatsu, Jap.) day, the day of purification that fell six times a month, and to be in accord with the 'eight prohibitions' (aṣṭāṅgasamanvāgatopavāsa, Skt.; hassaikai, Jap.)[2] and live, like the world-fleeing, a severe and pure religious life and attend the sermons of the priestly sangha. This was somewhat like the Sabbath of the Christians.

But though one might strictly observe such moral precepts, one was not barred from observing the Brahmanic morals or other customs of the Indian society at large if these did not go against the Buddhist moral precepts. In this sense, the conditions placed on the lay followers were fairly lenient. Emphasis was laid more on the spirit than the formality. In this respect, Buddhism differed from the contemporary teaching of Jainism which required the lay followers to observe the 'Twelve Dharmas' (jūnihō, Jap.), made up of the 'Five Small Vows' (goshōsei, Jap.), the 'Three Complementary Vows' (sanhosei, Jap.), and the 'Four Vows for Learning' (shigakusei, Jap.), binding much their profession and daily life; also it differed from the Brahmanic teaching which fixed minute rules on routine duties of the lay such as the rite of worship, the mode of prayer, and other ways of life. This was perhaps why Buddhism was accepted by all and why it easily spread to all

1) Also 'upavasatha' (Skt.), 'upoṣadha' (BSkt.).
2) 1) not to kill, 2) not to steal, 3) not to do sexual intercourse, 4) not to tell lies, 5) not to take intoxicating drinks, 6) not to wear beautiful clothes, etc., 7) not to sleep on a raised bed, and 8) not to take meal after noon.

places. And this was why Buddhism, living within the sphere of the Brahmanic world where strict caste and other stipulations of social life existed, could not establish an unshakable ground of its own.

As an instance, we may quote the case of the Buddhists of Sāvatthī (Śrāvastī, Skt.; shaejō, Jap.), the capital of Kosala (Kośala, Kosala, Skt.). It was one of the biggest towns or the biggest of India in the days of the Buddha. Anāthapiṇḍika (Anāthapiṇḍada, Skt.; kyūkodoku, Jap.),[1] or Sudatta,[2] the rich and virtuous of the city, first took refuge in the Buddha's teaching. He built the Jetavana monastery in the outskirts of the town and invited the Buddha and his sangha there, and requested the Buddha to deliver sermons to the people of the town. Thus, gradually the number of Buddhists grew. Beginning with King Pasenadi (Prasenajit, Skt.; hashinokuō, Jap.) and his queen, the ministers, the rich, and even ordinary people became Buddhists. A female called Visākhā-Migāramātā built in the town the Migāramātā Hall and made it serve as the abode of the sangha. Thus, half of the people of this great town, it was said, became either Buddhists or had friendly feelings towards the Buddhist teaching. It seems that in those days there were few cities in India other than Sāvatthī which had such large numbers of Buddhists and had the financial means to offer food to thousands or even many more thousand members of the sangha during the three months of the rainy season.

Thus, if we look into the records referring to the places where the vārṣika took place in the rainy season during the forty-five years of the Buddha's life after his attaining enlighten-

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1) Sudatta was so called because of his meritorious acts to the 'lonely' (orphans, etc.) and the 'aged' persons.
2) The personal name of (Anāthapiṇḍada).

ment, we see that the last twenty-five years of the Buddha's life were almost all spent at Sāvatthī. This shows how zealous and how numerous the Buddhists of Sāvatthī must have been.

Whatever the case, in the last years of the Buddha, such important supporters of his as Anāthapiṇḍika and Visākhā must already have been dead. Besides, a new king Vidūdabha did not show much goodwill towards the Buddhist teaching. He even attacked the kingdom of the Śākyas. And Viḍūḍabha himself too died soon after because of an unexpected calamity that befell him. It is possible that the capital Sāvatthī too was later thrown into disorder. Perhaps by this, love for the Buddhist teaching too must have waned all at once.

When the Buddha died at Kusinārā (Kuśinagara, Skt.), a place not far from Sāvatthī, Mahākassapa (Mahākāśyapa, Skt.) executed the Buddha's funeral service. At the time, the zealous followers of the faith came from all places and divided the Buddha's bones into eight parts. They built a stūpa at each place and worshipped it. But Sāvatthī was not one of them. What we can gather from this is that in Sāvatthī there were no zealous followers of the Buddha's teaching at the time. Later, Mahākassapa picked out the 500 best arhats, to compile the Buddhist treasures of 'dharma' and 'vinaya'. And as the place of synod, he did not name Sāvatthī, which was, up till some two or three years before, one of the great centres of the Buddhist teaching; instead, he chose Rājagaha (Rājagṛha, Skt.), the capital of Magadha, which stood far out to the south. Why? Was it not that in Sāvatthī there were then not enough of the followers of the faith who could offer food to 500 arhats during the three months of the rainy season? Only Ānanda seems to have had some followers of his at Sāvatthī. So, he called at the place before taking part in the synod that met at Rājagaha. As to the activity in Sāvatthī, Buddhist literature totally keeps silence

other than to state that there were goings and comings of some bhikṣus and faithful in connection with some memorial works in the Jetavana vihāra. Or the town itself may have been, soon after, attacked by Ajātaśatru, king of Magadha, and razed to the earth.

Be this as it may, why do we so suddenly see no followers of the Buddhist teaching in Sāvatthī which had so many up till the last years of the Buddha? Possibly because the Buddhist teaching did not penetrate into the life core of the faithful. What influence there was was that of the Buddha's great personality; people but took refuge in him spiritually. And the Buddha never intended to replace the old Brahmanic teaching with his own or cause a change in the social life of the people so that birth, marriage, funerals, etc. should accord with Buddhistic ideals. Such temporal affairs were left to the customs of the day. This may be one of the chief reasons why the Buddhism of Sāvatthī all so suddenly died.

Thus, Buddhism did not build itself up as a solid religion of a community; it did not organize the lay into a Buddhistic system. Especially, since around the fourth century when the Gupta dynasty widely adopted the custom of orthodox Brahmanism as a social institution of the Indian public in general, Buddhism gradually lost its faithful and there was now almost no lay brotherhood. All this is very probable. In the days of Primitive and Abhidharma Buddhism and in those of Early Mahāyāna, there was no such thorough Brahmanic social organization of the Indian public, and Buddhism, of all the Indian religions, held the strongest position. This tells that the Indian populace was showing much goodwill towards Buddhism. From this standpoint, some scholars call the India previous to the days of the Gupta dynasty, a period of 7–800 years, 'Buddhist India'. And this is roughly true.

Be this as it may, as Buddhism did not care about the social system and the habits and customs of religious rites and prayers which formed the time-old fundamental basis of the life of the Indian populace, it could not mould out what was Buddhistic, particularly in the everyday phase of life of the populace. So, the basic ground of the populace remained just as it had existed since of old. Thus, Buddhism formed, so to say, only the superficial strata of Indian life, with but a shallow bottom. Viewed thus, ‘ Buddhist India ’ was but a misnomer. The chief reason why Buddhism could not lay a hold on Indian soil seems to lie here.

Especially as Mahāyāna Buddhism, as its ideal, did not make any distinction between the lay and the priestly and did not possess, like Primitive and Abhidharma Buddhism, the dual church system, this seems to have weakened the foothold from where to disseminate the doctrine and acquire the economic base of its own to stand upon. With Buddhism it was its own original standpoint to separate out the priestly from the lay. The duty of the priestly sangha was to uphold Buddhism in its religious, doctrinal, and propagandizing phases and that of the lay was to support the priestly sangha economically. Both functioning healthily, Buddhism could fare well. But Mahāyāna Buddhism negated and threw into discorder these two functions and thus, however high its ideals, embosomed within itself a flaw, so that it failed to serve as a religion of the community. It was Abhidharma Buddhism that had enjoyed the support of the populace to the end. And we see that the Buddhism of the South still flourishes greatly, which is none but Abhidharma Buddhism which has the dual system of the sangha.

4. Mahāyāna Buddhism of the Early and the Middle Period

It is not quite clear when Mahāyāna Buddhism took start. But there must have been good reason for it to emerge. It was a movement of revivalism. The object was to rectify the shortcomings of Abhidharma Buddhism and to save it from degeneration.

As stated already, Abhidharma Buddhism is none but Primitive Buddhism ossified in formalism. Primitive Buddhism was not as yet quite in a fixed state. But since the latter days and those of Abhidharma Buddhism, Buddhism became rigidly fixed in form. The priestly sangha had to observe the vinaya rules to the minutest details. But a split began in Abhidharma Buddhism, to divide into the two groups of rigid conservatives and somewhat lenient reformists. One of the reasons why Abhidharma Buddhism broke up lay in the fact that people had departed in view regarding the vinaya rules. The reformist Mahāsaṁghika valued spirit more than formalism and stood against the formalism and priestcraft of the conservative Theravāda and took a lenient view of life. Whereas the conservatives stuck literally to the scriptures and tried to understand the doctrine as given in letters, the reformists meant to read between the lines. So, the two attitudes of 'emon-gegi' (Jap.) and 'egi-gemon' (Jap.) arose. The former is 'to understand signification through letters' and the latter 'to understand letters through signification'. The conservatives were in the former category, while the reformists in the latter.

As the scriptures that we now have are those handed down by Abhidharma Buddhism, they are concerned mostly with the

priestly sangha and very few of them with the life of the lay followers. And the greatest characteristics of Abhidharma Buddhism lay here. It was thought that as long as the priestly sangha was strong and healthy, Buddhism would continue to exist. Such a thought may have existed partly since the days of Primitive Buddhism. But with Abhidharma Buddhism, this trend became more pronounced and this is what we still see in the Buddhism of the South.

To have things fixed, what was needed was to make vinaya rules and the doctrine popular and practicable for priests in general. In the days of Śākyamuni Buddha when many were superb in intellect and life's experience and when many were perfect sages, no detailed rules of life were needed; the system of the doctrine too could be high in grade. But such a teaching high in grade could but answer the purpose of the limited few of the superb; the greater mass needed the details of the vinaya rules, and popular had to be the teaching. To have things thus detailed and set in a popular way was safe for Buddhism. And from about the last part of the days of Primitive Buddhism, whatever high in grade gradually lost ground. In vinaya and doctrine, popularization and lowering of the grade went apace. It was Abhidharma Buddhism that had thus got unified and organized.

As thus the higher standards of the doctrine lost ground, inconveniences and dissatisfactions began to be felt by those who had higher ideals. What was lacking was the true and deep spirit of Śākyamuni Buddha. For example, the right comprehension of 'anātman' (muga, Jap.) and 'śūnyatā' (kū, Jap.), the basic ground of Buddhist doctrine, could hardly be arrived at from the scriptures of Primitive Buddhism that we now have, which are none but things handed down by the various schools of Abhidharma Buddhism. So long as 'anātman' is

superficially shown as 'no-self',* what could come about is its lower phase only. The same could be said about 'pratītya-samutpāda'.*

The highest ideal of Abhidharma Buddhism was to extricate one's own self from the bondage of karma and transmigration through the Three Worlds (trayo dhātavaḥ, Skt.; sangai, Jap.)[1] and to attain the eternal amṛta* of nirvāṇa. This is but a selfish attitude to shun and fear sorrow; it is none but the self heteronomously ruled over, the self which only cares about the law of causality. Needless to say, the starting point of religion is to extricate one's own self from sorrow and attain happiness and peace. So, nothing is wrong. Religiously this must be so. But from the ultimate end of Buddhist thought, one must go a step further, forget one's own sorrow and happiness, and guide and save those around one who are lost in sorrow. To save others, one must be ready to walk into sorrow. One must forget one's own safety or danger, sorrow or happiness. We say 'selfless love' or 'to practise all-void'. The scriptures of Primitive Buddhism do not necessarily lack such a thought, but very rare are the cases in which this is talked about.

The 'four limitless minds' (catur-apramāṇa, Skt.; shimuryō-shin, Jap.) of: 1) 'positive love' (maitrī-a., Skt.; ji, Jap.), 2) 'sympathy with others' sorrows' (karuṇā-a., Skt.; hi, Jap.), 3) 'sharing joy with others' (muditā-a., Skt.; ki, Jap.), and 4) 'abandoning of all attachments and always abiding in a mind of equanimity' (upekṣā-a., Skt.; sha, Jap.) stated in the texts of Primitive Buddhism urge one to act towards all humans and brute creations alike with a mind of compassion and protection. Also, the 'four embracings' (catur-saṁgraha-vastu, Skt.; shishōji, Jap.) of: 1) 'giving' (dāna-saṁgraha-vastu, Skt.; fuse, Jap.), 2) 'loving words' (priyavādita-s., Skt.; aigo, Jap.) 3) 'help to others' (arthacaryā-s. Skt.; rigyō, Jap.), and 4) 'sharing fate with others' (samānārthatā-s., Skt.; dōji, Jap.) also tell one to save equally all those who exist

1) Chap. II, 7 (Tr.).

around one, physically, spiritually, in speech and actions, so that all stand on equal ground. There are some other similar references given in the texts of Primitive Buddhism. But, generally, the texts of Primitive Buddhism refer but to the practice and perfection of one's own personal self. This is no doubt so, for if one becomes perfect, one untold can guide and save others.

It is not that Abhidharma Buddhism does not take up the question of saving others. The priestly sangha teach the lay the Law (Dharma); and the lay pay back the priestly sangha in kind. So, the world goes in peace and the religious mission of Abhidharma Buddhism is fully attained. Especially, in Primitive and Abhidharma Buddhism an arhat is the sage of the highest grade, one worthy of receiving 'offerings'[1] from the faithful, and is thus a 'field of weal'. By receiving, he gives joy and the fruition of merit to the faithful. So he guides and saves the faithful by receiving dāna[2] and offerings. In this way Abhidharma Buddhism too aims at saving the world at large.

Even at that, the main idea of practice of Abhidharma Buddhism lies rather in the perfection of one's own person. Actually the 'Noble Eightfold Path' (āryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga, Skt.; hasshōdō, Jap.), the most representative of the religious practices done since the days of Primitive Buddhism, tells one only what is needed for the perfection of one's own self and not a single reference is made to the salvation of the world at large. And as Abhidharma Buddhism became more fixed and formal, what resulted was a flaw in the whole teaching. This tendency became all too conspicuous.

The idealists who were vexed at the low key and sluggishness of Abhidharma Buddhism and whose hearts were aflame with a drive for change looked for the positive salvation of

1) 'Pūjanā' in Skt. Any religious offering done to the Buddha, the Dharma, the Sangha, etc. (Tr.).
2) 'Giving' in the Buddhist sense of the term (Tr.).

the world at large. To attain this end, they not only did not rely upon the Noble Eightfold Path, the traditional way of practice, but decided to take up the practice of 'ṣaṭ-pāramitā' (Skt.; rokuharamitsu, Jap.), the superb 'sixfold way of practice', the one practised by Śākyamuni Buddha in his former lives as a bodhisattva. This system of practice contains in it such items as 'giving' (dāna, Skt.; fuse, Jap.), and 'forbearance' (kṣānti, Skt.; ninniku, Jap.), the items not included in the Noble Eightfold Path, but those most needed in guiding and saving the world. In Old Buddhism which had existed since the days of Primitive Buddhism, the giving, especially the giving of money and in kind, was what the lay followers were to do. The priest was not told to do this. This is to say that giving was an act of good for the ordinary people. It was not an act of good which was the highest and the absolute, but one relative and low in grade. This was how things were. But with the reformist, giving was for both the lay and the priestly the first condition as a Buddhist. Besides, this was not necessarily a thing of relative value. When done as a practice of 'selflessness' (muga, Jap.), it was the highest and the absolute good.[1] In an actual communal life of selflessness, the Buddhist ideal could be put to practice only through this act of giving. So was it thought. Right wisdom too was embed-

1) The reason why 'selflessness' and 'all-void' (śūnyatā) are severally talked about comes from the fact that all is to make the actual life selfless and all-void. So the final principle of Buddhism lies, not in dhyāna or wisdom, but in the actual practice of giving (dāna), etc. What is needed is that selflessness is being put to practice. In giving or charity, we say 'giving in the emptiness of the three phases of self' ('sanrin-kūjaku-no-fuse', Jap.). In this, the giver does not think he (giver) has given, to whom (receiver) he has given, things (gifts) of what value he has given; only sympathy and kindness urge one to give, making one totally forget one's own self. This is a giving in the emptiness of self, the highest of good.

ded in this selflessness. Even without the wisdom of the highest grade, when giving was done as an act of selflessness, the aim of the Buddhist ideal could be attained.

This was the ideal of pāramitā, which differed from the Noble Eightfold Path of Old Buddhism. No distinction was seen here between the lay and the priestly. Anybody could at once practise selflessness, the way of a bodhisattva that aims at the personal perfection of man. Viewed thus, Old Buddhism which aimed at abandoning the worldly life and attaining arhatship was attacked. So, the practice of this Bodhisattva Way was not one particularly instituted for the world-fleeing priestly group, but an act of good which could be practised by any faring in the world and carrying on professions, if only one had the will and the effort, just as Śākyamuni Buddha who had lived as a lay in his previous lives and did many an act of good of pāramitā.

Thus, the reformist group of Abhidharma Buddhism, not satisfied with what Abhidharma Buddhism taught, put forth a new movement of thought. This was, not to bind one with the formalities of vinaya, not to distinguish the priestly from the lay, but, instead of the formal and flat doctrine, to stand on a higher ground of the first principle and to forsake the bondage of heteronomous thought of the karmic theory in which one tries to extricate one's own self from sorrow and seek happiness. It was to practise selflessness that stands beyond sorrow and happiness. It was no practice of the Way for the perfection of the personality of an individual, but rather one that aimed at saving and guiding the world at large. This was the aim of of the reformist movement, which was to save Buddhism from deterioration and stagnation; this was to carry things back to the original state of Buddhism and let shine the true quality of Buddhism as a religion.

This movement of Mahāyāna Buddhism called in a fairly good number of adherents who shared the ideal. Even among the conservatives there were many such adherents. And within a very short period the thought spread to various parts of India. So would it seem. And apart from the tripiṭakas of Abhidharma Buddhism, many Mahāyāna sūtras began to be compiled, which contained the new ideals of Mahāyāna Buddhism. The words in these sūtras are all ascribed to the direct sermons of the Buddha. But even the earliest were works as late or later than 4–500 years after the Buddha's death. We cannot know today who actually brought forth these sūtras. What is possible is that the writers never purposely forged sūtras under the Buddha's name. Attained the true spirit of the Buddhist teaching and convinced they were on the right track, they wrote these out. Thus we have the Mahāyāna sūtras of the early period.

Serveral disputes and refutations seem to have taken place between the thoughts new and old. This can fully be guessed at through the documents that contain the different acceptations of all schools and from what are said in Mahāyāna sūtras. But because of this, the two Buddhisms of old and new could each look back and reform. On one hand, the teachings other than Buddhism gradually began to raise heads. This made the Buddhists stand up in one body. But there were no such bloody fights, as among Christians and others, among the sects. Instead of quarrelling, this made them work together and seek advancement.

When once Mahāyāna Buddhism became established,[1] there came about a tendency to organize philosophically what it wanted to advocate. This took place after A.D. 300. In the

1) It was not that but one single platform was put foreward; though one in spirit, some variances seem to have existed in parts.

Early Mahāyāna which preceded this date, the religious practice of selflessness was the centre of thought; stress was not much laid upon theorizing. In the latter part of Early Mahāyāna, such masters as Nāgārjuna (ryūju, Jap.) and Āryadeva (daiba, Jap.) appeared and they synthesized all these Mahāyāna thoughts. But the object was no mere synthesizing as theories or philosophies, but to explain theories within the boundary of Buddhist doctrine, to make things serve for the practice of the Way. Nothing went as in Abhidharma Buddhism that went before or in Mayāyāna philosophies, in which theorizing was the end. The situation was as in the days of Śākyamuni Buddha, who, if needed, gave theoretical sermons for practising the Way, but rejected sheer discussion.

Against this, the Mahāyāna Buddhism of the middle period began to show more interest in philosophic principles. Viewed from the historical standpoint of Indian philosophy, it was the days of the so-called 'Six Schools of Philosophy' (roppatetsugaku, Jap.),* in which philosophic thoughts competitingly arose. So, Buddhism too may have had to vie for superiority and to organize minor philosophic thoughts into systems. We see this tendency not only in Mahāyāna, but also in Abhidharma Buddhism, the so-called Hīnayāna. Thus, the Buddhism of this period cared most about philosophical theories. We call the Buddhism of this period 'Scholastic Buddhism', whose business it was to claim the superiority of each school. The four schools of the Mādhyamika* (chūganha, Jap.) and the Yogācāra (yugagyōha, Jap.) of Mahāyāna, and the Vaibhāṣika (bibashashi, Jap.) and the Sautrāntika (kyōbushi, Jap.) of Hīnayāna were most known. They were regarded until later periods to represent the Buddhist teaching, even by the teachings other than Buddhism.

In this period, even the Mahāyāna sūtras of the middle

period, which arose around this time, did not dwell upon faith and practice where only rested the true object of the sūtras, but dealt more with philosophic principles. Outwardly they were sūtras, but in quality they were more treatises. And the philosophic items of the day that represented Mahāyāna Buddhism were the 'Buddha Nature' (buddhatā, Skt.; busshō, Jap.) or the 'Matrix of Thuscome' (tathāgatagarbha, Skt.; nyoraizō, Jap.), which discussed the fundamental question of the possibility of practice and attainment, and the 'Mind-Only' (vijñaptimātratā, Skt.; yuishiki, Jap.), which tried to explain psychologically and metaphysically the process by which one attains fruition through practice.

The Buddha Nature discusses the question of potentiality by which one becomes a Buddha, the perfect man. We listen to the Buddha's teaching, understand the doctrine, exert effort and practise it accordingly, and we finally attain perfect personality. This so comes about because there is a potentiality in us by which we can understand the truth and realize it. This potentiality was called the 'Buddha Nature'. In the days of Primitive Buddhism, this philosophic question was not directly entered into. But in the days of Abhidharma Buddhism, such a school as the Mahāsaṁghika, for example, took up this question and said that the mind was by nature pure and untainted and that, by nature, it was no other than the Buddha's superb wisdom itself. So we say 'the mind is by nature pure' (shinshōhonjō, Jap.). Such a thought grew up in the days of the mid-Mahāyāna period, calling forth such thoughts as the Buddha Nature and the Tathāgatagarbha, which minutely discussed this point philosophically.

Against the fact that the Buddha Nature and Tathāgatagarbha dealt with the basic nature of mind, the Vijñaptimātratā took up its actual and phenomenal aspect. That one suf-

fers from the sorrow of transmigration and that one becomes a sage by effort and practice all rest on our personal experience of the body and mind. Primitive Buddhism treated this by the law of ' interdependence ' (pratītyasamutpāda). Abhidharma Buddhism classified the movement of mind into many such elements as the ' prime actor ' (shutai, Jap.) and its ' subordinate natures ' (zokusei, Jap.), and these were studied. And part of the Abhidharmic schools began to allege that the movement of mind is made up not only of the superficial psychical actions, but also of the effect of the strong influence worked upon the surface consciousness by the latent consciousness which is housed deep in the mind as a sum total of man's past experiences, and that the latent mind must rather be the prime actor itself. Taking this stand, people now began, not only to study the movements of the surface mind, but also to dig deep into the latent phases of the mind psychologically, philosophically, and metaphysically. This was what was propounded by the Vijñaptimātratā School. That we get illusioned and suffer and that we attain a peaceful state of enlightenment all arise out of the latent mind, the sum total of our past experiences. This sum total is ' Ālayavijñāna ' (arayashiki, Jap.). As all rest on this consciousness, we say ' Yuishiki ', the ' Mind-Only '.

The theories of Buddha Nature and Tathāgatagarbha which dealt with the unmoving state of mind and the Vijñaptimātratā which took up the phenomenal phase of a moving mind were later synthesized. This called forth the philosophic thought of ' Shinnyo-engi ' (Jap.), the ' Causation of Thusness '. All these exerted much influence upon the Buddhism of China. Here we meet with the greatest efflorescence of the Buddhist thoughts in the entire history of Indian Buddhism. Seen from the general standpoint of Indian philosophy, these Buddhist

thoughts could be said to have attained the most superior theoretical standards of all Indian phisolophical thoughts.

5. Degeneration and Death of Buddhism

As Scholastic Buddhism had attained the highest point of development in the philosophic phase of its doctrine, what the latter-day Buddhism did was mainly to comment upon or expound these philosophic theories. Thus came out a formal or exegetic Buddhism, which produced nothing new. This Buddhism was extremely particular about details. At the time, Nālanda and other big temples were the centres of study, and thousands of students were there. But what they did was only to dig into hazardous details which were not directly connected with Buddhist practice or the emancipation of self. This was so in the case of Primitive Buddhism, in which complicated systems of abhidharma were born as people tried to explain or expound the teaching. From this grew up a Scholastic Buddhism, quite different from the original intent of the Buddhist doctrine, which was to practise and believe. In the same way, in the latter days of Scholastic Buddhism the original mission was lost, and Buddhism became but a subject of study. The reason why Indian Buddhism gradually began to decline lay here. When Abhidharma Buddhism degenerated, Mahāyāna Buddhism arose, by which Abhidharma Buddhism too gained its self-discipline. Thus, by the joint activity of the two, Buddhism regained power, even calling forth a further advance. But the case was now different.

As stated already, the priestly sangha of Abhidharma Buddhism walked in the footsteps of Primitive Buddhism, strictly observed the moral precepts, and carried on a disciplined life. This healthy life of the priestly sangha upheld, either directly or

indirectly, the faith of the lay followers. Thus, the priestly group formed the strongest backbone, which upheld the social progress and kept alive the teachings of Buddhism. But Mahāyāna Buddhism had no priestly sangha in the serious sense of the term. It did not much care for the difference between the priestly and the lay. Any person striving for personal perfection was, whether a priest or a lay, equally looked up to as a Mahāyāna bodhisattva. We do not know whether the writers of Mahāyāna sūtras were the priestly or the lay; nor do we know whether Mahāyānā Buddhism had any church system. The only thing we can say is that those ābhidharmikas (BSkt.; ābhidhammika, P.) who were active in the field of Buddhist doctrine and philosophy, were almost all priests. Not much is known of their daily life, as to to what extent the moral precepts were observed by them. But their life seems to have been supported mainly by kings and ministers who sat in power. Most of the Mahāyāna temples seem to have been built from the donations of the zealous followers of the faith, and the upkeep of the temple and the life of the priests were made possible by funds and the produce arising out of the land, all which having been donated by the important followers of the faith.

The sangha was not supported by what was given by the followers of the faith as in the days of Primitive and Abhidharma Buddhism. If life depended on alms-offering, the priests had naturally to be strict in observing moral precepts, which alone could cement the bond between them and the followers of the faith. Should priests be living in immoral and shameless ways, this would lose them the respect of the people and, at the same time, the economic basis of their priestly life.

But if priests possessed the land and wealth of their own and if the economic basis of the temple and priests were stabilized, the mind would, unless one was firm-set for truth, lose the dis-

cipline, with the result that life would become devoid of morality and authority and would become easy-going. Especially, if this became hereditary and customary, the consequent ill would become worse. The life of the Brahmins of the Buddha's day went thus. Like instances could be seen in Japan too, in the temple life of all ages.

In the days of Scholastic Buddhism, it is possible that the economic base of temple life was thus to some extent, not only in Mahāyāna but also in Hīnayāna. This was against the original concept of Buddhism and was a degeneration. Thus, the Buddhism of the latter part of the scholastic age was a mere school of study. At this juncture, a movement took start to restore the lost prestige. This was the rise of the esoteric teaching of Tantrism (Shingon, Jap.). It seems that from around the 8th century Indian Buddhism became Tantric in the correct sense of the term. This was a mixture, it seems, of Mahayanism and the Hinduism which took into its doctrine the popular faith of India. Or Mahāyāna Buddhism may have directly adopted the popular faith of the land. This we can say because the magical and Tantric elements of popular faith had already existed in India since the days of the *Atharvaveda* and we come across traces of them even in the sūtras of the Mahāyāna Buddhism of the early and the middle period; or even as far back as in the early sūtras of Primitive Buddhism. But it was from around the 7th and the 8th century that the magical colour of Tantrism began to set a trend in all India. Buddhism was no exception, and showed such a tendency.

But this Tantrism has the theoretical and the practical aspects. On the theoretical side it took in all the good points of Buddhism that had existed up to then and tried to explain Buddhism through the concrete channel of symbolism. The standpoint and aim were worthy of praise. And the 'factual

phase' (jisō,* Jap.) of practice which agreed with the spirit of this symbolism was serious in attitude. In so far as the orthodox and moderate side is concerned, Tantric Buddhism (Shingon Mysticism) had not lost the right tradition of Buddhism as religion; rather it was the most developed of all the Buddhistic teaching. Shingon Buddhism that came to Japan through China was this kind of moderate 'Rightist' Mysticism, or the 'Dakṣiṇācārin Mysticism' (udō-mikkyō, Jap.).

But this symbolism too became mixed up, on the other hand, with Saktism, a female-god worship, a popular faith of Indian sexualism which developed itself into the lust-seeking thought of 'Great Pleasure' (vipulasukha, Skt.; dairaku, Jap.).

This was no other than the 'Leftist' Mysticism, or the 'Vāmacārin Mysticism' (sadō-mikkyō, Jap.). Here the spirit of Buddhism deteriorated. It was now no Buddhism, but a mere popular faith. The fall of Indian Buddhism actually took place because of this left-turn of Tantric Mysticism.

In a sense, the adaptation of Buddhism to popular faith was, from the intention of the Buddhists of the day and from what the moderate Rightist had shown, an effort to bring itself down to a popular level so that people could come close to the depths of the Buddhist doctrine and so attain the actual feel of religious faith and experience selflessness. Further, it may have been a move to plant itself, like the Brahmanic teaching, in the soil of popular faith, in the everyday habits and customs of life and so strengthen its stand. But the result, as in the case of the Leftist Tantrism, was that what was true Buddhism was lost and that only the unsightly phase of popular faith remained, to make it no Buddhism at all. Possibly some Buddhistic formalities remained. But, later, even these too were forgotten. None are now aware whether what they have is Buddhism, as can be seen today among some

tribes of the Buddhist communities of India. According to the Indian National Census, there are still today tens of thousands of people in East India, i.e. Assam and Bengal, who do not know they are Buddhists or merely call themselves Buddhists. This comes from the fact that this region was once the territory of the Pāla dynasty, the last supporters of the Buddhist teaching. Here Tantrism flourished, this dynasty having existed for about 400 years from the 8th century, till after the 13th century when Buddhism was totally annihilated, with its temples demolished and the priests killed. Buddhism flourished among the people only as a popular faith.

In sum, what we can say is that the decline and degeneration of Mahāyāna Buddhism in the days after the 7th or the 8th century was due to the fact that it became too scholastic, that it had, in a strict sense, no priestly sangha that had observed moral precepts, that its sangha and the temple possessed private properties, thus living easily and not striving to increase the number of the faithful, that Buddhism became Tantric, and that it had become mixed up with the low-grade popular faith.

Along with these causes which lay within Buddhism itself, there were other causes that had led to its weakening and death. One was the revival of orthodox Brahmanism, which greatly surged forward around the early part of the Gupta dynasty, i.e. the 4th century, in theory and as a religion, and also as a social institution. Already in the days of Scholastic Buddhism, it did not shelter behind Buddhism; possibly it arose above it. This partly came from the protection extended to it by Gupta kings and also from the fact that Brahmanism later took in the popular faith of India. Besides, around the 7th and the 8th century, such great persons came as Kumārila and Śaṁkara, who took in all the good points of Buddhism theoretically and from the standpoint of the church

system, and who, picking up the weak points of Buddhism, attacked it time and again. Already Buddhism had in itself weak points and was on the brink of decline. With such positive attacks and pressure coming from outside, those who were Buddhists so far had now turned to Brahmanism—Hinduism. Besides, Buddhism, since the days of Primitive Buddhism, was extremely lenient, not demanding from the followers of the faith any special Buddhistic moral rules or social duties. This was so because it was a spiritual idealism. And this was the weak point of Buddhism. Against this, the popularization of Brahmanism and the rise of Hinduism brought forth a social system which now became the foundation of life of the Indian people at large. No matter its faith was pure or not pure, or if one had ideals or no ideals, so long as one lived within the boundary of this social institution, one had to belong to this teaching. This tendency was afoot already as early as in the days of the Gupta dynasty.

Added to the attacks coming from Brahmanism (Hinduism), the Muhammadans, after the 8th century, began to invade India. Even before, around the 5th century, Mihilagula, the king of the Huns, entered India from the northwest and demolished the Buddhist temples, killed the priests, and worked havoc on Buddhism. But compared with the attacks of the Muhammadans, this was almost nothing. The Muhammadans entered India from the western border, the region of Sind, and from Mid India extended their sphere of influence to East India by degrees. Religion was not the sole weapon; they advanced under arms and with politics. Besides, they were the iconoclasts to the last degree. To demolish idols was to be true to their religious faith and the merit was to be the greater. Everywhere and anywhere, they broke idols. The Buddhist or the Hindu or the Jain was of no concern. But those who

suffered most were the Buddhists, because Buddhism was centred in temples and priests' quarters; or rather, the temples and priests' quarters were the places where Buddhism existed. So, when the temples were demolished and the priests killed, it meant total death to Buddhism. The greatest and the last damage Buddhism suffered was the attack directed against it around 1200, when the Muhammadan general Kutb-ud-Dīn entered Bihār with a hundred or two hundred horse and took the royal palaces and temples. They did not even know that the great temple of Vikramaśīla, almost a head temple of Tantric Buddhism, was a Buddhist temple. They demolished it and killed all the priests, not leaving one alive. Thus suddenly the end came to Buddhism.

As in the case of Buddhism, the Hindu and Jain temples and priests too met Muhammadan attacks. But Hinduism and Jainism had their teachings deep in the heart of the populace. They enjoyed a great respect of the followers of the faith; their teachings were woven into the habits and customs of everyday life. So, even when their temples and priests were attacked, it did not mean a total damage to their religions; only part suffered. Against this, Buddhism was already on the verge of death. Attacks came, which quickened the arrival of the end.

CHAPTER II

PRIMITIVE BUDDHISM AND THE CONTEMPORARY INDIAN THOUGHTS

1. The Thought of Karma and Transmigration

Buddhism arose around the 6th century B.C. as one of the Indian thoughts of the day. It did not come out all of a sudden, unconnected with the age and environment in which it lived. Directly or indirectly, it was closely connected with the current of the day. No doubt, one like Śākyamuni Buddha could stand above all. Even at that, he could not be independent of the age and background of his time.

Now, as we look into the thought of Primitive Buddhism in relation to the general trend of the age, we see that it has what is common to other Indian thoughts and also what is its own. In the former, we see the direct influence of the age and environment and in the latter what is peculiarly Buddhist, standing above the age and environment. And there are again two points common to the thoughts of India in general which are outstanding. One is the thought of karma and transmigration and the other the practising of the Way and attaining emancipation. Here we will see what is common to all others. Needless to say, we see these not only in Primitive Buddhism, but also in all other Buddhist thoughts.

When one does good, there comes about the fruition of happiness; when one does evil, unhappiness results. This is the thought of karma, the law of causality of good to good and evil

to evil. This thought was already prevalent in India since the early days of the *Upaniṣads*, previous to those of Buddhism.

If happiness does not result when one does good, if evil acts do not call forth misfortunes, and if evil prospers and good dies out, no order of moral could be expected in life. If so, it is wise to do evil and act as one wills. To rectify this disorder, the thought of causality came about and it was said that to good comes about good and to evil evil. This thought was not particularly Indian, but one common at all times and in all places: a thought to be found everywhere in the world. But how do matters stand in between, from the time good or evil is enacted up to the time when the result comes about, or what relation do the cause and effect bear to a person? Here the explanation varies.

The Chinese people generally thought that the good acts of the parents and ancestors called forth good result to children and that the evil of the forefathers resulted in unhappiness to descendants. They thought that the chain of causation ran through blood, from father to son. Confucianism says: 'In the family where good is amassed, there comes about a surplus of good; in the family where good is not amassed, there comes about ill'. This is an instance. In Japan too, this thought goes even now among the populace. In India too, we come across this same thought. But this is no thought of karma.

In the thought of karma, the chain of causation limits scope within the person himself. As one sows, one reaps. This is 'jigō-jitoku' in Japanese. The cause of good and evil calls forth the result. But does this result come about only when one is in life? It is not quite so. Cases can be in life in which evil prospers and good dies out. How are we to explain this? But the result of good and evil extends even to after-life, the chain of causation running through the 'Three Times" (sanze,

Jap.) of: 1) the former life, 2) the present life, and the life to come. This is what the thought of karma says.

A good person gains birth after death in the heavens, where happiness awaits him, and an evil person harvests hell and suffering. This thought existed in India, it seems, hundreds of years before Buddhism, already in the days of *Atharvaveda* down to those of *Brāhmaṇas*. But, at the time, the theory of transmigration was not fully established. We say 'transmigration' (saṁsāra, Skt.; rinne, Jap.). It means that one transmigrates through varied lives of heaven, man, hell, etc. in the course of the Three Times. Buddhism says one transmigrates through the 'Three Worlds' (trayo dhātavaḥ, Skt.; sangai, Jap.)[1] and the 'Six Realms' (ṣaḍ-gati, Skt.; rokudō, Jap.).[2] This thought of transmigration became established, it seems, some two or three hundred years before Buddhism, already in the days of the *Upaniṣads*.

Now, how do the actions of good and evil persist up till the time when the result comes about? The concept differs by school and sect. In the days of Abhidharma Buddhism, various concepts existed. But where Buddhism all equally differs from other thoughts is that it does not recognize the 'soul' as an entity of self that transmigrates; what it says is that karma transmigrates. 'Saṁsāra' generally goes in English as 'transmigration'. But as the word somewhat suggests a soul that transmigrates from one world to the other, it is considered not fit for the Buddhist notion of 'saṁsāra'. So, some scholars in the West use the term 'metempsychosis' to represent the Buddhist notion of 'saṁsāra'. This says that the mind

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1) By 'Three Worlds' is meant: 1) 'kāmadhātu', 2) 'rūpadhātu', and 3) 'arūpadhātu'.
2) By 'Six Realms' is meant the six realms of: 1) hell, 2) hungry pretas, 3) brute creations, 4) asura, 5) man, and 6) heaven.

that shoulders karma moves about and changes. There is a delicate difference between the concepts. But let alone the question for the present. What we can say is that Buddhism must have adopted the theory of karma and transmigration from the standpoint of popular need. Even at that, there is no denying the fact that Buddhism fell in with the general current of Indian thought.

2. Contemporary Philosophers of the Day who had Negated the Karma Thought

But there were not a few, it would seem, among the philosophers and the religious teachers of the Buddha's time who had negated this karma thought. Especially among the famous ' Six Masters of the teachings other than Buddhism ' (' rokushi-gedō ', Jap.)* there were many who had negated the karma theory.[1] For example, Pūraṇa-Kassapa says:

> ' It is no sin even if one hacked other persons' bodies, caused pain and worry to others, took life, stole, committed adultery, lied, commanded or urged others to do such. Even if one killed the people and animals of this earth and made a mountain of dead bodies, it is no sin; neither does the result of

1) The texts of Primitive Buddhism and those of Jainism write about the teachings of the Six Masters. Further, the *Āgamas* in Chin. and P. refer to these. But what are handed down do not agree. Some points disagree as to what were said by the Six Masters. Of these, what the ' *Shamongakyō* ' of the P. texts (the *Dīgha-nikāya*, 1, the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*) says is regarded as most moderate in view. Here this sutta is consulted. See also: B. Barua: *A History of the Pre-Buddhistic Philosophy*, Calcutta, 1921; Hakuju Ui: *A Study of Indian Philosophy* (*Indotetsugakukenkyū*), Book III; *A History of Indian Philosophy* (*Indotetsugakushi*); Enshō Kanakura: *A Spiritual History of Ancient India* (*Indo-Kodai-Seishinshi*); *A Study of the Spiritual Culture of India* (*Indoseishinbunka-no-Kenkyū*).

> the action come back to one. Also, even if one on the southern bank of the Ganges hacked others' bodies and killed, caused pain and worry, it is no sin; neither does the result of action come back to one. Further, even if any other person on the northern bank of the Ganges did any act of dāna or executed any religious rites, such is no act of good; nor does the action call forth any reward. One may give things to neighbours or to the poor, or one may make effort, and practise the Way, or may observe moral precepts, it is no virtuous act; nor does the result of the action come back to one'.

This not only negates karma, but also does not recognize good and evil, a thought that totally breaks up morality. Did such a nihilistic thought call forth general approval, find its place as a philosophic theory, and invite supporters? What is possible is that as in those days the degenerate Brahmins pretended to show themselves as moralists, but in fact carried on an indolent and shameless life, antipathy might have purposely called forth such an extreme view. Generally, in a lawless age such an immoral, baneful thought is likely to gain the heart of the people. And the age in which Śākyamuni Buddha lived was, politically and economically, and from the standpoint of religion and thought, in a state of turmoil, confusion and break-up.

Next comes Makkhali-Gosāla, who at first seems to have practised the Way together with Mahāvīra, the founder of Jainism, but who later parted from him. He is considered to have put forward a thought characteristically his own. He says:

> 'One becomes good or evil, pure or tainted because one inevitably so becomes, not because one makes effort or that one is indolent. There exists absolutely no such relation of cause and effect, to say that good calls forth good, and evil evil. There is

no acting of good or evil on one's own part, no letting others do it, no talk of effort or endeavour, and no free will of one's own. Man is predestined; there is no free will of his own. When born, man has his own predestined fate, environment, natural gift, the distinction of the six castes of black, blue, red, yellow, white, and pure white, by which man is definitely segregated and one suffers or is happy. The wise and the ignorant alike, man transmigrates for a period of 8,400,000 great kalpas,* after which man, without any ado, becomes liberated from sorrow and gets emancipated. So, do good or observe the moral precepts, one can absolutely never change the predestined course of transmigration. The predestined sorrow and happiness never increase or decrease during the time of transmigration. This is as with a ball made by winding thread, which when unwound and when there is no more to unwind, there just comes about the state of 'no ball'. In the same way, both the wise and the ignorant finally get liberated from sorrow, when the predestined course of transmigration is fully completed'.

This is a kind of transmigration theory, no doubt, but one standing on determinism. It negates the karma theory.

It seems that there were a fairly good number of people who took to his view of life. But the Buddha is reported to have criticized him, saying that Makkhali Gosāla was like a clothing made of human hair. A clothing made of human hair does not take in the sweat, so that in summer it feels wet and hot, whereas in winter it does not keep warmth, so that it helps nothing to protect one from cold. So, it is totally useless. That is why the Buddha compared Makkhali to a clothing made of human hair, and said that there was not a whit of good in what Makkhali said, causing but worry and harm to the world. The men of this school were called 'Ājīvika' (jamyō-ha, Jap.). But they seem to have won the respect and support of the kings in Aśoka's

days and in those of Daśaratha, Aśoka's grandson. Even later, they seem to have aroused response from the public. This tells that what they said were not quite as bad or useless as the Buddhists put it; they must have had public support. With all the discredit directed against their doctrine, what we can gather is that the adherents of the teaching must have observed the moral precepts and were serious in penance, so that they were able to earn the respect of the people.

The third master Ajita-Kesakambalī is also said to have negated karma and transmigration. He says:

> 'No good comes from the actions of compassion and charity, or from worshipping or praying to god. There is no karma of good or evil, nor is there any such result. There is no present world, nor is there the world to come. There is no father, no mother. There is no saint who does the right practice and effort, and who arrives by it at any enlightenment or emancipation. What there are in the world are but the four elements of earth, water, fire, and wind. By the combination of these, man and animal get born, grow up, move about, and change. When they die, the four elements discompose. The element of earth returns to the great earth, the watery element to the realm of water, the fire element to the realm of fire, and the wind element to the realm of wind and the sense organs to the air. Carry the corpse to the crematory and commit it to fire, it likewise turns to emptiness. So, after the death of man and animal, nothing remains but the four elements. There is no result of karma, no future, no transmigration. Karma or transmigration is utter nonsense'.

He was an absolute materialist; he recognized, it seems, no soul or spirit other than substance. Such a materialist was called in India 'Lokāyata' ('junse-ha', Jap.) or 'Cārvāka'.

Such a view of life seems to have sustained life for long ages. The name often appears in the literature of later ages. The people of this school are classed as materialists who had totally negated religion and morality. But from the fact that they carried on penance, we may say that they may not have been those who had out and out negated religion or who had acted against morality. They may possibly have been like those of the school of Pūraṇa Kassapa, who were most serious in the manner of life but who only spoke of irrelevant things, just to contradict the hypocritical religionists and moralists.

The fourth Pakudha-Kaccāyana too seems to have been a materialist, who did not recognize the karma result of good or evil. He said:

> 'The seven elements of earth, water, fire, wind, joy, sorrow, and soul are the existences eternal and undying. They are not made or formed by others; nor do they produce or create others. They are the existences, independent, immovable, and ever-existing. There is no perturbation, no change; they never step on others or have influence on others; nor do they cause worry to others or give joy to others. So, there is none that kills others, that causes others to kill, or that is killed. There is none that hears, that is conscious of, that lets others hear, or that makes others feel conscious of. Cut the other's head with a sword, it does not take the other's life. It is only the sword that has got into the elements of the body'.

3. Sceptics and Jainism

Of the Six Masters, the above-quoted four negated the karma of good and evil and the results of the actions done. But the fifth Sañjaya-Belaṭṭhiputta is said to have been one who had neither positively negated nor confirmed the theory of the karma-

result, but one who was a sceptic.

According to him, those who claim they are philosophers say that what they think is the truth and that what others think is wrong. This carries the inference that what each upholds is the truth and that there are many different truths. But there can never be many truths for a single thing. This means that what are insisted upon by all the philosophers are not truths, but sheer subjective views. Unless a single objective truth is arrived at, it is a useless thing to put forward subjective propositions and carry on refutations. It is better to abandon this kind of idle talk, and stop talking of right or wrong, good or evil; it is wise and helpful if one seriously practises the Way. This was an agnostic stand.

Such a scepticism may not have to be totally rejected all in all when one looks into the motive. But examined logically and scientifically, what we see is that there is a lack of full inquiry into the nature of things; this attitude is very cowardly. If one is to doubt everything, one cannot even say definitely that what are insisted upon by philosophers must be doubted, that their views are subjective, that one cannot attain the objectiveness of truth. The Buddha once carried on the talk in this way and pointed out to the sceptics the inconsistencies in their logic and corrected their view of life. So, Buddhism regards this kind of sceptic as a sophist.

Sāriputta (Śāriputra, Skt.) and Moggallāna (Maudgalyāyana, Skt.), the two great disciples of the Buddha, were at first the disciples of Sañjaya. But they were not satisfied with the teaching of their master. Hearing the words of the Buddha, they became impressed. Their master entreated them to stay, but they left and came to the Buddha's camp. So is it said. Also Dīghanakha (Chōsōbonshi, Jap.), an uncle of Sāriputta, may not have been like Sañjaya. But from what he said, he was a

sceptic. This Brahmin too came to the Buddha's camp and was shown the inconsistencies of the sceptical view of life by the Buddha.

Lastly, Mahāvīra, the founder of Jainism, was moderate in presenting the teaching and talked about causality and the karmic result of good and evil. Of all the non-orthodox groups, Jainism was nearest to Buddhism and had shown great activity. Till later, this religion sustained its power of influence. Even now in India, there are more than a million and many hundreds of thousands of the followers of this faith. One of the important reasons for this seems to be that it took in the karma theory which was the common-sense belief of the day. But Buddhists criticize and say that though the followers of this school talk of karma and the result of karma, what they say is in fact none but a form of determinism. But if we look into the doctrine of Jainism, we see that it is no determinism at all. This is what it is. With the non-orthodox groups, there are not a few cases in which one meets with irrationalities and inconsistencies in their theories, but they were very serious in their practice of the Way. So they could expect respect and honour from the people.

4. General Aspect of the Theories of the Day that had Negated the Karma Theory

Śākyamuni Buddha classified what were said by śramaṇas and Brahmins into five classes and stated that these five represented the wrong views of karma theory regarding the good and evil, the happiness and sorrow of man.[1] These were:

1. Issara-nimmāṇa-hetu-vāda (jizaikesainsetsu, Jap.)

1) The *Chūagon*, 19 (the *Nikengyō*); the *Majjhima-nikāya*, 101; the *Devadaha-sutta* (the *Tenpikyō*, Jap.).

2. Pubbe-kata-hetu-vāda (shukusainsetsu, Jap.)
3. Saṅgati-bhāva-hetu-vāda (ketsugōinsetsu, Jap.)
4. Abhijāti-hetu-vāda (kaikyūinsetsu, Jap.)
5. Diṭṭhadhamma-upakkama-hetu-vāda (gūzenkikaiinsetsu, Jap.)

Of these, the first, ' issara-nimmāṇa-hetu-vāda ', may be termed the god's will theory. What the orthodox Brahmins say falls under this category. It says that this world and the fates of man are all the works and creations of such high gods as Brahmā and Īśvara and that all hang on the will of god. Here no free will of man is allowed. So, it is meaningless for man to practise the Way, make effort and try to make away with sorrow. Because all that happen in the world do not come from man's will or effort, but from that of god. Here there is no margin left for education or religion in which man makes effort to practise the Way and perfect his own person. As no free will of man is allowed, none can be held responsible for actions good or evil.

The second, ' pubbe-kata-hetu-vāda ', says that as the happiness and misfortune of life are all the results of our own actions of good or evil in our past lives and as the fate of our whole life was fixed as we gained life in this world which is a fruition of past lives, do as much good or evil, or heap up efforts, this will only influence our next life, but not change the present. This is a kind of determinism.

Buddhism ascribes this ' pubbe-kata-hetu-vāda ' to Jainism and cynically alleges that the fact that they insist upon penance and fasting and that they cause pain to the body comes from the fact that, as the theory of the ' pubbe-kata-hetu-vāda ' says, they must so suffer sorrow in this present life just because they did evil things in the past; that they, therefore, must carry

on such penance and fasting.[1] But the doctrine of Jainism does not actually hold such an extreme view of determinism. Possibly Jainism may have such a taint. What is probable is that the Buddhists peculiarly distorted this fact and misconceived what actually was.

The third, 'saṅgati-bhāva-hetu-vāda', seems to insist that all that there are in this world and life are the results of the combination of all such elements as earth, water, fire, and wind, and that man's sorrow or happiness, good or evil, gets fixed by the good or bad result of this combination. And as the state of this combination is fixed when man is born, this persists throughout his life unchanged. So there is no margin left for any effort to be made, to change man's fortune in this life. From this standpoint, this 'saṅgati-bhāva-hetu-vāda' too may well be a kind of determinism. This points to what is insisted upon by Ajita and Kakudha of the Six Masters.

The fourth, 'abhijāti-hetu-vāda', says that man is, when born, classified into the six ranks of black, blue, red, yellow, white, and pure white, and that by this classification, a man's wisdom, circumstances, and family status all get fixed. So, this is also a kind of determinism, which leaves no margin for man's effort. It was Makkhali-Gosāla who said thus.

The fifth, 'diṭṭhadhamma-upakkama-hetu-vāda', answers to the 'adhiccasamuppāda-vāda' (muinmuensetsu, Jap.). This says that the fates of society and life are under no influence of causality and karma and that these are not the results one gains by the grace of god or as a punishment. They say this on the ground that there are people in the world who while doing good yet suffer, who doing evil yet live happy. They say that hap-

1) The sūtra quoted on p. 55, note, says: 'All the Jains did evil things in the past. Why? Because of this fact, the Jains encounter in this life extremely heavy pains'.

piness and misfortune do not come about because of any definite law or reason, but out of haphazard chances. Of the Six Masters, Gosāla was one who had insisted, so it is accepted, on the adhiccasamuppāda-vāda.

5. Buddhism and the Karma Theory

In the Buddha's days, the world of thought was in a turmoil and various theories went in the spiritual world. Even the karma theory did not dominate the mind of the people.

What the karma thought teaches is that good calls forth good and evil evil. It, thus, explains the fate of man rationally in a chain of long causation, extending from the past to the future. It tells that the sorrow of the present is the result of the past evil; that none else but oneself is responsible for the result. Thus, one has to console one's own self and forget one's sorrow. It makes good use of man's desire to evade sorrow in the life to come and to hope instead for happiness and ease. It thus enables man to shun evil and amass good in this life and to implant in him a good and beautiful behavior.

Further, if we are to transmigrate through lives, it is logical to say that some time in the past we must have been animals such as birds and beasts, insects and fish, and that these animals must have been once human beings also. After all, in the long course of transmigration, all living things must have been mutually chained together. This tells that to kill or give pain to other living beings means at once to kill or give pain to those who have once been our own parents and brothers. Thus engendered the feelings of a closeness in relation and compassion to all living things, ending in 'ahiṁsā', which means 'not to kill'.

As the fundamental stand of ahiṁsā and compassion, Buddhism

thus makes good use of a rather primitive theory of the transmigration of life. But cases are in which it also draws an analogy and tells one to put one's own self in the place of others and feel the pain and unhappiness, urging one thus to refrain from causing pain or worry to others. For example, the *Dhammapada* says, in its chapter on ' Punishment ':

> 'All tremble at punishment; all fear death.
> Put one's own self in their place; do not kill, do not let others kill. (129)
>
> All tremble at punishment; to all life is dear.
> Put one's own self in their place. Do not kill, do not let others kill. (130)

Further, Buddhism seeks, from a higher ground, the right cause of ahiṁsā and compassion in the law of ' interdependence ', which tells us that all are closely related to each other, so that for one to enjoy peace and happiness, the world at large too must be enjoying peace and happiness. This means that one must not make those around one unhappy. Also, as man's ideal rests on the perfection of his own self and of the society at large, he must have a compassionate and sympathetical mind also, to call forth an ideal society. All this rests on the law of interdependence. This is the original standpoint of Buddhism.

To kill goats, sheep, horses, or even men and to offer them to god as sacrifices, and to look for happiness is a cruel egoism, not to be permitted as deserving of man. So, even Brahmanism and later Hinduism, too, took to the karmic theory and came to regard ahiṁsā as the first of man's meritorious acts. It is so up till now. This is said mainly to be the result of Buddhist influence.

Thus, the karmic theory has many beautiful, good points. But there can be, on the other hand, an unsatisfactory aspect too, to reduce whatever sorrowful or unhappy as a self-earned result of actions done in the past and regard all as an irrevocable fate, surrendering one's self to it, and fail, at times, to act with a positive spirit and make good the adverse circumstances one is

in and so fight out things to better situations. This comes from a wrong view of the karmic theory, to reduce it to a sort of determinism. But the original thought of the karmic theory recognizes free will. Fought with will and effort, one's destiny will, moment after moment, unfold itself to brighter phases too.

Originally, the karmic theory was, from the standpoint of Buddhist doctrine, a popular theory of low order, a common-sense theory of the populace of the day. So, Buddhism first made use of it to rectify the minds of those who would not even believe in this common-sense theory of the day and whose heads were filled with heretical views of life. It was to lead people towards the right path of the karmic theory. Thus, it was but a preparatory step to guide one to the right Buddhist teaching.

The fundamental principle of Buddhism stands on the ground of the Four Noble Truths (catvāri ārya-satyāni, Skt.; shishōtai, Jap.) and the 'law of interdependence'[1] (pratītya-samutpāda, Skt.; engisetsu, Jap.).* These are no karmic theories, but those based on it. So, rightly to understand the law of 'interdependence', we must, as a forestep, rightly grasp the karma concept.

The relation between the above-stated popular karmic theory and the original teachings of the Four Noble Truths and the law of interdependence can well be seen in the Buddha's sermons which were delivered to guide people into the path. The Buddha frequently seems to have had recourse to this form of sermon. We come across such everywhere presented in a set form.

In order to lead those who were misinformed and who did not even believe in the common-sense karmic theory, the Buddha first took up the three teachings of: 1) dāna-kathā (seron,

1) The 'chain of causation' (MW, p. 673) (Tr.).

Jap.), 2) sīla-kathā (kairon, Jap.) and 3) sagga-kathā (shōtenron, Jap.). These say that if one gives food and offerings to Way-goers and the poor, if one observes the pañca-śīlas and does not take life, does not steal, does not commit adultery, does not tell lies, and does not take intoxicating drinks that often lead one to careless acts, one obtains birth in the heavens after death, as a reward to such good acts. Against this, one who, in this life, is miserly, who does not give, who does not do charitable works, and who abandons one's own self to such immoral acts as killing, stealing, adultery, lying, etc., gains, after death, birth in such evil realms as hell, etc. as a result of the ill acts done, thus having to suffer miserable lives. Because of this, one is urged to do good works such as giving and observing the moral precepts.

These three ' kathās ' (talks) rightly tell us about the karmic theory in concrete terms. If one does as one is told to do and mends life's way, one, not awaiting the life to come, but here in this present life, will experience that life is happy and is a peaceful one. Thus, one accords with the moral of the temporary category. For the member of a society, this suffices for the present. But from the standard of Buddhist ideal, the adherent needs further to heighten the mental plane and purify the state of faith.

Next, the wordly life of lust and joy is not evil in the moral sense. But this means a waste of wealth, and the lust and joy accompany sorrow instead, leaving behind regret. It is unhealthy and is a source of ill to children and to the life to come. So, this life of lust and joy must be renounced and rebuilt. Also, why do unhappiness and anguish, and how do happiness and peace, come about? What is the happiness that is pure which must be the true aim of life? What must one do in order to gain this happiness? Here the four truths of man's world and life, i.e. the Four Noble Truths, get expounded to one.

This phase of truth will not be given ears to even if one hears it, nor will it be understood, so long as one's mind is turned to the contrary side and does not believe even in the karmic law of cause and effect. So, Śākyamuni Buddha did not at once alluded to the Four Noble Truths; he spoke of them only when the mind of the people truly knew the law of cause and effect and only when the mental soil was fully tilled. This is compared to the case of a dyer who dyes cloth when dirt is taken off and the former colour is washed off from the cloth he desires to dye and when the cloth is blanched and is pure white. When all this is done, he dyes it to any colour he desires to dye. This is how it goes. When the mind of the faithful is tainted or coloured by any preoccupations, what is done first is to wash off the dirt and colour by the karmic law of cause and effect and when the mind is pure white, the Buddhist truth of the Four Noble Truths is for the first time imparted. By this method, the mind of the faithful takes in the principle of the Four Noble Truths, not in a wrong way but rightly; and by the right comprehension of the truth comes about the practice. So, the first condition set before one who desired to become a Buddhist was to trust in the karmic law, the common sense of the day. When any outsider desired to become a Buddhist and when the school to which the person belonged was one that had negated the karmic law, such an aspirant had to be on probation for a period of four months. When the person's mind became well balanced and could accept the law of causality, he, for the first time, was admitted into the priestly sangha. Against this, such an aspirant as, for example, from the Jaṭila (keppatsu-gedō, Jap.), who had recognized the law of causality, did not need to be on probation and was at once admitted into the sangha.[1)]

6. The Thought of Practice and Emancipation

So far, under five heads, we have looked into the karmic theory of causality, as the first of the Buddhist thoughts that were common to other Indian thoughts. As a matter of fact, since the days of Buddhism, almost all the religions and thoughts of India have recognized and spoken about the karmic theory of causality. Parallel to this, from around the same period, a second thought common in India had prevailed. This was to practise the Way and seek emancipation. Here we will look into this point.

All the ideals and goals of Indian thoughts and philosophies had laid stress on the release of bondage and worry of the body and mind. So, all were religious in attitude, and emancipation was the final objective. In Buddhism, too, the case is the same. But, for emancipation, one needs to practise good. And in this practising of good, there are the two phases of the absolute and the relative. This is also what is common in all Indian thoughts. By the relative acts of good, one cannot step out of transmigration and attain the absolute, the highest, immortal world of the ideal; what is possible is to gain birth in the realms of god and man, the highest world of happiness within the realm of transmigration. By the absolute act of good, one attains emancipation from the world of transmigration where birth and death reign. This is also what is meant. By 'relative good' is meant the giving and doing charity works and the observing of the moral precepts; by 'absolute good' is often meant the attaining of right wisdom by which one realizes and experiences truth. This kind of thought had

1) E.g.: The (Pāli) *Vinaya*, the *Mahāvagga*, the *Mahākhandhaka*, *Chap. on Upasampadā* (ND, Vol. III, pp. 116 ff.).

existed since the days before Buddhism. Already in the days of *Brāhmaṇas* we detect the beginnings.

Now, one finds the thought of deathlessness already in the days of the *Ṛgveda*, almost 1,000 years before the days of Buddhism. But then, was there no thought of a life to come, no thought of transmigration? Only vaguely was it thought that by religious rituals and prayers, one would attain deathlessness. Next, in the days of *Brāhmaṇas* no thought of transmigration was yet born, but people began to think about the world to which the dead would be going. And the path of the dead, for example, was classified into the 'heavenly path' (devayāna, Skt.; tendō, Jap.) and the 'fatherly path' (pitṛyāna, Skt.; sodō, Jap.). One who had the right knowledge of rituals and who had practised the Way as directed would, after death, pass through the heavenly path and gain the world of the sun, where it was thought one would enjoy happiness which knew no death and which was eternal. Against this, one who lacked the right knowledge and who merely did rituals would pass through the fatherly path and gain birth in the world of the moon, from where one would again be born in the world of man and become a prey to death.

In this way, in the days of the *Brāhmaṇas*, it was thought that there would be differences in the fruits of karma by observing the right or wrong rituals of worship. Now, as we come to the next age of the *Upaniṣads*, we see that first nothing seems to have been said definitely. But in the days before Buddhism, we hear about the differences of the world of Brahmā, the world of the heavenly beings, and the world of man. According to this concept, those who had committed evil would be born in the 'third path of life' (tṛtīya-mārga, Skt.; daisandō, Jap.), which was the realm of hell and beasts. But among those who had done good, there were those who had trans-

migrated and those who had transcended it. The action that invited transmigration was the good which was relative in value, such as doing rituals to gods and ancestors, offering food to religious teachers and the poor, studying the *Vedas*, doing fasting and penance, and observing such moral precepts as not to kill, not to steal, not to tell lies, etc. But of these, those who had abandoned home and did superb good and became the world-fleeing Brahmins were born in the ' world of heaven ' (devaloka, Skt.; tengai, Jap.) by the ' heavenly path ', and those who did the good of common grade and lived as householders took to the ' fatherly path ' and gained birth in the world of man. So was it thought. And this ' devayāna ' was, in the days before the *Upaniṣads*, a deathless world which ranked the same as the heaven of Brahmā. But now the heavenly path was not one which led to the deathless world, but to one lower than the absolute world of Brahmā, one which belonged to the world of transmigration.

Against this, one who did the absolute good gained birth in the birthless and deathless ' world of Brahmā ' (brahma-loka, Skt.; bonkai, Jap.), where emancipation was attained and one no more transmigrated. What was the highest good that ensured one the deathless state of emancipation? It was to believe in the oneness of Brahman and Ātman, to believe that Brahman, the highest principle of the universe, and Ātman, the highest principle immanent in man's self, are not two, but one; it was to have a right knowledge of this oneness of Brahman-Ātman, and to have a personal experience of emancipation, in which the individual self became one with the universal Brahman. In order to attain this end, one not only had to do the practices of such relative good as to study the *Vedas*, execute religious rituals, do dāna (giving), carry out penance and fasting, but also to forsake fame, wealth, wife, children, and rela-

tives, and gain mental equanimity by yoga, the practice of 'mental concentration' (dhyāna, Skt.; zenjō, Jap.). This was to recognize one's own self and arrive at the oneness of Brahman-Ātman.

Generally the Upanishadic thought corresponds to the Buddhist way of practice. Buddhism too talked about the relative 'leakable good' (sāsrava-kuśala, Skt.; urozen, Jap.)[1] and the absolute 'unleakable good' (anāsrava-kuśala, Skt.; murozen, Jap.). And of the leakable acts of good, those such as 'giving' (dāna) and 'precept-observing' gave one birth in the world of heaven and man, i.e. the 'world of desire' (kāma-dhātu, Skt.; yokukai, Jap.); and the 'absorbed meditation' (dhyāna, Skt.; zenjō, Jap.) gave one birth in such higher heavens as the 'world of form'[2] (rūpa-dhātu, Skt.; shikikai, Jap.) and the 'world of no form' (arūpa-dhātu, Skt.; mushikikai, Jap.). What the *Upaniṣads* said that one would gain birth in the world of man by the 'fatherly path' corresponded to what the Buddhists said that one would gain birth in the 'world of desire' by giving and precept-observing; and what the *Upaniṣads* said that one would gain birth in the 'heavenly world' (devaloka) by the 'heavenly path' resembles what the Buddhists said that one was to gain birth by dhyāna in such heavens as of 'form' and 'no-form'.

And the absolute good of the *Upaniṣads* which was to lead one to the 'brahmā-world' (brahma-loka) answered to the unleakable good acts of the Buddhists; the deathless world of 'brahma-loka' of the *Upaniṣads* answered to the deathless 'nirvāṇa'. Such detailed expositions of the Buddhist doctrine as

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1) The imperfect acts of good, tainted by illusions (Tr.).
2) 'Rūpa'* is not exactly 'form' or 'colour'. It is 'matter', whose qualities or attributes are 'form' and 'colour'. Hence severally rendered (Tr.).

stated above may not date back to the days of Śākyamuni Buddha, but possibly to those later than the Buddha's death, when the low-grade, popular, complicated doctrines began to be talked about. Because if the difference of the place of birth after death is to be talked about in relation to karma result, all will become extremely irrational in as much as concrete details get added. It is doubtful if the Buddha really did say such things. Even if he did, it could only have been done figuratively and in popular sense for the sake of simple people and in simple statements. That it began to take on concrete terms and be stated in details seems to have been, as with all other popular theories, things that came out to be in the latter days of Primitive Buddhism and in those of Abhidharma Buddhism, when Buddhism became fairly more formal and scholastic.

7. The Three Worlds (Mundane World) and the Supramundane World

A popular theory of Buddhism talks about the 'Three Worlds' (trayo dhātavaḥ, Skt.; sangai, Jap.) and the 'Supramundane World (lokottara, Skt.; lokuttara, P.). The Three Worlds are where one repeats birth and death, which is, in other words, transmigration as a result of the karma of the good and evil done in one's past lives. The 'Supramundane World' (World-Beyond) is the world of nirvāṇa which transcends transmigration. Needless to say, all this roughly corresponds to the Upanishadic concept of the three paths of the 'third path' (tṛtīyamārga, Skt.), the 'fatherly path' (pitṛyāna, Skt.), and the 'heavenly path' (devayāna, Skt.), and to the 'brahmā-world' (brahma-loka, Skt.), the world where there is now no more death. And the Buddha may have roughly referred to the Three Worlds and the Supramundane World. But what is possible is that he

had nothing to do with the detailed description, which Abhidharma Buddhism did in such concrete terms, of the Three Worlds of the 'world of desire' (kāmadhātu, Skt.; yokukai, Jap.), the 'world of form' (rūpadhātu, Skt.; shikikai, Jap.), and the 'world of no-form' (arūpadhātu, Skt.; mushikikai, Jap.) as places where living beings lived.

According to the theory of the Three Worlds propounded by Abhidharma Buddhism, the kāmadhātu consisted of such evil realms as hell, hungry pretas, and brute creations, which constituted the lowest stratum. Above this, on the surface of the earth, came the world of man with Mount Sumeru—which was none but the Himālayas idealized as the highest mountain—surrounded on four quarters by the four lands where man lived. Above this world of man were thought to exist the 'six heavens of desire' (ṣaḍ-deva-nikāya, Skt.; rokuyokuten, Jap.). Here in these six heavens of the 'world of desire' lived, at the foot of each quarter of Mount Sumeru, the 'four guardians of the earth' (cāturmahārājakāyika, Skt.; shitennō, Jap.), whose duty it was to protect the 'four lands' (shishū, Jap.);[1] and on top of Mount Sumeru, the thirty-three gods (trāyastriṁśadeva, Skt.; sanjūsanten, Jap.)—Indra to begin with—had their palaces in which they lived. As these four guardian gods and the thirty-three gods lived on land, they were called the 'land-abiding gods' (bhūmyavacaradeva, Skt.; jigoten, Jap.). But further up in the sky lived the four gods of 'Yama' (yamaten, Jap.), 'Tuṣita' (tosotsuten, Jap.), 'Nirmāṇarati' (kerakuten, Jap.), and 'Paranirmitavaśavartin' (takejizaiten, Jap.). As these gods had their abodes in the sky, they were called 'āntarikṣavāsin', the 'sky-abiding gods' (kūgoten, Jap.). The heavens of the above-stated six gods of desire were the

1) India (Jambudvīpa, Skt.) was one of the four lands, situated to the south of Mount Sumeru (Tr.).

worlds which one gained, as in the case of those who gain high births in the world of man, by doing such relative good acts as dāna and precept-observing. It is needless to say that those who were born as man under unhappy circumstances and those who were born in evil realms such as hell, hungry pretas, and brute creations were so born because of the ill acts done in their previous lives.

Next came such heavens as those of 'form' (rūpadhātu, Skt.; shikikai, Jap.) and 'no-form' (arūpadhātu, Skt.; mushikikai, Jap.). These were the worlds where one gained birth as a recompense of the dhyānas* done in one's previous life. These dhyānas were made up of four such varieties as: the 'first dhyāna' (shozen, Jap.), the 'second dhyāna' (dainizen, Jap.), the 'third dhyāna' (daisanzen, Jap.), and the 'fourth dhyāna' (daishizen, Jap.), which were so named because the differences in the degree of mental concentration, which is light or heavy, shallow or deep. Higher up, there were such serenely tranquil forms of dhyānas as the 'four no-form dhyānas' (catasra arūpyasamāpattayaḥ, Skt.; shimushikijō, Jap.), which were the 'space-boundlessness meditation' (ākāśānantyāyatana-samāpatti, Skt.; kūmuhenshojō, Jap.),[1)] the 'consciousness-boundlessness meditation' (vijñānānantyāyatana-samāpatti, Skt.; shikimuhenshojō, Jap.),[2)] the 'all-emptiness meditation' (ākiñcanyāyatana-samāpatti, Skt.; mushoushojō, Jap.),[3)] and the 'thoughtlessness and

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1) The first of the arūpadhātu meditations. A dhyāna by which one desires to attain the boundlessness of space and which one practises as one desires to abandon the world of rūpa (matter), which is of colour and form (Tr.).

2) The second of the arūpadhātu meditations. A dhyāna by which one desires to gain the tranquility of mind, with conciousness as an intermediary and which is so practised to get out of the boundlessness of space (Tr.).

3) The third of the arūpadhātu meditations. A dhyāna practised, after experiencing the boundlessnesses of both 'space' and 'con-→

no-thoughtlessness meditation' (naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana-samāpatti, Skt.; hisōhihisōshojō, Jap.).[1] Those who had perfected the above-quoted dhyānas in this life were thought to gain birth, as a recompense, after death, and according to the grade of practice attained, the world answering to the grade attained. This was so conceived as the result of the karmic theory of causality. These were the heavens of 'form' (rūpadhātu) and 'no-form' (arūpadhātu).

For example, one who had practised the first-grade dhyāna of rūpadhātu in this life gained birth, after death, in the first-dhyāna heaven. This first-grade dhyāna again had in it the three grades of top, middle, and bottom. One who had mastered the lowest-grade dhyāna gained birth in 'brahmapāriṣadya' (bonshu-ten, Jap.), the lowest of the first-dhyāna heaven; one who had mastered the middle-grade dhyāna gained birth in 'brahma-purohita' (bonpoten, Jap.); one who had mastered the highest-grade dhyāna gained birth in 'mahā-brahmā' (daibon-ten, Jap.), the highest of the first-grade heaven. The second-grade and the third-grade dhyāna also had three grades each. And each one gained, after death, birth in each heaven, according to the grade of dhyāna each had practised. As to the fourth-dhyāna heaven, there is a slight difference in detail by different schools. It was said that there were seven or nine heavens. Even in these, one gained birth by the grade of the dhyāna that one had practised. In the case of the superb arūpa-dhātu heaven too, things were the same. Answering to the practice of each of the four classes of the arūpadhātu medita-

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(Cont. from p. 69, note)
sciousness', one in which one realizes that all is void and empty (Tr.).

1) The fourth of the arūpadhātu meditations. A dhyāna practised to attain a state in which the coarse mentality is made away with and in which there yet remains a trace of minor mentality (Tr.).

tion, one gained birth in the heaven of each dhyāna practised.

Such names of heavens as those of the ṣaḍ-deva-nikāya, rūpadhātu, and arūpadhātu most probably go back to the myths of India previous to the days of Buddhism or to the dhyānas dating before Buddhism. There are some names that do not appear in the literature of the days previous to those of Buddhism. Even these could possibly go back to yet earlier days. Yama of kāmadhātu comes from Yama, the god of death, whose name was known since the days of the *Vedas*. The 'thirty-three heavens' may also go back to the 'thirty-three gods' of the days of the *Vedas*. Śakra (taishaku, Jap.), who is also called 'Śakra Devānām Indra' (shakudaikan'in, Jap.), meaning 'Śakra, the king of gods', points to Indra, the highest of the gods of the days of the *Vedas*. But in Buddhist cosmogony Indra is not the highest god of the universe, but only the highest of the gods of the earth, of the kāmadhātu. And above Indra, there were numerous other gods such as the 'heaven-abiding gods', those of the world of form, and of the world of no-form.

Next, Brahmā (bonten, Jap.), the highest of the gods of the universe of the days of the *Brāhmaṇas*, according to Buddhist cosmogony, sits above Indra. Even at that, he finds his place only in the world of form, as one of the first-dhyāna heavens, the lowest of the world of form, which is made up of the brahma-pāriṣadya, brahma-purohita, and mahā-brahmā, having above, even such other heavens as the second-dhyāna heaven up to the four arūpadhātu heavens. Further, Buddhism talks about the Supramundane World, that transcends the Three Worlds, the world where sages live. This shows that the highest of the gods of Brahmanism is very lowly placed.

Thus seen, the concept of the Three Worlds of the Buddhist —possibly the extension of the three worlds of 'heaven',

'sky', and 'earth' of the days of the *Vedas*—may have been one adopted and organized from what had existed before. This was because it was felt necessary to explain concretely each item of the popular Buddhist theory of karma. Even in the days of the Buddha, the term 'trayo dhātavaḥ' (three worlds) was used. But it alluded to matters of the spiritual world rather than the concrete actual one. We say 'kāmadhātu' (world of desire), 'rūpadhātu' (world of form), and 'arūpadhātu' (world of no-form). But these referred to the mental states of man. When there was much sensual desire, it was called kāmadhātu; the state answering to that of the dhyānas from the first to the fourth was called 'rūpadhātu'; and the tranquil, spiritually-unified state was called 'arūpadhātu'. The sūtras of Primitive Buddhism contain also, other than the above-stated, such a combination of terms as the 'world of form' (rūpadhātu), the 'world of no-form' (arūpadhātu), and the 'world of extinction' (nirodhadhātu, Skt.; mekkai, Jap.). But these cannot be taken to represent any actual world. Further, a 'Supramundane World' (lokottara, Skt.; shusseken, Jap.) is talked about, where the sages are said to live. This is said to exist beyond the cosmic category of the Three Worlds. But this only points to the spiritually-enlightened state of a sage. But as Abhidharma Buddhism began to state the karma theory in concrete terms, the Three Worlds came to be regarded as concrete worlds where living things lived.

The cosmogony that thus emerged was one that had strayed out of the original standpoint of Buddhism and in which we come across what are irrational and incongruous. If the Three Worlds were to be things concrete, what are we to do with the 'arūpadhātu', which must be, for example, a world without matter or substance? Could there be a world made up of spirit only, without any matter or substance? Or could there be

any living thing that is purely spiritual? Any phenomenal existence must necessarily be within the boundary of space and time. A world without matter means a world without any spatial extension. We cannot logically conceive any existence that has no spatial extension. This implied that a world or a living thing as of the arūpadhātu cannot actually exist. But, later, people even began to discuss about the life-span of the gods of this heaven.

Even the explanation of the rūpadhātu is not quite satisfactory. For example, it says that there comes about in the first dhyāna no sense of smell or taste, and that in the dhyānas above the second no sense of sight, hearing, or touch. This leads to the conclusion that the gods of the first-dhyāna heaven have no such sense-organs of smell and taste as the nose and the tongue, and that the gods of the grade of the second-dhyāna have no eyes and ears. Just as there can be no living thing without body, possessing but spirit only, we cannot conceive any living being (animal) that has no sense-organs.

What Primitive Buddhism said about dhyāna and the world of dhyāna was after all just a notion, or, at most a metaphorical or mythological conception expanded upon and explained by the people of Abhidharma Buddhism as actual and concrete existences: hence the most irrational presentations. This kind of notional and factual difference exists between Primitive Buddhism and Abhidharma Buddhism. The case does not limit itself to cosmogony only; there are not a few in other fields. This down-grading and popularizing of the standard is to be found, as will be explained later, even in the theory of pratītya-samutpāda. This treatment was seen not only in Buddhism, but also in the Brahmanic teachings and in other philosophical thoughts, where it was common, even before and after Buddhism. Only the Primitive Buddhism of Śākyamuni Buddha

was consistent all through with notional rationalism. This is clear as we look into the texts of Primitive Buddhism. Here too, we see how superb Buddhism was.

Just as the names of the gods appearing in karma thoughts and in the cosmogony of the trayo dhātavaḥ show the influence of the general trend of India of the day, such names of dhyāna as the rūpadhātu-dhyāna and the arūpadhātu-dhyāna were not particularly of the Buddhist teaching; most probably they were borrowings from other teachings. As to the dhyānas from the first to the fourth, there was one among those practising the dhyāna, who said that the first dhyāna was the nirvāṇa where birth and death were not known; and another who alleged that the dhyānas from the second to the fourth were the highest stages of emancipation. And Āḷāra-Kālāma, by whom Śākyamuni Buddha was taught while yet practising the Way, said that the ākiñcanyāyatana-samāpatti (all-emptiness meditation) was the highest of the ideal, while Uddaka-Rāmaputta is reported to have alleged that the naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana-samāpatti (thoughtlessness and no-thoughtlessness meditation) was the highest state of nirvāṇa. But Śākyamuni Buddha said that even these dhyānas were all imperfect acts of good not yet devoid of the transmigration of birth and death. Buddhism adopted these dhyāna systems. But this was nothing more than the result of influence worked upon it by the current thought of the day.

With Buddhism, the world of deathless nirvāṇa is one that transcends the trayo dhātavaḥ, the worlds of illusion; it is an illusionless Supramundane World. This concept of nirvāṇa goes back, as already said, to the brahma-loka of the *Upaniṣads*. It even goes further back to the thought of amṛta of the days of the *Vedas* and *Brāhmaṇas*. And as the *Upaniṣads* said that this state was not to be attained through such deeds of relative good

as rituals, dāna, fasting, penance, etc., but by the right wisdom of the oneness of Brahman-Ātman, Buddhism says that nirvāṇa is not attained by alms-giving, precept-observing, or the dhyāna of the leakable grade, but by the right unleakable wisdom as of the Four Noble Truths and of pratītyasamutpāda, the law of interdependence. Only Buddhism, unlike orthodox Brahmanism, did not see any such birthless and deathless eternal entity as Brahman-Ātman, but sat on the principle of 'selflessness' (anātman).*

In this way, in all such thoughts of karma and transmigration and the theories of religious practice and emancipation, what Buddhism put forward were the results of influence worked upon Buddhism by the Indian thought of the day. But, as will be explained later, it did not unconditionally take in all things, but adopted them from the Buddhistic standpoint with a critical mind. Whereas other contemporary teachings talk of an eternal self of ātman, Buddhism, for example, talks of 'no eternal self', 'non-ātman' (anātman). Further, the minute details of religious practices talked about in Buddhism were all what other religions had expounded. But Buddhism attached to them its own meanings. Organization was worked out and rational systems were given to all these. This is what we do not see in Indian religions other than Buddhism.

CHAPTER III

THOUGHTS PARTICULAR TO PRIMITIVE BUDDHISM THAT DISTINGUISHES BUDDHISM FROM OTHER RELIGIONS

1. Fundamental Standpoint of Buddhism and What the Contemporary Teachings Alleged

In the preceding chapter we have seen how Buddhism, under the influence of the Indian thoughts of the day, adapted itself to these thoughts. Here we will see how it differed from others and how it had a thought peculiarly its own. What is most important of all is the fact that Primitive Buddhism had negated metaphysics. This is manifested in such themes of Buddhism as 'anitya' (shogyōmujō, Jap.) and 'anātman' (shohōmuga, Jap.).[1] To begin with, 'anitya' means that all phenomenal existences are not permanent and that they ever change. By 'anātman' is meant that all existences are not fixed once for all, not absolute, but are relative and interdependent.

Why had it to put forward such themes? Because all the religions and philosophical thoughts of the day had disputed about the metaphysical and ontological basis of the universe. They thought all existences were not influenced by time and space and were eternally unchanging. Against this, Śākyamuni Buddha said that what does not exist within the range of time and space stands eternally above man's experience and that, therefore, we could not recognize or give judgment on it: so, we must leave off discussion. What we needed to care about

1) →Chap. IV, pp. 92 ff.

was only the phenomenal world in which we live, where we experience sorrow, where we have worries, and where we can practise the Way and make effort, by which we could get rid of what worries us. He said that this phenomenal world was not one definite and unchanging, but one not fixed and one changing. Here rested the main theme of discussion upon which Buddhism stood. 'Anātman' too negates the eternal, unchanging, fixed base of existence. It says that all are phenomenal existences relative and interdependent, where birth and death go and change takes place.

Against this, most of the philosophies and religions of the day discussed the ontological and metaphysical phase of the world. Of the ontological, there were those of monism, dualism, and pluralism. The orthodox Brahmanism which had handed down the tradition of the *Vedas* put forward, for example, the highest god, the creator and controller of the universe and life and said that this god was the eternal 'is'. To this eternal 'one and all' being, several such names were given, since of old, as: 'Prajāpati' (shōshu, Jap.), 'Indra' (taishakuten, Jap.), 'Brahmā' (bonten, Jap.), 'Īśvara' (jizaiten, Jap.). The names differed as ages differed. Śiva and Viṣṇu, the highest of the latter-day Hinduism, too were monotheistic gods.

All this was to view the ontological and the first principle of the universe from religious standpoints. But from the philosophic standpoint of orthodox Brahmanism, such as the *Upaniṣads* to begin with, the highest principle in this sense was called 'Brahman' (bon, Jap.) or 'Ātman' (ga, Jap.). They said that Brahman, the cosmic principle, and Ātman, the principle of one's own self, were not different. Thus, a monism of Brahman-Ātman was put forward. This eternal and unchanging reality, i.e. 'Brahman which is Ātman', is said to constitute the backbone of the phenomenal world. But as the Brahmins of

the day did not know what 'self' was and why 'self' was put forward, they only emphasized the existence of 'self', forgetting about the actual practising of the Way. The Buddha, seeing that this insistence upon self tended to mislead the people, put forward the antithetic 'not-self' as the basic significance of his teaching. So, this 'not-self' negates such an ontological nature of self. It contains in it also a practical phase of 'selflessness in action' (muga, Jap.), a signification most important, about which explanation will be made later.

Thus, orthodox Brahmanism mainly put forward, both religiously and philosophically, a monism. This monism may explain the principle, but not fully the relation between reality and phenomena. So, after the days of Mid Upaniṣad, i.e. around the period before and after the days of the rise of Buddhism, there came about, in orthodox Brahmanism, the Sāṁkhya, a thought of dualism, which put forward a pure spiritual principle of 'Puruṣa' (shinga, Jap.) and the basic principle of 'Prakṛti' (jishō, Jap.) or 'Pradhāna' (daiichigen'in, Jap.), which calls forth phenomena. This expanded into the basic theories of the Sāṁkhya and Yoga schools of the days of the Six Schools (roppatetsugaku, Jap.).* In this case also, Puruṣa, the pure spiritual principle, was an eternal cosmic principle. Also, Prakṛti, the basic principle that opens out the phenomena of matter and mind, was none but the eternal 'is' that knows no birth and death. This dualism, it seems, was not much related to Primitive Buddhism.[1]

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1) The two ṛṣis Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta by whom the Buddha is said to have once been taught in the days when he had been practising the Way are said to have been those who had practised dhyāna in accordance with the teaching of the Sāṁkhya philosophy. But the life of the Buddha that refers to this is not the one that is the oldest material. According to old texts and those of Primitive Buddhism, it does not refer to the relation be-→

Next, the non-orthodox śramaṇas mainly put forward theories of pluralism. Against the fact that the orthodox group viewed things from the standpoint of time-relation in an organic concept of flux, viz. the 'satkāryavāda' (inchū-uka-ron, Jap.), which states that the cause already embosoms the result, and the 'pariṇāmavāda' (tenpensetsu, Jap.), which says that all phenomenal things are by nature transient,[1] the non-orthodox groups viewed things mechanically and horizontally, breaking up things into elements that constituted these, viz. the 'asatkāryavāda' (inchū-muka-ron, Jap.), which says that the cause does not embosom the result, which was the 'ārambhavāda' (shakujūsetsu, Jap.), which states that motes combine and make up things or existences.[2] This of itself led to pluralism. We have already alluded, in the preceding chapter, to the non-orthodox teachings of the six contemporary teachings of the day of the Buddha. But we will now look into them once again from the standpoint of pluralism.

Pakudha-Kaccāyana of the Six Masters* of the Buddha's days talked about 'seven bodies' (satta-kāya, P.; shichishin, Jap.), i.e. the 'seven elements' of earth, water, fire, wind, happiness, sorrow, and soul, and professed that each was eternal and unchanging. And Makkhali-Gosāla added, it is said, to the above seven, space, birth, death, gain, and loss and professed that twelve were the fundamental elements. Also, Mahāvīra, the

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(Cont. from p. 78)
tween the Buddha and the two ṛṣis and to the teachings of Sāṁkhya and Yoga. So, it is doubtful if ever the Sāṁkhya existed in the days of the Buddha as a school of thought. Looked at from the standpoint of the Sāṁkhya itself, the emergence of this school dates far later than the days of the Buddha.

1) A theory saying that many can result from one. →NS, p. 48 (Tr.).

2) The proposition stands on a postulation which thinks that the world is made up of unbreakable and eternal mote elements that gather and combine and bring forth existences.→NS, p. 48 (Tr.).

founder of Jainism, put forward the two of 'soul' (jīva, Skt.; reikon, Jap.) and 'non-soul' (ajīva, Skt.; hireikon, Jap.) as existences. He stood on an animistic ground and professed that man and animal and even such inanimate objects as plant, even water, fire, and wind too had a soul and that the soul was an existence eternal and unchanging. As 'ajīva', he put forward the four of 'dharma' (hō, Jap.), the principle of movement, 'adharma' (hihō, Jap.), the principle of non-movement, 'ākāśa' (kū, Jap.), space, and 'pudgala' (busshitsuyōso, Jap.), the elements of matter, and professed that these four too were eternal existences. Thus, Jainism took up the above five as substance elements and called these 'pañcāstikāya' (goushin, Jap.), the 'five bodies of existence'.

Influenced by the twelve-element theory of Gosāla and the five-element theory of Jainism, there came about, even among orthodox Brahmins those who had professed pluralism. The Vaiśeṣika (katsuron, Jap.), one of the Six Schools,* is an instance. This school put forward the 'six word-significations' (ṣaṭpadārtha, Skt.; rokukugi, Jap.) of 'substance' (dravya, Skt.; jitsu, Jap.), 'characteristic' (guṇa, Skt.; toku, Jap.), 'action' (karma, Skt.; gō, Jap.), 'sameness' (sāmānya, Skt.; dō, Jap.), 'difference' (viśeṣa, Skt.; i, Jap.), and 'harmony' (samavāya, Skt.; wagō, Jap.) or the ten categories of word-signification, which include, besides the above, the further four of 'ability' (śakti, Skt.; unō, Jap.), 'inability' (aśakti, Skt.; munō, Jap.), 'partial-agreeing' (sādṛśya, Skt.; kubun, Jap.), and 'non-existence' (abhāva, Skt.; musetsu, Jap.),[1] and professed that these represented reality. These are further classified into many kinds. For example, it will say that 'dravya' contains further the nine kinds of earth, water, fire, wind, space, time, direction, self, and

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1) Here 'non-existence' (abhāva) itself, which is 'nothingness', is also taken in as a category of reality.→RT, p. 318 (Tr.).

mind, each of which being regarded as an eternal real existence.

Further, the Sarvāstivāda school (setsuissaiubu, Jap.) of Abhidharma Buddhism is said to have alleged that 'the elements in the Three Times[1] truly exist and are eternal' (sanzejitsuu-hottaigōu, Jap.). The school classified the phenomena of matter and mind into as many as 'five categories and seventy-five elements' (goi-shichijūgohō, Jap.) and said that each element existed in the Three Times and that the element (dharma, Skt.) persisted eternally. From this standpoint we may say that it is closely related to Jainism and the Vaiśeṣika school. Possibly it had further developed, influenced, directly or indirectly, by the teachings other than Buddhism. But being Buddhism, it did not call, as in other teachings, what exists the 'original body' (hontai, Jap.) or the 'true body' (jittai, Jap.). Also, of the seventy-five elements or dharmas, all, except the 'non-created' (asaṁskṛta, Skt.; muihō, Jap.),[2] are classified under the category of the phenomenal which come and go and which undergo change. Even the 'non-created', which is to know no birth and death, originally spoke of nirvāṇa, the supramundane world which stood beyond the ordinary category of existence. But Abhidharma Buddhism conceived it as an existence that does not suffer change. The Sarvāstivāda school ascribed to it even 'space' (ākāśa). Even at that, it differs from the metaphysical notion of reality conceived in other teachings. For, Primitive Buddhism and even Abhidharma Buddhism do not recognize any metaphysical existence or substance. In this sense, the element theory of the Sarvāstivāda school cannot be treated as one of the pluralisms of the other

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1) The three of past, present, and future (Tr.).
2) What transcends the category of creation within the notion of the causes direct and indirect. The eternal world beyond the phenomenal; tathatā is so named.→NS, p. 44 (Tr.).

teachings.

2. Two World-Views of 'Not-Is' and 'Is', and Scepticism

Orthodox or non-orthodox, teachings other than Buddhism thus all put forward monism, dualism, and pluralism as the logical basis of existence and said that there was a metaphysical core basis from which things took start. Buddhism called all such propositions that talked about eternal reality by the single term of 'sassata-diṭṭhi' (P.), the theory of 'eternally-is' (jōken, Jap.). This stands against 'uccheda-diṭṭhi' (P.), the 'not-is' (danken, Jap.). 'Not-is' is a world-view which thinks that existences are not eternal and that all break off, perish, and finally get reduced to sheer nothingness. And in regard to self, the 'eternally-is' alleged that the soul, which was self, ever existed after the bodily death and before birth. Against this, the 'not-is' said that by birth the soul suddenly appeared in man's body from utter nothingness and that by the physical death, it died along with. This will say that the soul has life only with the body and that it comes out of nothingness and turns back to nothingness. This amounts to saying that other than the physical body there is no soul. This is like materialism that thinks that the body is the soul. Actually, Ajita Kesakambalī was a materialist who had professed that there was no self or soul other than the material elements of earth, water, fire, and wind. In this case, no allusion is made as to whether such substances as earth, water, fire, and wind are permanent or momentary. Some may have said that elements were permanent, but that the self perished. But the true extirpation theory must say that both the substance and spirit come about from nothingness and that they again turn back to noth-

ingness. In the 'Sixty-two Heresies' (dvāsaṭṭhi-diṭṭhigatāni, P.; rokujūnikenron, Jap.) which were the heretical views seen from the Buddhist standpoint, there were seven 'not-is' theories against the four of the 'eternally-is'.[1] Whatever the kind, the not-is theories negated reality. This means that these negatively took up the question of reality. Hence, this is also one of the metaphysical views of life.

Further, it is said that among the heretical views of the day there were those that could be termed as the 'indefinite' or scepticism, the thoughts of which could not be classified as either the 'eternally-is' or the 'not-is', and those which neither negated nor affirmed. Such were the Sañjaya of the Six Masters (rokushi, Jap.) and Dīghanakha, uncle of Śāriputra. They were called 'amaravikkhepa', the 'undying derangement theory' (fushikyōranron, Jap.), or 'homanron' (Jap.), the 'to-catch-eels theory', because they but spoke this and that and could not rightly be caught hold of just as when we try to catch hold of eels. In modern parlance, what they said was none but sophistry. It is said that among the Sixty-

1) The four eternally-is theories look back to the world gone by and allege that though man's body and mind repeat birth and death and transmigrate, the self and the world are unconnected with birth and death, being permanent and unchanging. As they are four in the number and in the way of looking back to the past, we say the 'four kinds of eternally-is theories' (shishu-no-jōken, Jap.). Next, the 'seven kinds of the not-is theories' are the seven of: 1) the flesh and body born of parents, 2) the body of the heavenly beings of the kāmadhātu, 3) the body of the heavenly beings of the rūpadhātu, 4) the self that has attained the ākāśānantyāyatana-samāpatti, 5) the self that has attained the vijñānānantyāyatana-samāpatti, 6) the self that has attained the ākiñcanyāyatana-samāpatti, and 7) the self that has attained the naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana-samāpatti. What is said is that these seven get reduced to sheer nothingness after death.→The *Dīgha-nikāya, 2,* and the *Bonmōkyō.*

two Heresies there were four kinds of sophistry or scepticism.[1] These did not positively take up the question of the ontological principle, but doubted the ontological aspect of the world or stopped talking when matters came to refer to the subject. They did not act as Buddhism which positively negated ontology and took to phenomenalism. This tells that they too, directly or indirectly, cared about ontology.

Thus far, we have gone through the metaphysical theories of ontological stand, no matter whether the attitude was positive or negative. Buddhism classified these theories into ten or fourteen groups, calling them the 'ten indefinables' (jūmuki, Jap.) or the 'fourteen indefinables' (jūshimuki, Jap.). The term 'avyākata' (muki, Jap.) means 'what is not explained about', which amounts to: 'what cannot be either written or explained'. Because what is metaphysical is not phenomenal which lies within the boundary of space and time, because it stands beyond man, so that he cannot directly experience or recognize it and, therefore, we cannot judge and say this and that. Now, the ten indefinables are:

a. The self and the world are, in the concept of time: ......
- 1) infinite
- 2) finite
- 3) infinite and also finite
- 4) neither infinite nor finite

1) By the four kinds of sophistry is meant that one fears, when expressing opinions regarding good and bad or when speaking out definitely, that: 1) the words might turn out to end in vain, 2) attachment might arise, or that 3) one talks ambiguously because one fears one might be spoken ill of, and that 4) just because of the born quality of intellectual ignorance, one does not speak out definitely as to whether there is or is not the world to come, whether there are or are not the transformed beings, whether there is or is not the karmic fruition, or whether the Tathāgata lives or does not live after death. →The *Dīgha-nikāya* (the *Brahmajāla-sutta*) and the *Bonmōkyō*.

b.	The world is, spatially:	5) infinite 6) finite
c.	The soul and the body are:	7) the same 8) different
d.	The Tathāgata (one who is enlightened), after death:...	9) lives 10) does not live

When we say 'fourteen indefinables', we add to 'b', further, the two categories of: 'finite and infinite' and 'neither finite nor infinite'; to 'd', further, the two categories of 'lives and does not live' and 'not lives and not does-not-live'. But actually it is rational to add to 'c' also 'the same and different' and 'neither the same nor different', and thus to get sixteen indefinables. 'a', 'b', 'c', and 'd' are thus each to have four categoreis, which is more rational.[1]

Thus, to classify a thing into four categories is called 'catuṣkoṭika' (shikufunbetsu, Jap.). This is, in judging a thing, to: 1) affirm, 2) negate, 3) affirm and negate, and 4) neither affirm nor negate. This is the ordinary logic of India in judging a thing. For example, we take up the case of 'a'. 1) alleges that the self and the world are, from the category of time, infinite and permanent. This tells that one sees in and

1) But in the texts of Primitive Buddhism, we come across, in the case of indefinables, other than a,b,c,d, further 'e', which will have it that the self or the world is: 1) made by itself, 2) made by another, 3) both made by itself and made by another, 4) neither made by itself nor made by another; and 'f', which will have it that the sorrow, happiness, self, or world is: 1) permanent, 2) impermanent, 3) permanent and impermanent, 4) neither permanent nor impermanent; and also 'g', which will have it that the sorrow, happiness, self, or world is: 1) made by itself, 2) made by another, 3) both made by itself and made by another, 4) neither made by itself nor made by another.

out of one's own self an existence which is eternal and undying. So, it is the theory of ' eternally-is '. Against this, 2) alleges the finiteness of one's self and the world. This says that all that exist around one die out, which is the theory of ' not-is '. 3) says that there are in what exist in one's own self and the world those that are permanent and those that die out. It means that this recognizes in one's own self and the world that which is permanent and that which dies out. This is what we might call the ' partial eternally-is ' (ichibunjō, Jap.) and the ' partial not-is ' (ichibundan, Jap.), and is an eclectic view of 1) and 2). 4) negates both 1) and 2), which means that one cannot definitely say as either 1) or 2). This is, so to say, an ' indefinable ', which is a scepticism. True scepticism does not say ' not 1) ' or ' not 2) '; it will not arrive at any affirmation at all. But the scepticism or sophistry of the day seems to have been putting things in this way. Here logic and clarity are lacking in the statement and this became the butt of attack by the Buddha.

As to the relation between the soul and the body of ' c ', we may say that 1) if it is that the soul and the body are to be one, this means that our soul appears together with the body and dies out as the body dies out. So, this is a ' not-is ' theory and 2) if it is that the soul and the body are different, this means that the soul does not appear along with the body either before the body or after death. So, this is an ' eternally-is ' theory, which talks about the undyingness of the soul. It is not necessary to say that 3) is an eclectic theory and that 4) a scepticism.

To conclude, we may say that each of the above-stated ten or fourteen indefinables belongs to the ' eternally-is ', the ' not-is ', eclecticism or scepticism. All these dispute about ontology, which is in itself metaphysical. Primitive Buddhism negated this metaphysics from the very outset. The well-known ' *Senyukyō* '

(*Mālunkya-sutta*, P.) of the *Chūagon* is the best instance. Here Śākyamuni Buddha shows his attitude.

According to this sūtra, there was a bhikṣu called Mālunkya-putta, who had entered the order from a non-Buddhist teaching. Hearing that the Buddha was a most eminent philosopher of the day, he became a Buddhist, desiring to gain the right answers to the ten indefinables which other teachings were generally disputing. And he was speculating on such questions as 'finite' or 'non-finite' relating to the self and the world in the concept of time, 'finite' or 'non-finite' in relation to the world in the concept of space, and the 'same' or 'different' relating to the soul and the body. But the Buddha and his disciples were not concerned about these questions at all. Not satisfied, he came to the Buddha, definitely to ask of him about this point. He said that he would leave the Buddha's camp if the Buddha did not give an answer to his question.

The Buddha said to Mālunkya: 'I never told you to embrace my teaching and practise the Way, saying I would explain to you the ten indefinables; I never promised to explain the ten indefinables to you, did I? And you, too, did not become a Buddhist, promising your own self regarding this matter. Anybody who, like you, insists that he will not practise the Way will die before coming to know rightly of the Buddhist teaching. Because any such metaphysical questions as the ten indefinables are what we can never rationally experience or solve; the solution of the problem is eternally impossible.

'Yours is like the case of a young man hit by an arrow which is treated with deadly poison. The relatives and friends are much worried. They call in a surgeon and try to extract the poisoned arrow. But the man would not let him. He says he will not let others have the arrow extracted unless he knows if it was a man or a woman who had directed it at him, from what local-

ity the person came, what the caste was, what the name, how the style, how the face, and how old; also, how big or small the bow was that had discharged this arrow, and what the string was made of. Was it a rattan or a string? Or a catgut? What was the arrow made of? Was it a rattan or a reed? Of what is the feather of the arrow? Is it of an eagle, a hawk, or a peacock? What ties the arrow? Is it the tendon of a cow, a buffalo, or a deer? What is the barb of the arrow made of? Is it of iron or bone? What kind of poison is it that is used? It is like saying and protesting that unless all these questions are solved, the poisoned arrow should not be extracted. In the meanwhile, the deadly poison will travel all over the body and the man will die.

'You blindly insist that unless the ten indefinables are explained to you, you will not practise the Way. This is like the case of the young man hit by a poisoned arrow. The doubts of the young man may get solved, but anything like the question of the ten indefinables can never be solved. If you are to wait for the solution and then embrace Buddhism, you will absolutely have no chance of coming to understand the Buddhist teaching; you will probably not make away with sorrow. Even if the questions of the ten indefinables get solved, it never helps one to get rid of sorrow'.

Hearing this, Mālunkya-putta realized his fault and he followed the right injunction of the Buddha.[1]

3. Why did Primitive Buddhism Negate Metaphysics?

The first of the reasons why Śākyamuni Buddha deprecated metaphysics was the fact that metaphysics is beyond man's cognition or experience and we can never arrive at a solution.

1) The *Chūagon*, 221 (the *Senyukyō*). The *Majjhima-nikāya*, 63 (the *Mālunkya-sutta*).

The present-day astronomy discusses the questions such as whether the world is beginningless or endless, or whether it has a beginnig or an end; or whether the world has an end or no end in spatial extension. But all this is only possible within the boundary of supposition. We cannot experience for ourselves the beginning or the end of the world, nor can we go to the end of the world. If so, we are not in a position to solve the question. The same applies to the question of the soul. As to whether it is undying or it snaps off and turns to nothingness, we can never know and say this and that, unless we can experience the world that was before or that is to be after our life.

This negation of metaphysics by the Buddha can well be compared to the case of Kant who had deprecated the materialism and idealism which were discussed in the philosophy of the days previous to him. Because these were the questions impossible to solve, as all stand beyond the world of experience. It was also because of this that Kant had avoided to state or study the thing itself that sat beyond human experience, of which existence we nevertheless might guess at.

The second reason for deprecating metaphysics comes from the fact that, even if such metaphysical questions were to be solved, it never helps us to get rid of uneasiness and sorrow. Against the fact that religious practice and emancipation all concern the things of the phenomenal world which we can actually feel and touch, the world of metaphysics is unrelated to this experiencing. This situation compares well with Greek philosophy in which Socrates urged moral virtue which could be of use to life and opposed the sophists who had discussed the matter just for discussion's sake, having nothing to do with the actual moral or spiritual enrichment of the self. This is to say that metaphysics has no connection with religious

practice and emancipation: hence of no help to religion.

As regards the above two points, Śākyamuni Buddha says that any search into metaphysics has no 'gain in Law' (dhamma-saṁhita, P.; hō-no-nyōyaku, Jap.) and no 'gain in signification' (attha-saṁhita, P.; gi-no-nyōyaku, Jap.). The 'gain in Law' corresponds to intellectual truth and moral justice, and the 'gain in signification' to what has actual value and what is useful. Consequently, such theories as the 'eternally-is' and the 'not-is' are no truth of the world and nothing useful to life religiously or morally. This was the situation.

What Buddhism is concerned with is what is perfect in 'Law' and 'signification'. If truth has nothing to do with practice and the emancipation of self and if it is not helpful to society, we must not take it. Even if it is useful to society, we should not take up anything which does not accord with truth; if it goes against morality, we should not take it. The former has nothing to do with practice, which is merely truth for truth's sake or discussion for discussion's sake. Such may well be the truth, but is deprecated as 'idle talk' (prapañca, Skt.; keron, Jap.). In the case of the latter, any faith or practice that does not accord with truth and morality is stamped out as superstition or heresy and is alike deprecated.

Be this as it may, what Buddhism looks for, in the ultimate, in matters of faith and practice, transcends any category of helpful or not helpful, profitable or not profitable, or deliberation or judgment. What it speaks about is 'selflessness in action' (mugagyō, Jap.) which discounts any thought of usefulness or otherwise. In 'giving' (dāna, Skt.) and charity, there is no consciousness as to whether one is giving to the poor, or the recipient is low in standard or miserable, or whether one feels sympathy; or no consciousness as to how much is being given. It is like the case of a mother who just feeds her baby with milk.

What there is is the oneness of one's own self and the other; what there is is but ' to give ', the act of selflessness. This practice of selflessness and the ' gain in signification ' do not contradict one another. About this point, allusion will be made later.[1)]

1) →Chap. IV, 7: ' Wisdom of Prajñā and the Practice of Selflessness '.

CHAPTER IV

CHARACTERISTICS OF PRIMITIVE BUDDHISM

1. Rationality and Objectivity

As stated in the preceding chapter, in regard to such matters as universe and life, subjectivity and objectivity, Primitive Buddhism stood on a ground peculiarly its own, which was totally different from what were generally talked about in the other teachings of the day. From this standpoint, we can recount the characteristics of Buddhism as: 1), when intellectually viewed, rationality and objectivity, 2), from the emotional phase, ethicality and humaneness, and 3), and, from the social points, cosmopolitanism, universality, and open-heartedness. We will examine these one by one.

First of all, what is characteristic of Indian religion is the fact that it is, compared with other religions, extremely intellectual and logical. Most religions of the world talk about faith, moral precepts, and rituals. These all concern the practical side of religion. But seldom is explanation given logically. Against this, any philosophy of India has, as its final objective, a religious signification and looks for the emancipation of self from sorrow. And almost all the religions of India possess their own theories upon which their faith and practice stand. But as stated already,[1] there are not a few cases in which their theories are over-metaphysical, so that the faith cannot actualize, or their theories are too irrational, or the theory and the practice do not accord with each other, thus

1) →Chap. III, pp. 76 ff.

lacking rationality and objectivity. Against this, Primitive Buddhism deprecated metaphysics and took up what were phenomenal and studied them very rationally and objectively. And the central pivot of the doctrine was the 'law of interdependence' (pratītyasamutpāda, Skt.). Further, this law stood on the 'three characteristics' (sanbōin, Jap.)* of: 1) 'all phenomena are transient' (anitya, Skt.; shogyōmujō, Jap.), 2) 'all existences have no undying self' (anātman, Skt.; shohōmuga, Jap.),* and 3) 'nirvāṇa is all-quietness', (nirvāṇa, Skt.; nehanjakujō, Jap.);* or on the 'four characteristics' (shihōin, Jap.),* which have, besides the above three, 'all is sorrow' (duḥkha, Skt.; issaikaiku, Jap.).* The 'Four Noble Truths', a form of the 'law of interdependence',* too may be added to these. All these explain the fundamental thoughts of Primitive Buddhism.

2. The Three or Four Characteristics

The term 'hōin' of 'sanbōin'[1] (Jap.; 'three characteristics') means 'mark or evidence of Buddhism'. So, if the three or four conditions of anitya, etc. fitted in well, it was thought that what was said was Buddhism. Thus, Chinese Buddhism took up the three characteristics as a yard-stick by which to judge a sūtra. The famous 'irohauta',[2] a song composed with the alphabetical units of the Japanese language, popularly ascribed to Kōbōdaishi,[3] also tells us about the three

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1) 'h' at times changes into 'b' after 'n'. So, 'hōin' becomes 'bōin', as 'h' is here preceded by the 'n' of 'san' (Tr.).
2) The 48 basic sound-units of the Japanese language are adeptly woven into a song. Up to so far, believed to have been done by Kōbōdaishi. But seems to be one done in the mid-Heian period (*Kōjien*) (Tr.).
3) The founder of Shingon Buddhism of Japan. Also called 'Kūkai' (Tr.).

characteristics. It will say that if one knew well the contents of the three or four characteristics, one had gained the essentials of Buddhist thought.

All Phenomena are Transient Since of old, the people of China and Japan loved to say 'shogyōmujō', which is 'all phenomena are transient' (anitya). But this was so said when things went from good to bad. When anybody died, for example, we said it was because 'all phenomena were transient'. This was, no doubt, an extreme case. Anyhow, the term seems to include in it a sense of pessimism, and desperation even. Because of this perhaps, some say that Buddhism is a pessimistic religion. This, however, is a limited view arising out of insufficient understanding of the contents of anitya and duḥkha.

Now, anitya is not only applicable when a thing moves from good to bad, but is also relevant when a thing moves from bad to good. The world is not immovably fixed once for all. The rich are not always rich; the dull do not necessarily remain dull. It is a common occurrence that the rich become poor, and the dull, if there is endeavour, become wise. As there is change, one can forsake the dissatisfied present and hope for the reward of training and effort. If the poor and the dull are ever to remain the same, there can be no light or hope in life. As there is impermanence, there is light, and one can have hopes and expectation.

Viewed thus, 'impermanence' is a living truth. There is nothing in the world that does not change; all things change and move. Natural science too tells us this. The mind has no moment of rest. Things look static. It only so seems. The table or the bookcase in the study looks the same yesterday and today; it looks as though there has been no change last year and this year. It may so look, but change there is in the age

and the damages it may have sustained. Days go by, a year comes, and we see a change. Thus, each day a change must have been going on to some degree. This indiscernible change is happening with every material thing. Further, modern physics tells us that every element or chemical compound which constitutes a physical existence is made up of an atom and that this atom exists, as in the case of the solar system, the atomic core being surrounded by neutrons and electrons, which move about at a great speed and with regularity. Our eyes may see that all is absolutely static; but a great movement is going on. It is not only that the microcosm of the atom is in motion, but also the macrocosm of the heavenly world. This earth rotates, and rotating it goes around the sun. The solar system itself is further in motion, changing its position every moment. So is it said. The eye may see a physical existence as static. But actually it is changing and is in motion in manifold ways. Thus viewed, mind and matter and all phenomena are, more than what Buddhism says, impermanence itself. So 'impermanence' must be an eternal truth.

Now, why did Buddhism put forth this fundamental premise of 'impermanence'? We see here several significations. First, by impermanence we take a pessimistic and despondent view of life. This is to show that life is 'sorrow' (duḥkha, Skt.; ku, Jap.). The sūtra says: 'It is sorrow because impermanence rules'. This is it. Generally we do not look back on our own self when we are in our best days. But when ill fortune visits us, we look back on our own self. By looking back, we rightly see things. The sorrow seen through impermanence, we gain a right eye and see what we have had no occasion to see up to so far and see the shortcomings of our own self and of the world. Then a religious mind springs forth. It is because of this that we say that impermanence calls forth a

religious mind.[1]

Now, impermanence tells us that nothing in the world is permanent and unchanging. Our own self, those who are intimate to us, wealth, position, or fame may get lost or become worse at any time. As thus we see the true phase of the world which is impermanent, we can renounce attachment to our own self, to those who are intimate to us, to wealth, position, or fame, to which we have held on tenaciously with greed. This is to say that impermanence makes us discard our own self of vain greed. There is a story of bhikṣuṇī Khemā, which tells us how she had abandoned the worldly life and entered the Way.

Bhikṣuṇī Khemā was the consort of Bimbisāra, king of Magadha. She was beautiful and was proud of it. So, even when the king took refuge in the Buddha, she, because of arrogance, did not even try to see the Buddha. Desiring much to make her see the Buddha, the king praised the Buddha in her presence. So, the queen came to think of seeing the Buddha. As the Buddha read her mind, he thought of crushing her arrogance. The Buddha caused a woman far more beautiful than Khemā appear before her and to be fanned and attended to. Seeing this, Khemā was surprised and regretted her own arrogance. The Buddha further made this beautiful young woman become, in her presence, gradually a middle-aged, an elderly, old, and finally a haggard old woman with bent body, an ugly woman, who then powerlessly fell to the ground behind the Buddha. Seeing this actual form of impermanence, Khemā is said to have entered the sangha and became a bhikṣuṇī.[2]

Now, this realization of impermanence enables one to arrive

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1) The texts of Primitive Buddhism everywhere say: 'The five groups (pañca-skandha, Skt.; goun, Jap., i.e. our own body and mind) are impermanent. As they are impermanent, there is sorrow'. It is also stated that by looking into and meditating on the impermanence of the five groups one can arrive at the unsurpassed enlightenment.

2) The *Commentary of the Chōrōnige* (the Therīgāthā), 139–43, note.

at the right view of the world and life, by which one gains a mind to make effort. Our morrow is not certain. So, we must finish up the day's work the same day, not to carry it over to the next day. If we think there is the morrow and if we thus carry things over to the next day, nothing and no good will be completed. There is but today or this moment only once, which will never come again. To view 'birth and death is all important; sharp comes transiency' (shōjijidai-mujōjinsoku, Jap.) is 'to meditate on impermanence' (aniccānupassanā, P.) and to regard highly this moment that never comes again and to make effort. Thus, each moment is highly valued and highly made good use of. Man's life is the heaping up of this moment; there is no life other than the moment in which one actually finds one's own self. So must we make effort every moment. The last word of Śākyamuni Buddha was: 'Vayadhammā saṅkhārā appamādena sampādetha' (Impermanence rules the world; be not indolent, make effort and gain the end). So did Śākyamuni Buddha say to his disciples, which was only in this sense. Seeing that life is impermanent, one comes to value the moment and live it to the full. About this, the *Chūagon* contains the famous gāthā, '*The Wise Man of a Single Night*' (*kenzen-ichiya-no-ge*, Jap.).[1]

All is Sorrow 'Duḥkha' means that 'life is all sorrow'. But as a matter of fact, life has both sorrow and joy. There will probably be no life which is all misfortune and no joy. One who is economically well to do and is blessed with clothing, eating, and living and who is healthy and youthful is happy; one in the contrary situation is not happy. This is commonplace. But the same conditions of economic well-being, health,

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1) Quoted on sect. 9 (p. 215) of this chap.

and environment may be a joy to one, but a source of unhappiness to some, and neither happiness nor unhappiness to another. Because sorrow or happiness is by nature a mental attitude which differs with persons and is mostly a subjective state. As happiness or unhappiness, fortune or misfortune, is subjective and personal, the standard differs with different people. All will not see life necessarily as a worry or a misfortune. So, the premise 'all is sorrow' (duḥkha) is no unconditional truth. This premise may not be as objectively true as the other two which are: 'all phenomena are transient' (anitya) and 'all existences have no undying self' (anātman).[1]* Against this, 'all is sorrow' is taken up as a Buddhist platform of truth and regarded as one of the four characteristics of the teaching. Why?

Now, why do we say that 'all is sorrow' (issaikaiku, Jap.)? Buddhism recounts the three phases of sorrow, which are: 'kuku' (duḥkha-duḥkhatā, Skt.), 'eku' (vipariṇāma-duḥkhatā, Skt.), and 'gyōku' (saṁskāra-duḥkhatā, Skt.). 'Kuku' literally means 'sorrow-sorrow', which mainly refers to bodily pain. The pain ordinarily referred to is this. The one arising out of illness or bodily harm can be a pain to anybody who has the sensibility to feel. So, we will call this the objective pain for the present. But when one's sense is dull or when one's activity is denied one by some other extreme strain, cases can be in which the pain is not totally felt, as when one is anesthetically treated or as when one gets injured in the battlefield.

'Eku' means 'breaking-sorrow' and points to the mental pain caused by any destruction or annihilation. The harm or loss caused to wealth, position, or fame which one had, or the death of one's relative or friend causes one no direct bodily pain. But it

1) →Pp. 100 ff. & Glossary.

leaves behinds a great mental shock, despair, or pain. In as much as expectation or hope was great in respect to what was lost, so much is the hopelessness or despair when that loss is incurred. 'By the thirsting-love comes pain'. So says the law of interdependence or the Four Noble Truths. It is none but this. If there is no desire or expectation of thirsting-love, there is no pain or worry. Thus, any person experiences this 'breaking-sorrow' if there is this 'thirsting-love'.

Lastly, 'gyōku' means that 'the phenomenal world is sorrow'. The 'gyō'* of 'gyōku' is 'saṅkhāra' (saṁskāra, Skt.) and is the same as the 'gyō' of 'shogyō-mujō'.* It means 'to make together'. This points to the phenomenal world. This means that all phenomena stand on condition and cause, no single phenomenon arising or dying without any cause and condition. The fact is well illustrated by such premises as 'all phenomena are transient' (shogyō-mujō, Jap.) and 'all existences have no (undying) self' (shohō-muga, Jap.). Thus, viewed from the standpoints of 'sorrow-sorrow' and 'breaking-sorrow', what we can say is that the phenomenal world is not all sorrow; one feels it only when one experiences bodily or mental harm or loss. When things move towards good, one is happy and is pleased instead. So, the premise that 'all (the phenomenal world) is sorrow' is no unconditional truth.

Now, the premise that the phenomenal world where birth and death and change go is sorrow was not peculiarly Buddhist. It was a belief commonly accepted in the philosophies and religions of India, because it had already such thoughts as 'transmigration' and 'emancipation'. To repeat birth and death was undesirable; emancipation (vimukti, Skt.) and extinction (nirvāṇa, Skt.) were what were desirable. Unless we were definitely emancipated from birth

and death and transmigration, any heavenly pleasure was a thing of limited duration. The evil realms of hell were ever at one's door. No absolutely unchanging happiness was there possible so long as one was fettered to karma and transmigration. This happiness could only be attained when emancipated, i.e. when man had stepped out of the world of birth and death. Viewed thus, the 'gyōku' which said that 'all (that is phenomenal) is sorrow' was also a truth. The 'sorrow' (ku, Jap.)* in this sense stood against the 'bliss' of 'nirvāṇa and all-quiet extinction' (nehan-jakumetsu, Jap.).

Viewed in this way, the three of 'sorrow-sorrow', 'breaking-sorrow', and 'all that is phenomenal is sorrow' are no sorrow through and through and not to everybody. Only from the Buddhist standpoint can we say they are truths and from this angle only can we say 'all is sorrow'. This is opposed to 'nirvāṇa is bliss'. This was what could be said by a sage already emancipated from sorrow. And 'all is sorrow' spoke of the standpoint of a common mortal not yet emancipated, one garbed in 'thirsting-love' and 'clinging'.

All Existences have No Undying Self 'Shohō-muga' (Jap.; anātman, Skt.) means that all existences do not possess such a metaphysical quality of existence as 'self' (ātman). Here the 'hō' (Jap.; dharma, Skt.; dhamma, P.)* of 'shohō'(=all things) means merely a 'thing' or 'what exists'.[1] And this theme constitutes the most central point of Buddhism as a religion and as a teaching of practice. 'All phenomena are transient'

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1) The word 'hō' has such a sense as 'truth', as in 'engi-no-hō' (law of pratītyasamutpāda) or 'teaching' as in 'kyōbō' (sermon of the Buddha or the Buddhist scripture). But here the application of the term is wider, pointing to 'thing' itself. The 'hō' of 'goi-shichijūgohō' (five categories and the seventy-five elements) too means 'thing' or 'element'.

(anitya, Skt.; anicca, P.) is merely theoretical. There is here less of the practical side in this doctrine. Only when we say we 'meditate on impermanence' (aniccānupassanā, P.; mujō-kan, Jap.), it touches on the practical side of the teaching, urging one not to be indolent but to make effort. 'All is sorrow' too does not have a direct bearing on the practice of the Way. But to feel sorrow and to want to evade it is the starting point of religious faith. So, it concerns the practice of the Way. One who does not feel uneasy or worried will not have any religious urge to get liberated. Religion has its function only when one believes that religion relieves one of mental uneasiness or worry and that nothing else whatever can. So, we might well say that one not having uneasiness or worry needs no religion in the strict sense of the term. When the world is felt as sorrow, there is the first call of religion.

Thus, all phenomena are transient (anitya) and 'all is sorrow' (duḥkha) are indirectly connected with religious practice. Against this, 'all existences have no (undying) self' (anātman) directly addresses us about the practical side of Buddhist faith. It is not that it has no theory other than the practical side. That is why 'anātman' has varied significations. First, it divides into the two phases of the theoretical and the practical. These again have various implications.

The theoretical side of 'anātman' (muga, Jap.)* tells us, as alluded to already, that all existences have intrinsically no eternally-fixed nature or quality of its own. This lack of fixed nature is called 'mujishō' (Jap.; niḥsvabhāva, Skt.), which means 'lack of own nature or quality'. The 'jishō' (svabhāva, Skt.), i.e. 'own nature or quality', of 'mujishō' points to an independent metaphysical entity of its own. It is the basic principle of Primitive Buddhism not to recognize any fixed, independent, metaphysical entity of a thing. So, truly to understand Bud-

dhism, one must uncompromisingly know that an existence is essentially selfless. But this theory cannot be understood offhand by a beginner. However, even if this selflessness is not theoretically comprehended, if it is actually grasped, this suffices for practical purposes. So, for beginners and the lay followers of the faith who had no time in life to learn it theoretically or academically, the practical side only was shown and the theoretical side omitted. Thus one was made to arrive at the principle of selflessness as one practised it. The three phases of 'dāna' (dāna-kathā, P.; se-ron, Jap.), 'sīla' (sīla-kathā, P.; kai-ron, Jap.), 'birth in heaven' (sagga-kathā, P.; shōten-ron, Jap.) outwardly referred to the law of causality.[1] But as practice progressed and as purity is augmented, one is led spontaneously to selflessness by degrees.

As it was very difficult for beginners to gain the depths of the theoretical meaning of 'selflessness' or 'no-self' (anātman), cases were not seldom in which this was presented through popular parables at the outset. The '*Zōshakuyugyō*'[2] of the *Chūagon*,[3] for example, is one instance, which tells us in a simpler manner about this anātman. Here, the fact that man's body has no ontological entity of its own self, the 'true self' (jittai, Jap.) or 'true dharma' (jippō, Jap.; true element),[4] is compared to a house which is so called temporarily, but which is only a composite of timber, mud, water, grass, etc., that fill the space. So, it says that man's body is but a temporary name given to an existence which fills the space

1) Pp. 6 off.
2) The *Chūagon*, 30, the *Zōshakuyugyō*; the *Majjhima-nikāya*, 38, the *Daizōshakuyugyō* (the *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta*).
3) One of the Chin. trsls. of the *Four Āgamas*, corresponding almost to the P. '*Majjhima-nikāya*' (Tr.).
4) →p. 103, note 2)

with sinews, bones, skin, blood, etc. Also, the *Zōagongyō*[1] contains a gāthā said to be by Bhikṣuṇī Vajirā, (Vajrā, Skt.), which tells us that the cart is no other than a temporary composite of parts; that man's body too is made up of the 'five groups' (pañca-skandha), which temporarily combine; that there is none which could substantially be called an entity. About this point, the famous Nāgasena who lived two or three hundred years after the Buddha's death tells King Milinda more fully about this point.[2]

In the *Āgamas* of Primitive Buddhism, allusion to selflessness is found everywhere. But few allude to the highest significance of selflessness. Most are rather popular and low in grade. This comes from the fact that the texts extant are of Abhidharma Buddhism, which had discarded, in all cases, the first principle of Primitive Buddhism, adopting only the popular theories of

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1) The *Zōagon*, XLV (sūtra 1,202), says: 'It is as it were all materials are harmoniously joined together / And we call it a cart. / All groups are conditioned together / And temporarily we get a name'. The *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, V, 10, says: 'For example, parts gather together and we call it a cart. When all groups (skandhas) exist thus, we temporarily say a sentient being'.

2) The *Nasenbikukyō*, Book I (the *Milindaōmongyō*), pp. 25 ff. (ND, LIX, Book I, pp. 49 ff.): Bhikṣu Nāgasena exchanged words with King Milinda and told him that Nāgasena was but a name in which there existed no true self of Nāgasena, that this was as in the case of a cart which was made up of a combination of axle, wheel, shaft, body, spoke, pin, yoke, thill, etc., by which a temporary name of 'cart' comes about, there existing yet no self of the cart itself; that, in the same way, man was made up of 32 constituent parts or of five groups (pañca-skandha) and was a temporary existence, there being no personal self of man himself. He thus addressed the king. In the days of Abhidharma Buddhism, it was said that the dharmas (elements) of the five groups that constitute the body and mind were real, but that man himself was not real, being only a temporary existence. But Primitive Buddhism said that the five groups themselves were selfless.

the day. Therefore, it is wrong to conclude, viewing things from the selflessness referred to in the texts extant which generally are of the lower grade, that the teaching of selflessness of Śākyamuni Buddha and of Primitive Buddhism were all of the lower grade.

One of the reasons why Mahāyāna Buddhism arose was to correct this inferior standing of Abhidharma Buddhism. So, Mahāyāna Buddhism, instead of 'anātman' (no-self), resorted to the 'all-void' (śūnya or śūnyatā, Skt.; kū or kūshō, Jap.) and expounded the selflessness of a higher order. This was to avoid confusion with the selflessness of Abhidharma Buddhism. The 'all-void' expounded in the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* and the *Madhyamaka-kārikā* of Nāgārjuna was what was in reality the selflessness of Primitive Buddhism. It is not that the sūtras of Primitive Buddhism totally lack this first principle, but cases are very rare in which this is so presented. In the selflessness theory expounded in such texts as the *Āgamas* of Primitive Buddhism, we have, other than the parables of the house and the body, the following:

I. Primitive Buddhism often quotes the five groups of 'rūpa' (shiki, Jap.), vedanā (ju, Jap.), 'saññā' (saṁjñā, Skt.; sō, Jap.), saṅkhāra (saṁskāra, Skt.; gyō, Jap.), and viññāṇa (vijñāna, Skt.; shiki, Jap.), stating that these represent 'what exist'. 'Khandha' (skandha, Skt.; un, Jap.) means 'what is gathered up'. So, 'five skandhas' means a 'collection of five elements'. These 'five groups' seem to have represented originally man's self as a whole which is made up of body and mind. 'Rūpa' (shiki, Jap.)* is man's flesh and blood, which are 'matter' or 'material thing'; 'vedanā' is the action of sensing sorrow and happiness; 'saññā' is the action of symbolizing a notion or mental image; 'saṅkhāra' (gyō, Jap.) is such

mental actions as volition and others. The word 'gyō'[1] (saṁskāra, Skt.) is the 'gyō' of the 'shogyōmujō'. But the 'gyō' (saṁskāra, Skt.; volition) of the 'five groups' is narrower in sense than the 'gyō' (saṁskāra, Skt.; element, thing) of 'shogyō'. Also, the 'gyō' (saṁskāra, Skt.) of the Twelve Links of Interdependence (dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda, Skt.; jūni-innen, Jap.) fairly much resembles that of the five groups, but it is not quite the same.[2] In any case, there are not a few instances in Buddhism in which the same term is made to stand for several meanings, of a wider or narrower implication. The case is so with 'muga' (anātman, Skt.).

Next, 'viññāṇa' (vijñāna, Skt.; shiki, Jap.) means 'consciousness' that recognizes or judges things. It is considered that our body and mind are made up of the five elements of 'rūpa', 'vedanā', 'saññā', 'saṅkhāra', and 'viññāṇa'. As time went on, these five groups began to mean not only our body and mind but also the world at large that surrounds us. So, these five groups came to represent all matter and mind, in and out of our own self. In this case, 'rūpa' represented all 'matter', 'vedanā' the feeling and sensing of sorrow and happiness, 'saññā' the symbolizing of notion, 'saṅkhāra' the mental actions other than vedanā, saññā, and viññāṇa or whatever is mental, and 'viññāṇa' the action of consciousness or its governing body or recognizing subject.

Whichever category of the five groups, what was said was that the five groups were all selfless. This was the representative concept of 'anātman'. In this connection, the heretics other than the Buddhists had, it was thought, twenty

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1) 行 (Tr.).
2) The Chin. word 行 (gyō) stands in Chin. trsls. for several items, and is at times hard to distinguish one from the other.→Chap. on 'Twelve Links of Interdependence', pp. 131 ff. (Tr.).

views regarding the self. This so came about as each of the five groups was viewed from four angles, and as each was regarded as self. Hence, twenty varieties. These twenty views of self come out to be, if we see rūpa from four angles, as, for example:

1) 'Rūpa' is the self. Regarding each content of 'rūpa' (flesh and body; matter), which is earth, water, fire, and wind, and blue, yellow, red, and white, we may consider that 'the earth is the self', 'the self and the earth are one and not two, and are none else'. Thus, all that constitute rūpa are seen as self.

2) Rūpa belongs to the self. In this case, vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra, and viññāṇa are the self, rūpa being considered to belong to the self and to be its attribute.

3) Rūpa exists in the self. Vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra, and viññāṇa are the self. And rūpa is considered to exist in the self.

4) The self is in rūpa. Vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra, and viññāṇa are the self; this self is considered to exist in rūpa and in the body.

These are the views held. With the other four skandhas too, each is viewed in four ways and we get the twenty kinds.

The *Agon* often alludes to the same view of self which almost amounts to what has been said above. It says that each of the five skandhas is: 1) the self, 2) what belongs to the self, and 3) what exists along with the self. And this is a heresy. But this is but a simplification of the twenty views stated above.

In this way, each of the five groups is dissected and looked into, so as to prove that each is after all selfless. But one who has fully mastered the meaning of selflessness does not need such

an analytical, mechanical, and formal method; one with a greater wisdom can at once understand the essence of selflessness without resorting to any such analytical method. So, such an analytical method can be called a teaching of anātman, done from a popular standpoint, for those lower in the grade of intellect.

II. There is a sūtra called '*Mugasōkyō*' (*Anattalakkhaṇa-suttanta*, P.), one that tells us that the five groups are selfless. According to the tradition handed down, Śākyamuni Buddha delivered his 'first sermon' (shotenbōrin, Jap.) to the five bhikṣus, the first of his disciples, on the Four Noble Truths (catvāri āryasatyāni, Skt.; shishōtai, Jap.) and the Noble Eightfold Path (āryāṣṭaṅgika-mārga, Skt.; hasshōdō, Jap.). They arrived at the right Buddhist view of the world and life theoretically and gained the pure 'dharma-eye' (dharma-cakṣu, Skt.; hōgen, Jap.), the 'wisdom's eye' for Truth. So, the Buddha again delivered to the five bhikṣus a sermon on impermanence (anitya), sorrow (duḥkha), and no-self (anātman) of the five groups. This sermon is the *Mugasōkyō*. The five bhikṣus, hearing the sermon, sat in dhyāna, meditated on the impermanence, sorrow, and no-self of the five groups, and attained, so is it said, arhatship (arakanka, Jap.), the highest of Buddhist enlightenment. This is to say that, meditating on the impermanence, sorrow, and no-self of the five groups, they thus attained, not only theoretically but also through personal experience, the perfection of man. This means that the *Mugasōkyō* stood on an extremely lofty height of the teaching and led one to enlightenment of the highest order. But the various *Mugasōkyōs* handed down to the present day mostly refer but to the popular teaching of anātman. It is only in one or two instances that we meet with the first principle of the original teaching of anātman.

The reason for this is that the texts of Primitive Buddhism extant are those handed down by Abhidharma Buddhism, in which the original teaching of the first principle of anātman was, so it would seem, remoulded, in the days of Abhidharma Buddhism or in the latter days of Primitive Buddhism, into a popular theory of the one which we have now. If so, what difference is there between the original teaching of the *Mugasōkyō* and that which was remoulded? First, we will quote from what was popularly said about anātman, the one handed down by most of the texts of Primitive Buddhism, which says:

> ' Rūpa is no-self (anātman). If rūpa is the self (ātman), it will not become sick; and we may well say referring to rūpa: Let my rūpa be like this or let not my rūpa be like this. But rūpa is no-self. So, rūpa will become sick; and we cannot, referring to rūpa, say: Let my rūpa be like this or let not my rūpa be like this '.

The same is said about vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra, and viññāṇa. In this case, the ' self ' (ātman) is in value identical with Brahmā or Īśvara, the highest of the Brahmanic pantheon. Here it is used in the sense of one who possesses complete control over everything as in the case of the highest god who can do as he wills and who can make others get born, die, or change. So, if rūpa were an unmolested self, it could have things as it willed and it could order it that illness never visits one or it could at once awaken one into enlightenment. But actually one becomes sick and suffers from the sorrow of birth and death and transmigration. So, rūpa is not an ātman (self), but a ' non-ātman '. The fact of ' not-free ' and ' not-potent ' tells that the five groups are ' no-self '. The *Mugasōkyōs* extant,

those handed down by various Abhidharmic school, are of this type.[1] Only the Chinese translation of the *Mugasōkyō* of the Sarvāstivāda that one finds in the *Zōagon* makes it that 'ātman' is an ontologically unchanging entity and that 'anātman' is one phenomenal, which is impermanent and which changes. This is, as stated before, the original concept of 'self' (ātman) and 'no-self' (anātman). The *Mugasōkyō* that is of the first principle says as follows:[2]

> 'If rūpa is the self (ātman), there could be no case in which sickness visits rūpa; also, we may not be able to say: 'Do like this', 'Do not do like this'. As rūpa is no-self, there can be cases in which sickness visits one, or we can say to rūpa: 'Be like this', 'Be not like this'.

The no-self of the vedanā, saññā, saṅkhāra, and viññāṇa is expounded in the same way. The reason for this is that if the world is one totally fixed (self—ātman), all will have to be in a fixed state. There can be no occasion for our doing practice or making effort, or for education or religion. But everything in the world and life is 'non-ātman' (no-self), having no fixed state; it is changeable in any direction or form. And we can have freedom of mind, by which we can practise and make effort, and there can be occasions for education and religion, and for the progress of civilization.

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1) The *Saṁyutta-nikāya* XXII, 59 = *Vinaya* (Pāli), the *Mahāvagga* (ND, p. 323); the *Shibunritsu*, XXXII; the *Konponsetsuissaiubu-binayahasōji*, VI; the *Butsuhongyōshūkyō*, XXXIV; the Skt. text of the *Mahāvastu*, III, p. 325. Further, even in the *Zōagon* (Chin. trsl.), in such a place where allusion is made to the no-self of the twelve spheres (dvādaśāyatanāni, Skt.; jūnisho, Jap.) that begins with the eye, etc., the no-self is referred to, standing on the ground of popular acceptation of the term. The *Zōagon*, XIII (sūtra, 318).

2) The *Zōagon*, II (sūtra 34).

When adverse circumstances visit us or when anything extreme befalls us, we are prone to get disappointed, become desperate or pessimistic, and begin to think that there can be no way out. But adverse circumstances and misfortunes are not eternally lasting. As the saying goes: 'It is not yet too late'. If we are determined to reinstate and make effort, it is not that the adverse circumstances and misfortunes cannot be changed. 'Nothing is fixed in the world' is the doctrine of 'no-self' (anātman),[1]* which must be the truth of life. The law of interdependence '[2]* (pratītyasamutpāda, Skt.; engisetsu, Jap.), which constitutes the central pivot of Buddhist thought, stands on this basic ground of 'no-self'.

So far the theory of 'no-self',* which is not in the other philosophies and religions of India, is particularly of the Buddhist. At the same time, the practice of no-self or the 'practice of selflessness' (mugagyō, Jap.) is also extremely important to Buddhism. Buddhism as a religion requires of us that we should pay more attention to this side of practice. Then, what is the practical side of selflessness? The texts of Primitive Buddhism do not say much about this point. But the sūtras are full of cases that refer to the actual practice of this selflessness. For the ideal of Buddhism must end in the practice of no-self. The state of nirvāṇa that transcends birth and death and transmigration is none but the ultimate end of this practice. For the enlightenment talked about in Buddhism is none but the actualization of no-self.

The 'all-void' (śūnyatā, Skt.; kū, Jap.)* propounded by Ma-

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1) A term opposed to ātman, which is 'a permanent substantial entity impervious to change' (T.R.V. Murti: *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 26) (Tr.).

2) From the standpoint of phenomenalization, this term may well be rendered as 'dependent origination' (Tr.).

hāyāna Buddhism which came about later and the 'emptiness' (mu, Jap.)* of the Zen Buddhism of China all pointed to this state of 'selflessness'. This selflessness which is the practical side of the doctrine of anātman is to negate the ego and to make away with personal attachment. The so-called 'makaseshugi' (Jap.) which is the 'total surrendering of one's own self' or the 'absolute other-power' (zettai-tariki, Jap.) is none but the actual practice of this selflessness. So, the last stage of Nembutsu (Jap.) and Shōdaimoku (Jap.)[1] too must be the practice of this selflessness. Further, if we widen the scope of discussion, we find that it is not only in Buddhism but also in other religions and art, that the ultimate end is selflessness.

Nirvāṇa—All Quietness The word 'nirvāṇa' (Skt.; nibbāna, P.) is said to come from 'nir-vā', which means 'to blow out'.[2] It points to a state in which the flames of illusion as greed, anger, and ignorance are snuffed out. It was not Buddhism that had first coined this word. It had been in use, it seems, even before the days of Buddhism, among the non-orthodox circles. Later, we even see this used among the people of orthodox schools. We come across the word in the great epic *Mahābhārata* and others. According to the texts of

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1) The saying of 'Namumyōhōrengekyō' of Nichiren Buddhism, which is somewhat in the category of Nembutsu (Tr.).

2) The general notion of nirvāṇa, the end of Buddhist ideal, was being discussed since the days of the very outset of the study of Buddhism in the West. Some said that it was a state of 'nothingness' (kyomu, Jap.), 'emptiness' (kūmu, Jap.), or 'death' itself. But as the materials of Primitive Buddhism came to be known, the right meaning of nirvāṇa was revealed by Childers, Rhys Davids, and Oldenberg. Even at that, there is a gap of acceptation between the people of the Orient and the West. It is doubtful even today if the conception of nirvāṇa and its true nature is clearly understood by the scholars of the West.

Primitive Buddhism, the heretics of the day seem to have regarded several states of meditation such as the rūpadhātu-dhyāna (shikikaijō, Jap.) and the arūpadhātu-dhyāna (mushikikaijō, Jap.) as ideal states of nirvāṇa; and there seem even to have been those who alleged that such temporal pleasures as the sensual satisfaction of the five senses were nirvāṇa. As already stated, the two ṛṣis by whom Śākyamuni Buddha was taught when as yet in the days of practising the Way said that the ideal state of nirvāṇa was such wonderful states of the arūpadhātu-dhyāna as the ākiñcanyāyatana-samāpatti and the naiva-saṁjñā-nāsaṁjñāyatana-samāpatti. The Buddha in no time gained the same state of dhyāna as that of his two masters. But he gained no peace of mind. So, he thought that this arūpadhātu-dhyāna could not be the ideal state and he parted with his two masters. The six years of hard penance also taught him that no penance of whatever kind which tortures the human body could enable him to realize nirvāṇa. So, he abandoned this method also.

And living on a life of the Middle Way between the two extremes of penance and sensual pleasures, he attained nirvāṇa. Awaking into the truth of the world and life, he became the Buddha. And nirvāṇa was not what could be attained by the sheer practice of dhyāna as alleged by heretics. It had to be

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(Cont. from p. 111)
É. Burnouf: *Introduction à l'hist. du boudhisme indien*, Paris, 1844, pp. 18, 516, 594; Max Müller: *The Meaning of Nirvāṇa*, London, 1857[3]; S. Hardy: *Eastern Monachism*, London, 1866, pp. 5, 20, 291; R. C. Childers: *Dictionary of the Pāli Language*, London, 1875, pp. 265–74; H. Oldenberg: *Buddha*, Berlin, 1912[5]; T. W. Davids: *Buddhism* (American Lectures), New York, 1896, and others; E. W. Hopkins: *The Religions of India*, London, 1896, pp. 321 ff.; É. Senart: '*Nirvāṇa*' (in Album Kern), Leyden, 1913, pp. 101–4; F. O. Schrader: '*On the Problem of Nirvāna*', JPTS, 1904–5, p. 157; de la Vallée Poussin: *Nirvāṇa*, ERE, Vol. 9, pp. 376–9, and others; Stcherbatsky: *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna*, Leningrad, 1927.

gained from realizing the wisdom of truth about the world and life. This closely resembles the previous orthodox Brahmanic system of the *Upaniṣads*, which said that the ideal state was to be attained by realizing the oneness of Brahman-Ātman. The *Upaniṣads* do not call this state of the oneness of Brahman-Ātman nivrāṇa. They called this state ' neti neti ' (not, not), an unmolested state of great bliss inexpressible in word. So, as a matter of fact, the content may not have been very far away from what Buddhism meant by nirvāṇa. But it is doubtful if there ever was one who had gained this state. Yājñavalkya, one regarded as the most eminent of the philosophers of the Upanishadic school, talks about this state. But it could have been but a verbal explanation. It did not seem that he himself had even experienced and realized this state.

Among the non-orthodox śramaṇas, there were not a few, it would seem, who had claimed that they had attained nirvāṇa. But none of them seem to have satisfied Śākyamuni Buddha. Of these, Mahāvīra, the founder of Jainism, and many of his disciples claimed that they were successful in their practice and that they had gained light. They said that by penance one could liberate the spirit from the bondage of flesh, the spirit thus attaining the unmolested state of freedom. This was the ideal form of emancipation. Yet, so long as one had the carnal body which was the result of past karma, there could be, they said, no true state of release, as one was not away from the bondage of carnal body, and that only after death could one gain the true freedom of spirit. Because of this, most of the leading disciples of Mahāvīra had fasted and chosen death, so it is said, desiring thus to attain the last fruition of emancipation. If it is that true emancipation is not to visit one unless one is dead, the ideal state is to be realized only after death. This means that there can be no perfection of man while yet in life.

Further, the Sāṁkhya school, which was of the house of orthodox Brahmanism and one of the ' Six Schools of Philosophy ' (roppatetsugaku, Jap.) and which most probably had originated from the dhyāna school that existed before Buddhism, made it, as in Jainism, that the true ideal state could be attained only when the pristine spirit was released from matter-phenomena. In this case also, mind and matter were two separate units, and the independence of spirit alone gave one a free, unmolested state of activity. So, only when flesh and matter were gone, i.e. after death, could one for the first time attain the true ideal state. This meant that the ideal state never came to one while yet in life and was a thing actually not of use. With the people of this school too, we do not hear of any who claimed that he had realized the ideal. So, we may say that all was simply a matter of talk and theory.

Compared with other religions and philosophies, the case of Buddhism was different. For, the Buddha himself had experienced the state of nirvāṇa and had also spoken about it to his disciples. Because of this, many hundreds and thousands of his disciples gained the same enlightenment and arrived at nirvāṇa. This ideal is not what one gains after death, but one that is gained in this life as one attains perfect personality. It is not only that one attains the perfection of one's own personality in this life and gains a free and unmolested activity, but also that one exerts effort and makes the world around one an ideal place of peace and happiness where there now reigns no uneasiness or worry. The true value of religion rests here. However, even with Buddhism, in the days of Abhidharma Buddhism, people, like the Jains, thought that the perfect realization of the ideal was to be gained after death. But this must be a degeneration of Buddhism. Pointing out this error, Mahāyāna Buddhism put forward the theory of ' apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa ' (mujū-

shonehan, Jap.),* the 'nirvāṇa of no resting on nirvāṇa', and restored the standpoint of Śākyamuni Buddha of the days of Primitive Buddhism.

From the above, we may know that Buddhism stood out from all the others of the day, not only in theory but also in practice. And as will be alluded to later, we see, in the field of practice to attain this ideal, rationality and effectiveness which we see nowhere else.

As this state of nirvāṇa is away from the bondage of illusion, we call it 'all-quietness' (śānta,[1] Skt.; santa, P.; jakujō, Jap.). In contrast to the premise that 'all is sorrow' (saṁskāra-duḥkhatā, Skt.; sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā, P.; issaikaiku, Jap.), we have 'all-quietness is bliss' (upasama sukha, P.; jakumetsu-iraku, Jap.), a state away from the relativeness of birth and death, the absolute where peace and bliss reign. This permanent state of happiness is the Buddhist ideal. But as Buddhism at the outset puts forth such apparently pessimistic and world-negating premises as 'anitya' (impermanence) and 'duḥkha' (sorrow), there are scholars in the West who criticize Buddhism as a gloomy religion. But they lose sight of the final point of peace and the bliss of nirvāṇa. So, they cannot be considered to have rightly comprehended or appraised Buddhism.

As alluded to already, religion always starts from such an unsatisfied state of feeling as sorrow or sin. The more one has this consciousness of apprehension, sorrow, and sin, the more one will feel and seek after a more perfect ideal state. Where there rests a high ideal, there necessarily exists pessimism against the present state, a mind to escape, self-surrendering, or introspective. Unless this actuality is met face to face, there can be no arriving at the true ideal. Here is a chain of religious

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1) 'Composed, calm' (MC, p. 311) (Tr.).

situations in the Buddhist path, which begins with 'impermanence' and 'sorrow', and ends in 'nirvāṇa and all-quietness'.

3. Law of Interdependence

The 'law of interdependence' (pratītyasamutpāda, Skt., paṭiccasamuppāda, P.; engi, Jap.)* is what has been organized out of the 'three characteristics' (ti-lakkhaṇa, P.; sanbōin, Jap.) or the 'four characteristics' (catu-lakkhaṇa, P.; shihōin, Jap.). So, we may regard this as the fundamental thought of Buddhism. It is said that the Buddha awoke to the interdependent structure of the world and attained enlightenment under the bodhi tree. From this standpoint, we may say that Buddhism stands basically on the thought of interdependence. This is the truth of the world and life, and the world-view of the Buddhist teaching. This is looked up to as the truth that is absolute, unchangeable, and eternal; not necessarily of the Buddhist, but one which is relevant whether Buddhas have come out in this world or not.[1] The law of interdependence is considered to be an objective truth, universal, and rational. This is shown by the word 'dharma' (dhamma, P.; law). So, it says: 'One who sees interdependence sees the law (dharma) and one who sees the law sees interdependence'.[2] Further:

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1) The *Zōagon*, XII (sūtra, 296): 'Whether Buddhas come out in this world or whether they do not come out in this world, this 'Law' (dharma) persists: it exists in this universe'. The *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, XII, 20, says: 'The principle of interdependence is the unchangeable, eternal truth (dharma) whether Tathāgatas come out in this world or whether Tathāgatas do not come out in this world: the Law sits and the Law decides'.

2) The *Chūagon*, 30, the *Zōshakuyugyō*: 'If one sees interdependence, one sees the dharma; if one sees the dharma, one sees interdependence'. The *Majjhima-nikāya*, 38 (the *Daizōshakuyugyō*).

'One who sees interdependence sees the law; one who sees the law sees the Buddha'.[1] When one rightly sees interdependence as truth, one comes to understand Buddhism.

Then, what does 'engi' (pratītyasamutpāda) mean? In Japan, people popularly say 'the engi is good', 'the engi is bad', and 'one cares much about the engi'. All these are departures from the original meaning of 'engi'. Here, what is meant points to 'a sign of what is to happen', 'the beginning of a thing that is to happen', or 'a premonition', etc. Or there are cases in which we say 'the engi of a certain temple' and 'the engi of a certain Shintō shrine'. What is meant here is 'how a thing came out to be' or 'history'. Here, too, the original meaning of 'engi' is lost.

The original meaning of 'interdependence' naturally comes out of the Three or Four Characteristics. The first 'impermanence' tells us that the world is impermanent; that all phenomenal things ceaselessly change, repeating thus birth and death. The second 'no-self' tells us that what exist are not things unrelated to others, but mutually dependent upon each other in time and space. And by 'sorrow' we see that actual life is generally full of sorrow and apprehension, that sorrow and apprehension do not come out without cause, that these are not things fixed up, that we can well change or extirpate these, that all phenomena are impermanent and selfless, that the ways in which things change and act upon each other are not ruleless, there being always the law that governs interrelations and changes, and that things must appear or die out according to this law.

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1) The *Ryōbonshōjikyō*: 'If a bhikṣu sees interdependence, this says he sees dharma. If he rightly sees dharma, he sees me'. The *Tōkangyō*: 'As one sees the Twelve Links of Interdependence, one sees dharma. This is to say that he sees the Buddha'. Also, in the *Daijōtōkangyō*, we meet with the same expressions.

The law of change in this category is called the 'law of interdependence'.[1]*

'Pratītyasamutpāda' (paṭiccasamuppāda, P.) means 'to come about by depending upon' or the 'way of the phenomenal world that comes about having relations with others'. All the phenomena of the world and life come about under conditions and causes that necessitate things so to happen, following the law of interdependence. It does not go as the people of other teachings say that they so happen by the will and power of the highest god who controls the birth and death of all things, that all phenomena are predestined and fixed by karma, or that phenomena happen, without any condition or cause, all rulelessly, all of a sudden, and by chance. If we have the right knowledge of the movements of phenomena and know under what conditions things come about or die out, we, in accordance with the law of phenomena and by our own effort and power, can make away with what we do not wish to have and call forth what we desire to come about. This means that, armed with the knowledge of the law of interdependence, we can easily make away with the sorrow of birth and death and transmigration, and gain the happiness of emancipation (vimukti, Skt.) and enlightenment (nirvāṇa). The law which Śākyamuni Buddha discovered was this, and by this he awoke and became the Buddha.

This law of interdependence is variously shown in the texts of Primitive Buddhism. What is most basic of the theory is: 'If there is this, there is that; as this comes about, that comes about; if there is not this, there is not that; as this dies out,

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1) To Buddhists this 'pratītyasamutpāda' is a law that underlies all phenomena. At least, in a religious sense we can say this. So, in this trsl. the term is often shown as the 'law of interdependence'. (Tr.).

that dies out '.[1] And ' All the things arisen out of causes and conditions perish ' also alludes to the law of interdependence.[2] The latter is generally what is meant when one has gained a theoretical understanding of the Buddhist view of the world and life and the untainted ' dharma-eye ' (dharma-cakṣu, Skt.; dhamma-cakkhu, P.; hōgen, Jap.), a sign of having attained the lowest rank of sageship. This is to say that one who has gained a general comprehension of the Buddhist principle in theory ought necessarily to know of the law of interdependence; and the wisdom that comprehends the law of interdependence is this ' hōgen '. The ' hō ' (law) of ' hō-gen ' (dharma-eye) is the ' law of truth '; it is none other than the ' law of interdependence '. Consequently, the ' dharma-eye ' means the ' wisdom's eye for the law of interdependence '.

The basic principle of interdependence which says: ' If there is this, there is that, etc.' puts forth the two items of interdependence. Also, the Four Noble Truths of sorrow (duḥkha), the cause of sorrow (samudaya), extinction (nirodha), and the way (mārga) are the two pairs of the two items. The interdependence mentioned in sūtras varies in number, being, other than that of two, those of three, four, and up to nine, ten, eleven, and twelve, or even more items. But the most representatative is the one of twelve categories, the so-called ' Twelve Links of Interdependence ' (dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda).

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1) For example, the *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, XII, 37, says: ' imasmiṁ sati idaṁ hoti, imassuppādā, idam uppajjati, imasmim asati idaṁ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṁ nirujjhati ' (When there is this, there is that; as this is come about, that comes about; when there is not this, there is not that; as this dies out, that dies out.). The *Zōagon*, XII (sūtra 293, 297, etc.).

2) For example, the Pāli *Vinaya*, the *Mahāvagga*, the *Mahākhandhaka*, *Chap. on Upasampadā* (the *Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta*), says: ' yaṁ kiñci samudaya-dhammaṁ, sabbaṁ taṁ nirodha-dhammaṁ '. There are many such instances.

The items of interdependence may well be regarded as those showing the relation between the general phenomena of birth and death and the change in the world and life. But the original aim of the law of interdependence was more to clarify man's fate of sorrow and happiness and to show under what conditions and causes sorrow dies out, than to refer to general happenings in life. Therefore, the phenomena taken up by interdependence is not what come about as natural phenomena but those that concern ethical and religious values, such as the sorrow and happiness that result out of one's own good or evil actions. And the interdependence which takes a degenerating course is called 'ruten-engi', the 'interdependence moving onwards towards transmigration', and the one in which phenomena get purified and become clean is called 'genmetsu-engi', the 'interdependence moving backwards towards nirvāṇa'. 'Ruten' means 'to amass worry by repeating birth and death' and 'genmetsu' 'to extirpate the worry of transmigration and turn back to the ideal world of nirvāṇa'. If we are to explain this from the standpoint of the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths of 'sorrow', the 'cause of sorrow', 'nirvāṇa', and the 'way', which is a kind of the theory of interdependence, the two items of 'sorrow' and the 'cause of sorrow' refer to the 'ruten-engi', and the two of 'nirvāṇa' and the 'way' to the 'genmetsu-engi'. Even in the case of the Twelve Links of Interdependence, the phase that refers to the progressive course of development of the twelve items is the 'ruten-engi', and the one that refers to the ceasing and extinction of the twelve items is the 'genmetsu-engi'.[1] In this way, the theory of interdependence sees the relation of birth and death and the change of the phenomenal world from the standpoint of ethical and re-

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1) About this, allusion will be made later.

ligious values. Here it differs from science, which studies the general relations of cause and effect of the phenomenal world.

Be this as it may, even with the law of interdependence, there are cases in which illustration is given from the angle of the physical world; also, those in which things that refer to the interdependence of ethical and religious values take up the items that concern natural phenomena which have nothing to do with value. At times, the interdependence relating to the general phenomenal world is called 'ge-engi', the 'external interdependence', and that which refers to the spiritual and the inner phase of interdependence relating to value is called 'nai-engi', the 'internal interdependence'. The 'ge-engi' is often resorted to in the form of parables for people naive in understanding so that the intricacies of the internal interdependence could easily be understood. What can be said is that the original aim of interdependence concerns the internal interdependence.

Whatever the case, as the causal relation of interdependence also concerns the karmic thought that chains the past to the present and to the future, saying that good results from good actions and evil from evil actions, it contains in it an expectant thought which we cannot explain away from a scientific standpoint. Even at that, the original standpoint of interdependence is extremely rational and the method never departs from that of today's science.

We do not yet come across in Primitive Buddhism any detailed explanation touching the way in which phenomena bear relation to each other. But in the Buddhism of later days this is done from various angles. Because, throughout all ages, the Buddhist teaching rests consistently on the principle of interdependence in a wider sense.[1] But the Buddhism of later days

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1) See: Benkyō Shiio: *General Introduction to Buddhist Sūtras*→

treated interdependence in a narrower sense and presented it only in the causal relation of time, in the category of fore and aft. And the interdependence of logical category that had no time relation was called 'jissō' (real-state) and not 'engi' (interdependence). So, in the Buddhism of later days the 'doctrine of interdependence' (engiron, Jap.) stood against the 'doctrine of real-state' (jissōron, Jap.), and the two were thought to belong to different doctrinal categories. It was because of this that the Buddhist teachings of India and China were classified into the two great doctrinal houses of 'engi' (interdependence) and 'jissō' (real-state). But the real-state doctrine too belongs to the category of interdependence in a wider sense. So, there are the two: 1) to see things vertically in time-relation and 2) to see things in their mutual and logical interdependence of existence at a point of time. The former is the factual and concrete phase of interdependence, whereas the latter sees interdependence from the angle of logic and form.

For example, a chain of relation as that in which the seed calls forth the bud, leaves, and stem, followed by flowers and seeds is a factual and causal interdependence. But in such a relation like the arithmetical formula of $2+3=5$, in which there is the relation of the two items of one that precedes and one that follows, the whole versus the part, the general versus the particular, the relative versus the absolute, there is no causal relation of time, but a logical interrelation. This kind of relation is called the 'non-time' or 'logical' interdependence.

In the days later than those of Abhidharma Buddhism, inter-

(Cont. from p. 121, note)
(*Bukkyōkyōten-Gaisetsu*), Chap. VII, 'The Twelve Links of Interdependence'; Hakuju Ui: *A Study of Buddhist Thought* (*Bukkyōshisō-Kenkyū*), etc. Especially, the latter explains the whole field of Buddhism under the single thought of interdependence.

dependence was discussed only in the causal relation of time and that of logical interdependence was excluded from the category. But the principle of real-state standing on logical relation too is none but interdependence; the original signification of interdependence lies in the phase of real-state itself. It was because of this that Nāgārjuna in his *Madhyamaka-kārikā* had put forward śūnyatā and explained the logical relation of all elements, all which was none but to clarify the doctrine of interdependence itself.

After the days of Abhidharma Buddhism, interdependence began to be talked about thus from the two standpoints of time and logical relations, calling forth such terms as ' engiron ' and ' jissōron '. It now became a fashion to name only that which came within the narrow category of time-relation ' interdependence '. But in the days of Primitive Buddhism we do not see any such clear line of demarcation in the law of interdependence. It had both the time and logical relations, stated in an indistinguishable state, so that things could be understood in either way. This much we can say. Further, in Primitive Buddhism there are cases in which interdependence is put forward in popular parables, for the sake of beginners, as the first principle; we come across there several kinds of interdependence. And in Abhidharma Buddhism, there are cases in which interdependence is classed into the following four of: 1) kṣaṇika-pratītyasamutpāda (setsunaengi, Jap.), 2) sāmbandhika-p. (renbaku-engi, Jap.), 3) āvasthika-p. (bun'i-engi, Jap.), and 4) prākarṣika-p. (onzoku-engi, Jap.). We see here the thought of interdependence discussed from several angles.[1] Of these, the

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1) Four kinds of interdependence (pratītyasamutpāda) are mentioned in the various writings of the Sarvāstivādins. The *Daibibasharon* (the *Mahāvibhāṣa-śāstra*), XXIII; the *Kusharon* (the *Abhidharmakośa-śāstra*), IX; the *Junshōriron*, XXVII.

kṣaṇika-pratītyasamutpāda is one in which phenomena are seen related to each other within the time duration of a moment, one which can be regarded as viewing interdependence from a logical standpoint. The three others are those seen in the process of time. Sāmbandhika-pratītyasamutpāda means one in which interdependence comes about unintermittently and successively, one relation after the other. Āvasthika-pratītyasamutpāda tells us about the causation of the 'five groups' (pañca-skandha) of body and mind that extend from birth to death, from the former life to the present, and from the present to the life to come. Prākarṣika-pratītyasamutpāda points to an interdependence that goes on for lives and ages, extending over long periods and different lives.

Thus seen, there are several elements in the interdependence of phenomena. Stated in the present-day language, they refer to causations logical, psychological, physiological, physical, chemical, politico-social, economical, ethical, religious, etc. And most of the present-day sciences study these relations. It is generally the case that the interrelations are extremely complicated, the causation being not of one kind, but multiple, with many causal relations simultaneously coming one upon the other. In the interdependence theory propounded by Buddhism, there are, other than these, a good number of such causal interrelations as those standing on metaphysical or religious grounds, as, for example, that which chains the past life to the present, and the present to the future, and the 'different-fruition causation' (vipāka-phala, Skt.; ijukuinga, Jap.),* i.e. the causal result in which the cause and effect are of different nature, the fruit of happiness arising out of good cause and the fruit of sorrow arising out of evil cause.

We can thus think, as stated above, of several relations of interdependence. But the reason why Buddhism talks of such

categories of interdependence is not to make clear the phenomenal relations of the factual world, but to show why apprehension and sorrow come about and how man can make away with sorrow and attain the ideal world where eternal happiness reigns. It is to know of the right way of life, take to this right way, make effort, practise the Way, and attain the ideal. What is needed of interdependence is one related to man's life. Any causation of a physical nature not connected with life is not needed, other than when taken up as illustration.

In sum, the law of interdependence well explains all phenomenal relations of the world and universe in a general sense. But from the Buddhist standpoint, it is to know it, as a law governing the movements of the world and life in relation to life's destiny in the religious and ethical senses. However, the phenomena of our world and life are extremely complicated in relation to time and space and are not easy to comprehend.

For example, take the case of a man as an individual. The present state of what he is is none but the sum total of what he has experienced up to the present. Since birth, he has been brought up in various circumstances, educated at home, in school and in society, and he has met and seen various people and things. The experience gained at each time does not die out, but is stored up in some form or other in the person himself. Experiences good and evil will accordingly lead the person into good or evil directions. The experiences of each moment may be extremely petty and minute; it may not even come to one's attention, but its frequent occurrence magnifies the impact. Any person who does evil things habitually will naturally come to look evil in his manners, talk, facial expressions and in the look of the eyes; against this, the virtuous person will, as a matter of course, look pure and holy. No one has his present appearance of face or attitude at the time of birth, but all the actions

of good and evil done since birth have left their mark. All our intellect, character, and physical qualitites are what we have experienced at every moment after birth. No doubt, we must already have had part of these qualities at the moment of birth, a result of our own experiences in past lives. Seen thus, our present existence must be attributed to what we have been since birth and previous lives. Thus, our present self and personality have interdependent relations with our experiences in the past. In the same way, our present experiences will mould our future. We say 'shukumyōtsū' (Jap.; pūrva-nivāsānusmṛti-jñāna, Skt.), an ability which, seeing what we are now, guesses at our past; also 'tengentsū' (Jap.; divya-cakṣur-jñāna, Skt.), which anticipates our future. All this can be gained by one fully acquainted with this law of interdependence.

In the above, we have seen through the law of interdependence that works all through from the past to the present, and from the present to the future in the case of an individual. But if we see the whole existence of this individual in relation to the world that surrounds him, we find that he incessantly receives stimulus and influence from the outside world and at the same time influences the outside world in some way or other. This is to say that not only do we see the influence worked upon our own self throughout the Three Times of the past, the present, and the future, but also we stand in an indivisible relation of interdependence with the outer world and society. A student, for example, builds up his own personality through relations with his friends, seniors, and teachers. Having good friends, he makes progress, but with bad friends, he will suffer a degeneration. In family, school, business company, village, town, or state, we get influenced by what surround us and at the same time, we influence others. This relation with what surround one or a mutual influencing is the relation of inter-

dependence by which one depends upon and assists others mutually. This goes not only in the field of ethical relations as good and evil, but also in the economic field such as in clothing ourselves, getting food, earning a living, etc.

Our clothing, food, and living come to us from all over the world, from the hands of those who produce, transport, and trade. We may know how a single bead of rice or a single piece of handkerchief comes to us, after passing through so many channels, and how each is related to so many people of the world. Strictly speaking, not a day of our economic life can pass without our obtaining cooperation from the world at large. Also, because we live and consume goods, there can be production, transportations, and trade in the world. Further, the financial and transportation organizations and all the other social facilities are, either directly or indirectly, related to each other. In Buddhism we say we should 'feel grateful to all people' (shujō-no-on, Jap.). This tells us that we exist by what surrounds us.

The same is true of our cultural life. All such cultural wealth as language, thought, science, literature, art, and technical achievements are what we have inherited from the past and what have been developed out by us of the present age. We enjoy it through public information and educational means. Without such organs of communication as newspaper, magazine, radio, and television, and without the language and literature that pass thoughts to us, not a day of our cultural life could have existed. So, in the field of cultural wealth too, we are linked spatially to all the cultures of the world and, in the relation of time, to all the past history of man, directly or indirectly.

Thus seen, our present existence is not only the sum total of our own past experiences, physically, morally, politically, eco-

nomically, culturally, and from the standpoint of art, but is also closely connected with the whole world in point of space and time. This is to say that our present state cannot exist without our own past, without what surround us, and without the whole of their past histories. This means in effect that our present moment embosoms in it all the past of our own self and all that surround us. In the same way, our present is a factor that determines our future, greatly influencing the world that surrounds us and also moulding out history. Thus, each present moment shoulders, we may say, a great responsibility towards our future destiny and all that surrounds us.

In Buddhism we say ‘ one is all and all is one ’ (issokuissai, issaisokuichi, Jap.). This is what it means. Our single self is all the world and all the world is closely connected with our individual self. All the phenomena of the world and life are vertically or horizontally, positively or negatively, closely related to and connected with each other in some sense or other. So, the Kegon philosophy that came about in later days calls this ‘ jūjūmujin-no-engi ’ (Jap.), the ‘ infinitely manifold chain of interdependence ’. Thus seen, what we do each moment of our life becomes the factor that determines our future; it influences, in either a good or an evil way, the world that surrounds us. We are responsible to all the world that surrounds us for what we think and do. We cannot rightly say, therefore, that we can act as we please because it is our own action. As we become good, the families, schools, companies, villages, towns, nation, and society all become good. If we become evil, the poison and misery extend to the world that surrounds us. Therefore, desire as we may to be happy materially and spiritually, it is not because we alone become happy, but with the world that surrounds us we become happy too; and together we become miserable also. When transportation stops by war and things

do not come from abroad, it is not possible for us alone to live luxuriously. True happiness visits us when the world that surrounds us becomes rich both materially and spiritually. The world is tied up by mutual assistance. And it is obvious that one's happiness cannot exist without the happiness of the whole. This common-sense view accords with the law of interdependence of Buddhism. Or rather this law of interdependence much more clearly explains to us this common sense. This comes from the fact that the theory of interdependence expresses the true state of the world and life and is none but the real-state (jissō, Jap.) of all that exist.

After the close of the World War II, we hear democracy much talked about. It says that as all people have to assist each other, one should realize one's own position and responsibility to society and act with this awakened mind in a responsible way. The fundamental concept of democracy can be more rationally and correctly explained by the Buddhist law of interdependence than by the Christian theology of the relation between God and man or between man and man who is subordinate to God.

Scholars are apt to conceive of the Buddhist law of interdependence as similar to the dialectics of Western philosophy. But this is a great mistake. Both the Hegelian spiritualistic dialectics and the materialistic dialectics of Marx teach that progress and development of the world and life stand on the repulsion and sublimation of the three elements of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. But the development talked about is, so to say, none but the development arising out of anticipated elements. This can well be a kind of determinism. In this sense, the dialectics is a totally different thing from the law of interdependence. Further, the dialectics says that there are two repulsing elements of thesis and antithesis

and that these two get sublimated to synthesis. But what happens in the phenomena of the world, either materialistically or spiritualistically, is not as simple as that. For a thing to happen, the causes and conditions of various natures are directly or indirectly interrelated. This can well be guessed at from the already-quoted ' one is all and all is one '. For a phenomenon to appear, all other things cooperate, if we use a stronger expression. Even in the case of the formal explanations put forward by Abhidharma Buddhism, we see various conditions set up for a thing to happen, as, for example, the ' six causes and four conditions ' (rokuin-shien, Jap.), the ' ten conditions ' (jūen, Jap.),* and ' twenty-four conditions ' (nijūshien, Jap.). We cannot easily recount all such direct and indirect causes and conditions. But for a thing to happen, things are vertically and horizontally connected with each other. This is what the law of interdependence says, which is extremely more rational than what the dialectics says.

Further, from the ground of interdependence we can best explain why we must do good, why we must not do evil, why we must work for the world, why we must not do what causes worry to others. For example, we can take up the case of why one must not kill living things. Now, the karmic theory of transmigration tells us to refrain from killing, on the ground, as stated already, that evil calls forth evil to one's own self, so that in order not to invite misfortunes to one, one must not do evil; and that as through the long course of transmigration all living things become our fathers, mothers, brothers and sisters, man and wife, this tells one not to kill or cause worry to one most dear to one. We may well say that we must do good and refrain from evil because God, state, parents, teachers, or elders command us to. This may serve to be a good reason. Further, one may think one must not kill or give worry to others because one does

not like to be killed or get worried by them. But such an ethical or moral injunction may but basically be an expedient and heteronomous means to an end. We cannot say that it rests on a rational, self-ruling free mind. Against this, the reason propounded by the law of interdependence is most rational and offers one an ethical or moral basis. In this respect too, the law of interdependence can be called the real-state doctrine, the unchangeable, universal truth that exists whether Buddhas appear in the world or not.

4. Twelve Links of Interdependence

Such texts of Primitive Buddhism as the *Āgamas* and *Vinayas* do not give us any detailed explanation of the above-stated law of interdependence. But anybody who fully understands the doctrine can explain it in several ways. And the sermons of Śākyamuni Buddha extending over 45 long years were but to explain this doctrine in practical ways. Though not so stated, we come across sermons on interdependence everywhere. So, sūtras are many that directly or indirectly concern interdependence. Especially, even when things are stated under the head of interdependence, there are again varying forms. Of these, the formula ' dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda ', the ' Twelve Links of Interdependence ' (jūniengi, Jap.) made up of twelve categories of causal links, is the most representative. In later ages, when interdependence was talked about, it was almost always this formula of ' Twelve Links of Causation '* (jūniengi or jūniinnen,* Jap.) which was meant. Here we will look into the Twelve Links of Interdependence, though the texts of Primitive Buddhism themselves do not give any detailed explanations, nor is the explanation consistent. But the true meaning of ' the law of inter-

dependence is extremely deep ' (engi-jinjin, Jap.) and is, as it is so expounded, very difficult to understand. For beginners with less ability to grasp, sometimes things are presented in popular parables; for those of greater intellect, it is explained from a somewhat higher ground; for those with excellent comprehension, it is given in simple words, and this was enough. For example, Śāriputra, known as the first of the intellectual disciples of the Buddha, heard, before coming to the Buddha, from Aśvajit, one of the Buddha's disciples, just this simple stanza:

> 'All things arise out of causes. The Tathāgata tells us about these causes. Also, there is an extinction to these. So says the great śramaṇa '.

Hearing this much, he is said to have grasped the law of interdependence and entered thus the order.[1] As interdependence is variously explained, to fit the power of comprehension of the one that hears the Way, there is no set form of explanation of the Twelve Links of Interdependence in the texts of Primitive Buddhism. Abhidharma Buddhism tried to set things in order. But as it adopted the simpler and popular way of explanation, even in explaining the Twelve Links of Interdependence, this popular way of explanation through parables came to be misrepresented as the original.[2] It was to correct this inferior

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1) E.g., the *Vinaya* in Pāli (the *Mahāvagga*, the *Mahākhandhaka, Chap. on Upasampadā*) says: ' ye dhammā hetuppabhavā, tesaṁ hetuṁ tathāgato āha, tesañ ca yo nirodho, evaṁ-vādī mahāsamaṇo '.
2) Relative to the fact that all Buddhist teachings dating later than Abhidharma Buddhism took the Twelve Links of Interdependence as the ' Twofold Causation Extending to the Three Times ' (sanze-ryōjū-no-inga, Jap.), see: Kōgen Mizuno: ' *Regarding the Theories of the Twelve Links of Interdependence* ', IBK, III, 1.

exposition of the law of interdependence in Abhidharma Buddhism that Mahāyāna Buddhism stressed the 'all-void' (śūnyatā, Skt.; kū, Jap.) of prajñā. It was also to propound the doctrine of interdependence in accordance with the movement of our mind and also to get philosophically deeper into the details that, later, in Mahāyāna Buddhism such teachings as the Vijñaptimātratā (yuishiki, Jap.) and the doctrine of the 'trividha svabhāva, trividhā niḥsvabhāvatā' (sanshō-sanmushō, Jap.), the 'three kinds of nature and the threefold non-properties', came to be propounded.

Thus, as there lacks any clear-cut, definite system of explanation of the Twelve Links of Interdependence in the texts of Primitive Buddhism and as Abhidharma Buddhism had wrongly handed things down in an inferior but popular version, no authoritative explanation of the Twelve Links of Interdependence exists even today, among the scholars of either the West or Japan. So, at times much controversy raged among the scholarly world.[1] But here I will not take the trouble to get into the details of such controversy, but just explain the Twelve Links of Interdependence as I understand them to be.

Regarding the Twelve Links of Interdependence, we come across all over in the texts of Primitive Buddhism such set

1) In the days close to the latter part of the Taishō era, repeated discussions went among the Japanese Buddhist scholars of the day regarding the doctrine of the Twelve Links of Interdependence, as to whether one was to understand it: 1) in the traditional way of the causation of time-relation or 2) in the non-time logical relation sitting on the original standpoint of Śākyamuni Buddha and that of the *Mādhyamika-śāstra*. The writings that came out were: Taiken Kimura: *The Thoughts of Primitive Buddhism* (*Genshibukkyō-Shisō-ron*), chap. V and the article in the supplement that appeared in the editions later than the 12th of the same work, is entitled: *Development of the Thought of Interdependence in Primitive Buddhism* (*Genshi*→

phrases as:

a. From 'ignorance' (avijjā, P.; avidyā, Skt.; mumyō, Jap.) comes about 'action' (saṅkhāra, P.; saṁskāra, Skt.; gyō, Jap.); from 'action' comes about 'consciousness' (viññāṇa, P.; vijñāna, Skt.; shiki, Jap.); from 'consciousness' comes about 'mind-and-body' (nāma-rūpa, P., Skt.; myōshiki, Jap.); from 'mind-and-body' come about 'six spheres' (saḷāyatana, P.; ṣaḍāyatana, Skt.; rokusho, Jap.); from 'six spheres' comes about 'touch' (phassa, P.; sparśa, Skt.; soku, Jap.); from 'touch' comes about 'feeling' (vedanā, P., Skt.; ju, Jap.); from 'feeling' comes about 'thirsting-love' (taṇhā, P.; tṛṣṇā, Skt.; ai, Jap.); from 'thirsting-love' comes about 'cleaving' (upādāna, P., Skt.; shu, Jap.); from 'cleaving' comes about 'existence' (bhava, P., Skt.; u, Jap.); from 'existence' comes about 'birth' (jāti, P., Skt.; shō, Jap.); from 'birth' comes about 'age-and-death' (jarā-maraṇa, P., Skt.; rō-shi, Jap.) and all such sorrows as apprehension, sorrow, bitterness, sadness, and worry.

b. As 'ignorance' dies out, 'action' dies out; as 'action' dies out, 'consciousness' dies out . . . etc. . . . as 'birth'

(Cont. from p. 133, note)
bukkyō-ni-okeru-Engiron-no-Kaiten); Chizen Akanuma: *On the Traditional Exposition of the Doctrine of the Twelve Links of Interdependence* (*Jūniinnen-no-Dentōtekikaishaku-ni-tsuite*), (*Shūkyōkenkyū*, new, II, 1, which was later included in his works entitled *A Study of the Primitive Buddhism* (*Genshibukkyō-no-Kenkyū*). The articles that took up the subject of pratītyasamutpāda in the light of logical relations were those of: Hakuju Ui: *A Study of Indian Philosophy*, II, 3, *An Exposition of the Twelve Links of Interdependence* (*Jūniinnen-no-Kaishaku*); Tetsurō Watsuji: *Practical Philosophy of Primitive Buddhism* (*Genshibukkyō-no-Jissentetsugaku*), chap. 2, on: *The Doctrine of Interdependence*, etc.

dies out, such sorrows as 'age-and-death' and apprehension, sorrow, sadness, worry, etc. die out.

Of these, 'a' propounds interdependence from the angle of the one that 'moves onwards towards transmigration' (ruten-engi, Jap.), whereas 'b' sees it from that of the one that 'moves backwards towards extinction' (genmetsu-engi, Jap.). The original course of interdependence that moves onwards towards transmigration is also said to start from the final link of the 'sorrow' of age-and-death, and revert to 'ignorance' that heads the list. Here, however, we will leave off any such distinction, but follow the set form of order and look into each one by one.

Twelve Links of Interdependence Explained

1. '**Mumyō**' (**ignorance**; avidyā, Skt.; avijjā, P.) means that 'there is no myō'. 'Myō' is 'wisdom'. It refers to the truth, the right view about the world and life. This is after all to know of the law of interdependence. 'Mumyō' means that there is a lack of this wisdom. It says that the root cause of our worries and misfortunes comes from the fact that we have no right view of the world and life. Needless to say, there are things in life that arise out of what is inevitable. But even at that, suffering from such catastrophes as earthquakes, etc. may well be avoided to some extent as science advances, by which man may know things beforehand and take necessary precautions. Thus will one avoid things better than when ignorant, failing to take any precautions. Cases are many in which quarrels, animosities, and antagonistic feelings arise from lack of the right knowledge of the structure of the world which stands on the law of interdependence, each depending upon and relating to the other,

and from lack of the right endeavour in walking in the footsteps of this law. Such disputes between workers and capitalists or entrepreneurs may be easily solved or may be prevented from arising if only the points of the other party were rightly seen, the business or enterprise was seen as a whole, and necessary efforts or measures were taken. Frictions and disputes raise heads as we lose sight of the whole, sitting on ignorance and clinging only to one's own interest.

Therefore, if one possesses the right knowledge of the world and life and rightly acts according to the law of interdependence, the worry and misfortune of the world will be greatly lessened. It is because of this that Buddhism counts 'ignorance' as the first of the basic causes of sorrow and misfortune. It does not say as in Christianity that one should be like a child. No doubt, it may mean that one should be as selfless and innocent as a child. It does not, therefore, much differ from what Buddhism says. But in the Indian language, the word 'bāla' (child) also means 'dull'. So, such an expression could not have come about, to say that one should be like a child.

2. **'Gyō' (action**; saṁskāra, Skt.; saṅkhāra, P.)[1] The

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1) 'Gyō' (saṁskāra, Skt.; saṅkhāra, P.) means etymologically 'to make together', 'what makes together'. Other than the 'gyō' of the Twelve Links of Interdependence it comes about as the 'gyō' of the 'five groups' (pañca-skandha) and the 'gyō', of 'shogyō-mujō' (anitya). Of these, the one of 'shogyō-mujō' refers to all phenomena that undergo birth and death and change. It is the 'gyō' most wide in implication. Next comes the 'gyō', the second of the Twelve Links of Interdependence. It points to all actions of of our 'body', 'speech', and 'will', the sum total of man's experiences. The 'gyō' of the 'five groups' is explained in the texts of Primitive Buddhism as 'cetanā' (will or volition), because, perhaps, the basic force of action lies in the will. But as a matter of fact, this must include in it all such mental actions other than those of 'vedanā', 'saṁjñā', and 'vijñāna'. And in the Abhidharma Buddhism→

'action' (gyō) of 'From ignorance comes about action' can be both 'action' and 'a collection of actions'. This 'action' is of three types, which are: 1) 'action of thinking' through consciousness (action by will), 2) 'action of mouth and tongue' (action by speech), and 3) 'action of body' (bodily action). On such an occasion, action is, needless to say, accompanied by the will of good or evil. And by wrong thought or lack of wisdom, i.e. ignorance, wrong actions come about. Of such wrong actions, we can, for example, recount, as that of will, greed, anger, and ignorance; as of speech, lying, ill-speaking, double-tongued slandering, and vain talk; and as of body, killing, stealing, and adultery. All these wrong actions arise out of ignorance.

But our actions do not die out then and there, but unfailingly remain behind in some form or other. Often we are apt to think that good acts are futile if not recognized by others, or evil can pass if others do not know of it. But actions good or evil always leave traces behind in the person himself. Because any action or experience gets stored up, however small, in the person himself, as an experience each time it is done. So, the person who thinks of or does evil becomes mean and rude in appearance and manner, so that others dislike and shun him; on the other hand, one who thinks of or acts good becomes soft and friendly, and people at once can see that the

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(Cont. from p. 136, note)
that came out later, all, not only those of mental action, but also those other than that which causes change to matter and mind and those that point to conditions and situations of matter and mind, were made to stand as other than matter and mind, and these are called 'non-concomitant mental elements', i.e. the 'things not associated with mind' (citta-viprayukta-saṁskāra, Skt.; shinfusōōgyō, Jap.). The 'gyō' of this kind includes in the category 'birth' (jāti), 'age' (jarā), 'death' (maraṇa), 'acquisition' (prāpti), 'life' (jīvita), 'name' (nāma), 'phrase' (pada), 'letter' (vyañjana), etc.

life in ordinary days has been beautiful. None of the good or evil person is especially conscious of what he is or desires to be thus. But the little experiences of ordinary days get accumulated and good or evil shows itself clearly in external appearances.

Thus, all actions and experiences of each moment get accumulated without fail on our own person and build up the qualities of our own intellect and character, and this becomes our present self. The personal contents of good or evil deeds and experiences thus accumulated are these ' actions ' (saṁskārā), which are the sum total of our deeds. So, the saṁskāra that comes out of ignorance is not only each action itself but also the accumulated personal content itself. And as this saṁskāra comes out of non-wisdom or ignorance, the logical sequence of it is that it must in the end lead to transmigration and sorrow. Against this, any action or sum total of actions resulting from the right view of the world and life must unfailingly lead one away from sorrow and misfortune.

In sum, it is because of the importance of our actions that we say: ' Be mindful even when alone ' or ' What is important is what we do in our ordinary days '. Our future gets decided as we in our ordinary days amass good or evil experiences. With birth, we have already a certain amount of intellect, character, or physical qualities, which are the legacies of our own past. But even these, because of the laws of ' anitya ' (impermanence) and ' anātman ' (no-self or selflessness), are not permanently fixed. The conditions of good or evil make these turn to either right or left. So, after birth, if we add, positively or through environment, the right conditions and amass good experiences, the quality that we have with us already will be improved, whereas, if the enviroment is bad or if wrong wills and actions are further added, the good born-quality will by

degrees deteriorate. It is because of this that we must be mindful of every moment, and must make effort and act in right ways.

3. '**Shiki**' (**consciousness**; vijñāna, Skt.; viññāṇa, P.) The 'shiki' of 'From action comes about consciousness' has the two phases of: 1) functioning of the consciousness of cognition and judgment and 2) consciousness itself of cognition and judgment. The functioning of the consciousness of cognition and judgment has the two phases of: 1) one arising out of the five senses and 2) one arising out of consciousness itself. The former answers to the so-called 'fore five consciousnesses' (zengoshiki, Jap.) of the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the body; and the latter consciousness itself. Together we have six consicousnesses. The former are the sensing functions, and the latter has in it all such functions of consciousness as of sensing, reasoning, guessing, memorizing, and judging. Next, the consciousness as consciousness itself can be talked about when each of the above-said six consciousnesses is looked upon as a single entity. Consequently, the six consciousnesses of cognition and judgment themselves can well be regarded as the functioning itself, and, at the same time, as the entity that functions. And the six consciousnesses talked about in Primitive Buddhism contain both these phases, and few are the cases in which a clear line of distinction is drawn. It is because of this that the scholars of the West and those of Japan today are divided in the explanation of this consciousness. In the days of Abhidharma Buddhism, consciousness was always regarded as a consciousness-entity (shikitai, Jap.) and the functionings of consciousness were regarded as different elements and a separate category was instituted, which was called 'mental faculty' (caitasika or citta-saṁprayukta-saṁskāra, Skt.; shinjo; shin-

sōōgyō, Jap.).

But the consciousness of the Twelve Links of Interdependence has in it the two categories of 'functioning' and 'consciousness'. As we see how consiousness functions in our own self, we realize that the function of sensing and judging is but what is external and that there lies underneath an inner and latent consciousness which urges and cooperates. The texts of Primitive Buddhism do not state clearly about this latent consciousness. Even Abhidharma Literature too does not discuss much about this. But, later, all Abhidharma schools came to realize this point. In the days of Yogācāras of the Mahāyāna school, we see that the world and life is seen as the centre through this latent consciousness. This comes from the fact that it is not quite possible fully to explain the Twelve Links of Interdependence unless we see this latent consciousness down under consciousness itself. The texts of Primitive Buddhism do not refer by word to this latent consciousness, but we cannot clearly explain 'From action comes about consciousness' unless we do actually take this into account.

Even in our daily life of cognition and judgment, we see the functioning of this latent consiousness. Take the case of a flower. The eye only sees the flower just as it is mirrored in the eye, whereas what senses and judges it as flower comes from the previous experience of having seen it. The memory of this experience comes back and we recognize that the flower we now see is the same as the one we had experienced before. And finally we arrive at the cognition that it is a flower. When we recognize it as a white flower, this cognition so comes about because we had a previous knowledge of colour of white, black, red, blue, etc., and because we see that it is not red, not black, and that, therefore, it is white. This 'white' may be

recognized as of a lily only after one has had the previous experience of having seen or heard of a lily and as the flower is the same as the one which has been seen before.

Thus, even in the very simple case of recognizing a white lily, the process of cognition and judgment is fairly complicate, and we see that as we call forth a judgment, the part played by latent consciousness which stores up past experiences is very great. Now, this latent consciousness is the fruit of intellectual experience of the past. So, it is either that ' saṁskāra ' (action) which is the sum total of experiences, or the latent consciousness gained as a fruit of ' action ' (or a ' collection of actions '). Be this as it may, ' From action comes about consciousness ' tells that the present congnition and judgment come about because of the entire experience of the past. With one who has amassed evil experiences in the past, these experiences become a kind of preconceived idea and form the personality of the person, and things get recognized through this distorted preconception. Needless to say, the judgment arrived at is a wrong one. In a way, both the functioning of conciousness and the consciousness itself that recognizes and judges things are based on the past experiences of good and evil. So, there cannot possibly be any consciousness which is uncoloured or in a blank state. Thus is it said that ' From action comes about consciousness '.

What we must know here in regard to consciousness is that the surface consciousness or the one which is latent must not be taken as an eternally unchanging entity. Consciousness is a phenomenon, whether the functioning itself or the one that functions. It changes every moment along with experience. So, it is no unchanging, permanently fixed entity. A bhikṣu who had entered the order from a teaching other than Buddhism once took this consciousness of the Twelve Links of Interde-

pendence to be an unchanging consciousness-body that repeats birth and death and transmigrates and as something like a soul. As he did not forsake the view, he was reproved by the Buddha, who had pointed out to him the wrong conception and taught him once again the right view of the law of interdependence.[1]

4, 5. **'Myōshiki' (mind-and-body;**[1] nāma-rūpa, Skt., P.); **'Rokusho' (six spheres**; ṣaḍāyatana, Skt.; saḷāyatana, P.) It goes: 'From consciousness comes about mind-and-body;* from mind-and-body comes about six spheres'. This is to say that 'consciousness', 'mind-and-body', and 'six spheres' are mutually related to each other. But the relations of these three are not necessarily in the category of causation of time, of fore and aft. It also refers to the relations of simultaneous happening, or the logical relation. So, the three of 'consciousness', 'mind-and-body', and 'six spheres' can be taken to be the reciprocal relation of simultaneous interdependence. Of these, the consciousness is a consciousness-body (entity) made up of both the surface and the latent consciousness. And the 'mind-

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1) The *Chūagon*, 201 (the *Sateikyō*); the *Majjhima-nikāya*, 38 (the *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sutta*; the *Daiaijinkyō*, Jap.). Sāti, son of a fisherman, was taken into the order and taught the Twelve Links of Inderdependence. But he could not rightly grasp the meaning. In accordance with what was said generally, he took it that consciousness itself was a substance that transmigrated, the self being ever the same repeating birth and death and transmigration from the past to the present, from the present to the future; and that it was a concrete body. He insisted that the consciousness-body* was none but the ātman itself. Other bhikṣus told him that he was wrong. As he did not abandon the wrong view, the matter was reported to the Buddha. Sāti was called before the Buddha, who minutely explained the principle of selflessness, and made Sāti forsake the wrong view, and he taught him clearly the right view of the Twelve Links of Interdependence.

and-body' (nāma-rūpa) is the object of cognition of this consciousness, which is 'mind' (nāma) and 'matter' (rūpa)—'body'.[1]* No doubt, as the object of cognition and judgment, there are, other than matter and mind, such objects as notion and name. But these all fall under the category of 'name' (nāma). In sum, all objects of consciousness are represented by 'nāma-rūpa'. So, nāma-rūpa equals, in content, the 'six sense-fields' (ṣaḍ-viṣayāḥ, Skt.; rokkyō, Jap.)[2] of: 1) 'matter' (colour and form; rūpa, Skt.; shiki, Jap.),[3] 2) 'voice' (śabda, Skt.; shō, Jap.), 3) 'smell' (gandha, Skt.; kō, Jap.), 4) 'taste' (rasa, Skt.; mi, Jap.), 5) '(the) tangible' (spraṣṭavya, Skt.; soku, Jap.),[4] and 6) 'non-sensuous objects' (dharma, Skt.; hō, Jap.),[5] which are the objects of the 'six consciousnesses' (ṣaḍ-vijñāna, Skt.; rokushiki, Jap.). The 'colour' and 'form', which are the objects of 'visual consciousness' (cakṣur-vijñāna, Skt.; genshiki, Jap.), are the 'matter' (rūpa, Skt.; shiki, Jap.). The object of 'aural consciousness' (śrota-vijñāna, Skt.; nishiki, Jap.) is the 'voice'. The object of 'touch (or tactual) consciousness' (kāya-vijñāna, Skt.; shin-

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1) 'Rūpa' itself may not mean 'body'. It is 'matter' or 'material thing' as against 'mind' which is not concrete. But as the doctrine of the Twelve Links of Interdependence itself concerns but the fate of man, it is here rendered as 'mind-and-body'. → Glossary (Tr.).
2) 'Viṣaya' means the 'field or sphere of activity or object of consciousness'. Here the 'field or range within which the sense-organs act or work': hence the 'sense-field' or the field within which the sense activity goes. →Glossary (kyō) (Tr.).
3) 'Rūpa' is what is physical, which is 'matter' or 'material thing'. Being physical it naturally has its own colour and form. That is why it at times is represented as 'form' or 'colour' in English, which, however, only represents part.→Glossary (shiki) (Tr.).
4) →Glossary (soku).
5) All abstract, metaphysical ideas and thinkings, which are the object of the thought-consciousness which thinks (Tr.).

shiki, Jap.), which is palpable, is the tangible, i.e. what is tangible (spraṣṭavya, Skt.; soku, Jap.); and all existences and non-existences which are the objects of 'thought consciousness' (mano-vijñāna, Skt.; ishiki, Jap.) are the non-sensuous objects (dharma, Skt.; hō, Jap.).

Next, to recognize and judge the objects of consciousness, there must be the sense-organs and the power to do so. The organs that make cognition possible are the 'six spheres' (ṣaḍā-yatana, Skt.; rokusho, Jap.), which are none but the 'six sense-organs' (ṣaḍ-indriyāni, Skt.; rokkon, Jap.).[1)]* These are the 'sense-organ of sight' (cakṣur-indriya, Skt.; genkon, Jap.), the 'sense-organ of hearing' (śrotrendriya, Skt.; nikon, Jap.), the 'sense-organ of smelling' (ghrāṇendriya, Skt.; bikon, Jap.), the 'sense-organ of taste' (jihvendriya, Skt.; zekkon, Jap.), the 'sense-organ of touch' (kāyendriya, Skt.; shinkon, Jap.), and the 'sense-organ of thinking' (manendriya, Skt.; ikon, Jap.). Of these, the 'sense-organ of sight' refers to the mechanism of sight (visual nerve) or the power by which one sees by using the mechanism of sight. It is not the eyeball which we commonly call 'eye'. The same also goes with such others as the 'sense-organ of hearing', the 'sense-organ of smelling', the 'sense-organ of taste', and the 'sense-organ of touch'. This is to say that the sense-organ of hearing is, for example, the 'sense-organ or the power of hearing'. So it goes with the others. Now, if we state in concrete terms about the relations of consciousness, mind-and-body, and six spheres, we see, for example, that to gain the visual cognition, there needs be the simultaneous presence of the three elements of the visual consciousness, the visual sense-field (visual object), and the sense-organ of sight (visual power). In the same way, to gain

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1) →Glossary (*kon*) (Tr.).

the functioning of the thought consciousness for thinking and judging, the three are needed of the thought consciousness, the non-sensuous object (object of the thought consciousness), and the sense-organ of thinking (faculty of thinking). So, the three of consciousness, mind-and-body, and six spheres of the Twelve Links of Interdependence point to the three conditions needed for the functioning of the consciousness of cognition and judgment. By the simultaneous presence of these three, there first emerges the functioning of cognition and judgment.

Other than the three relations of consciousness, mind-and-body, and six spheres of: 'From consciousness comes about mind-and-body, and from mind-and-body come about six spheres', we often come across, in such texts of Primitive Buddhism as the *Agon* and others, a statement such as: 'From the sense-organ (indriya) and the sense-field (viṣaya) comes about consciousness (vijñāna)', which states the process of cognition.[1] This tells that from the sense-organ of sight and the visual sense-field comes the visual consciousness, . . . and that from the sense-organ of thinking and the non-sensuous sense-field comes the thought consciousness, explaining the process by which the cognition of the sensuous and non-sensuous objects takes place. And for explaining the coming about of cognition, 'From the sense-organ and the sense-field comes about consciousness' is more general than the relationship of consciousness, mind-and-body, and six spheres. Both of these categories put forward the three elements of sense-organ, sense-field, and consciousness. The only difference is that whereas, in the case of the Twelve Links of Interdependence, the order goes as consciousness, sense-field, and sense-field, in the ordinary system

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1) E.g. the *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, XXXV, 106, etc.; the *Zōagon*, VIII (sūtra, 218, etc.), and in many other places.

of cognition it goes as the sense-organ, the sense-field, and consciousness. But then, can any such difference be logically permitted in explaining the same process of sensing and knowing? This comes from the fact, as stated already, that this cognition happens by the simultaneous presence of the sense-organ, the sense-field, and consciousness and that there is thus no harm if the order goes the other way. Only in the case of the Twelve Links of Interdependence, the factors of ignorance and action precede and there is a chain of order which proceeds from action to consciousness, so that consciousness stands first, followed by the sense-field and the sense-organ. The subject will be discussed later.

6. **'Soku' (touch**; sparśa, Skt.; phassa, P.) The 'touch' of: 'From six spheres comes about touch' is stated in the Twelve Links of Interdendence to come about only from the six spheres (sense-organs). But the truth is that this touch is no other than the coming into contact of the three of the sense-organ, the sense-field, and consciousness. That is why in the ordinary way of explaining cognition, the statement: 'From sense-organ and sense-field comes about consciousness' is followed by: 'Touch comes about by the harmonious joining of the three'. Thus, touch is the harmonious coming into contact of the three of the sense-organ, the sense-field, and consciousness. This is the correct way of explaining touch. This tells that touch is but the coming into contact or the situation in which this touch is actualized in the process of cognition by sensing and knowing, in which the three of the sense-organ (the sensing organ or faculty), the sense-field (the object of cognition), and the cognizing-body (the consciousness) come into contact. From this standpoint also, we may know that the relation of the consciousness, mind-and-body, six spheres, and

touch of the Twelve Links of Interdependence is the same as the relation of the sense-organ, the sense-field, consciousness, and touch referred to in the ordinary way of explaining the theory of cognition.

Further, in the theories of interdependence, there are cases in which the chain begins with the sense-organ, the sense-field, and consciousness of this cognition theory, followed by the items that are found in the Twelve Links of Interdependence, the order being touch, feeling, thirsting-love, cleaving, existence, birth, and age-and-death.[1] From this standpoint too, we see that the consciousness, mind-and-body, and six spheres of the Twelve Links of Interdependence speak about the three of the sense-organ, the sense-field, and consciousness.

7. '**Ju**' (**feeling**; vedanā, Skt., P.) 'From touch comes about feeling'. This feels hardship (ku, Jap.; dukkha-vedanā, P.) and ease (raku, Jap.; sukha-vedanā, P.), the result of the harmonious meeting of the sense-organ, the sense-field and consciousness. And in it we have the 'three feelings' (tisso vedanā, P.; sanju, Jap.) of the 'feeling of hardship' (kuju, Jap.), the 'feeling of ease' (rakuju, Jap.), and the 'feeling of not-hard and not-easy' (adukkhamasukhā-vedanā, P.; fukufurakuju, Jap.). These are further classified, from the standpoints of 'bodily' and 'mental', into the five kinds of: 1) apprehension (domanassa, P.; u, Jap.), 2) joy (somanassa, P.; ki, Jap.), 3) hardship (dukkha, P.; ku, Jap.), 4) ease (sukha, P.; raku, Jap.), and 5) indifference (upekkhā, P.; sha, Jap.), calling forth thus the 'five feelings' (pañca vedanā, P.; goju, Jap.). The relations between the 'three feelings' (tisso vedanā, P.; sanju, Jap.) and the 'five feelings' are as in the following:

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1) E.g.: the *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, XXXV, 107; the *Zōagon*, VIII (sūtra 218), etc.



This is to say that hardship and ease are classified into the two categories of: 1) bodily and sensual and 2) spiritual and intellectual; and no distinction is made between feelings and sentiments that are neutral, which belong to neither hardship nor ease. Any such feelings of hardship and ease of the sensual category are mainly those which are objective in quality, resulting from the pain felt through the action of the nerve that feels pain, whereas those of the mental, i.e. those of joy and apprehension, are rather subjective, differing by person and sensibility.

Originally, the mental sensing of hardship or ease comes about subjectively. When the mental requirement is not fulfilled, we feel sorrow and dissatisfaction; when the desire is answered, we feel pleased and satisfied. The desire and the way of feeling differs with the environment. Subjectively, one's past experiences and preconceptions call forth the differences. For example, the same white flower may be a source of great sorrow to one person, whereas it may be a joy to another. The different past experiences in such a case are due to ignorance and action from the standpoint of the Twelve Links of Interdependence. As these differ by person, the difference of feeling arises, which will be either sorrow or happiness. Hence 'From touch comes about feeling'.

8. **'Ai' (love;** tṛṣṇā, Skt.; taṇhā, P.) The 'love' (ai)

of ' From feeling comes about love ' is translated at times as ' katsuai '. This is the ' thirsting-love ', which is like our longing for water when thirsty. This totally differs from the ' love ' of God of the Christian teaching or the ' jihi ' (compassion) or ' renmin ' (sympathy) of the Buddhist. It is a blind love that arises out of wrong conception. The basic cause of sorrow is ignorance, but the direct cause is the ' thirsting-love '. So, in the Four Noble Truths, the ' cause of sorrow ' (samudaya) is ascribed to the ' thirsting-love '. There love is classified into the three of: 1) ' love of desire ' (kāma-taṇhā, P.; yokuai, Jap.), 2) ' love of existence' (bhava-taṇhā, P.; uai, Jap.), and ' love of non-existence ' (vibhava-taṇhā, P.; muuai, Jap.). Of these, the love of desire points to the sensual love, especially the sexual love between man and woman. The ' love of existence ' points to the desire for ' existence ' (u, Jap.), the desire to be born in a happy world. The ' love of non-existence ' is so said because man's existence in this world is not in a stabilized state, being filled with uneasiness and sorrow, because even happiness is temporarily gained and turns out in no time to be the cause of sorrow, and because so long as the wheel of transmigration turns, there is no moment of equanimity of mind. So, one longs burningly for a world of non-existence that knows no transmigration. It is to this that it points.

To long for happiness in the life to come or to desire no state of existence is not a thing to be conceived of by the people of Japan today. But in the India of the Buddha's time, because of the despair against the apprehension and sorrow of life then, in the present life, people seriously craved, it would seem, a happiness in the life to come or negated any existence at all that was accompanied by uneasiness and sorrow, and longed for a life of utter nothingness. The decadent and degenerate love to seek full enjoyment of the five senses and to be

soaked in lust exists in any world and at any time. This is human instinct. But in such an age as that of the day of the Buddha when chaos reigned in the worlds of thought, politics, and economics, there could possibly be a tendency to surrender to this human instinct.

Generally man has a blind desire to love and seek what one must not. This desire calls forth also a wrong mental state to hate one whom one must not hate. So, this thirsting-love is either a wrong love or a wrong hate. Thus 'From feeling comes about love'. Because of this, when we recognize anything, bias and preconception, the fruits of wrong experiences in the past based on ignorance and action, rule over and we feel sorrow and joy, and a mind arises to shun and hate what gives us sorrow and apprehension and to crave and long for what gives us ease and joy. In as much as the feeling of sorrow or joy is subjectively the greater, that much can love or hate that arises will be the acuter and more blind. Hence 'From feeling comes about love'.

9. '**Shu**' (**cleaving**; upādāna, Skt., P.) The 'cleaving' of: 'From love comes about cleaving' means 'to grasp and stick to'. Against the fact that love was a blind passion of love or hate, 'cleaving' is a strong action of selection to take in or abandon that which has arisen out of love or hate. We act and try to take in what we love and make it our own, and make effort to abandon or throw away what we hate or dislike. If love and hate were blind and wrong, the effort and action of selection that arise out of them to take in or abandon must also be wrong. After all, the mind of love or hate and the action to take in or abandon are what is called 'karma' —lying, ill-speaking, double-tongued slander, vain talk, killing, stealing, or adultery—, and our 'action' (karma) of good or evil thus

comes out to be. So, the two of ‘ love ’ and ‘ cleaving ’ may well correspond to the two of ‘ignorance’ and ‘ action ’ that head the Twelve Links of Interdependence.

10 ‘ **U** ’ (**existence**; bhava, Skt., P.) The ‘ u ’ (bhava) of: ‘ From cleaving comes about existence (u) ’ means ‘ existence ’. As to what this ‘ existence ’ should be, scholars vary in their views. If we view ‘ existence ’ from the ground of karmic theory, we get the two of the ‘ existence which is the action itself of good or evil ’ (gōu, Jap.), and the ‘ existence of sorrow or happiness as a result of the karmic action ’ (hōu, Jap.). There are scholars who regard this ‘ existence ’ (bhava) of the Twelve Links of Interdependence as the ‘ karmic existence ’ (gōu, Jap.), or the ‘ existence of recompense ’ (hōu, Jap.), or one made up of both the karmic existence and the existence of recompense; and there are other viewpoints. But the existence referred to here can never be the ‘ existence of recompense ’, nor the ‘ karmic existence ’ itself, but only a part, so would it seem, of the karmic existence. The ‘ karma ’ (gō, Jap.) is the same as the ‘ action ’ (gyō) of the Twelve Links of Interdependence. And this ‘ action ’ can be, as already stated, the action itself of good or evil and the one with a latent power, vig. those actions and experiences that have been preserved or accumulated. And the action was both the actions and experiences themselves and the latent power which was the accumulation of such actions and experiences. But the existence of the present case is only the latent power and does not include any action or experience. Because the action good or evil is the ‘ love ’ (taṇhā) and the ‘ cleaving ’ (upadānā). The existence (bhava) is what has become a latent power by the accumulation of the actions good or evil through love and cleaving which are the taking-in and abandoning, hating or loving. And as our

present existence is the accumulation of the experiences of our own past actions, it can be the ' bhava ' itself. Our personality or personal character is this. So, ' From love comes about cleaving and from cleaving comes about existence ' means that the karmic actions of good or evil arising out of love, hating, taking-in, or abandoning, mould our personality and character. And our personality, the sum total of our present, acts as basis and moulds our future. This fact is stated by: ' From existence comes about birth '.

11. **' Shō ' (birth**; jāti, Skt., P.) As ' existence ' is the element or factor that shapes one's future, we say that from an existence comes about the birth of the day to come. This ' birth ' may be taken literally as the one coming after death, or as one's existence that comes about each moment of life. If it is that even such a partial experience as our own cognition or judgment is also a birth, we may know that this has been shaped and influenced by the latent power, the sum total of our own past experiences. Our own existence as man comes about by the latent existence which is an accumulation of our past experiences. For several reasons as stated above: ' From existence comes about birth '.

12. **' Rō-shi ' (age-and-death**; jarā-maraṇa, Skt., P.) As ' From birth come about all such sorrows as age-and-death, etc.', the coming-about of our existence leads us inevitably to age-and-death. The ' age-and-death ' points more to the sorrow that arises out of age-and-death than the fact of age-and-death itself. It represents all the sorrow man is to suffer. The statement is made here, psychologically and physiologically, through the causal chain of interdependence, to show that all sorrows arise, after all, gradually from wrong thoughts and

wrong actions. The teaching of the Twelve Links of Interdependence tells us, physiologically and psychologically, the condition that, in the course of interdependence that moves onwards towards transmigration, wrong experiences get heaped up with ignorance and thirsting-love as the primary cause and condition; that, as these are all blind desires and actions, no satisfactory results could, as a matter of course, come about, and that these are the sources of uneasiness and sorrow.

Twofold Causation Extending to the Three Times

The chain of Twelve Links of Interdependence stated about above may be taken to refer to a course of interdependent relations that take place within a short duration of time, or the one that extends to whole life, or even the relation that covers two or three lives, or the one that occurs between different lives. The texts of Primitive Buddhism say nothing definite regarding this point. We may take it that it refers to any one of these relationships. But in the days of Abhidharma Buddhism, we see that the chain of the Twelve Links of Interdependence is explained as referring to a causation that extends to the Three Times of the past, the present, and the future, that it has come to be the theory of the 'Twofold Causation Extending to the Three Times', and that this way of explanation has come to be the only one to explain the theory of the Twelve Links of Interdependence. Even Mahāyāna Buddhism, too, that came out later, when explaining the Twelve Links of Interdependence, always referred to the chain as a Twofold Causation Extending to the Three Times. This wrongly explained and understood what was said in regard to the law of interdependence in Primitive Buddhism. Be this as it may, as this explanation of the Twofold Causation Extending to the Three Times has a long tradition covering the Buddhist history of Hīnayāna and Mahā-

yāna, we shall refer to it here as a matter of course.

According to this theory, the ignorance and action of the Twelve Links of Interdependence belong to the past, and with these as the cause embedded in one's past life, one gains in the present life the result of the five elements of consciousness, mind-and-body, six spheres, touch, and feeling. Accordingly, the consciousness is the 'consciousness-body for rebirth' (paṭisandhi-viññāṇa, P.; kessōshiki, Jap.), the consciousness one gains at the very moment of conception in one's mother's womb. Because the consciousness-body bears on its shoulder the past karma and travels from the past to the present and to the future, thus ever continuing its existence. And the first consciousness-body which one gains as one first moves from the past to the present life is called the 'consciousness-body for rebirth'. Next, the 'mind-and-body' is considered to be the 'mind-and-body' of the child that is growing up in its mother's womb. Sometimes the scholars of the modern age have explained the 'nāma-rūpa' of the Twelve Links of Interdependence influenced by this theory of embryology. The six spheres are considered to be the six sense-organs of sight, hearing, smelling, tasting, touch, and mind, which the child gains as it grows up. When the child has fully grown its physical form, it then comes out of its mother's embryo. Touch is the first experience of sense and knowledge which the child gains, as it comes out of its mother's womb, by the harmonious combination of the three of sense-organ, sense-field, and conciousness. According to this explanation, the sense-organ, the sense-field, and the consciousness that precede the touch have no place in the chain of Twelve Links of Interdependence. The feeling corresponds, as already said, to the function of sensing sorrow or happiness that comes about after touch. In this case, the feeling is said to be only one of sorrow or happiness

that man and woman feel before they attain adolescence.

Seen thus, the explanations and relations of interdependence of consciousness, mind-and-body, six spheres, and touch come out to be greatly different from what has been stated. Why had things to be explained thus from the standpoint of embryology? This comes from the fact that there is a passage in the *Agongyō*, which explains the consciousness of the Twelve Links of Interdependence as a 'consciousness-body for rebirth' (paṭisandhi-viññāṇa). But this was but an explanation of the difficult doctrine of interdependence presented in parables and with factual examples, so that those of lesser grade of understanding might easily grasp what was said. And such an explanation comes out but once or twice.

The *Jōagon*, XIII, 10 (the *Daienhōbenkyō*) says: 'The mind-and-body comes about from consciousness; as it comes from consciousness, there is the mind-and-body. If consciousness does not get into the mother's womb, there is no mind-and-body. If there is no consciousness, there can be no mind-and-body'. But it is one of the examples of consciousness, and the other two are the consciousnesses while in the mother's womb and in a child after birth. In Pāli, the *Dīgha-nikāya*, XV (the *Mahānidāna-suttanta*; the *Daienkyō*, Jap.). The word (viññāṇa) does not as yet appear in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, 38, and the *Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhaya-sutta*. But we see there a popular explanation in which the 'soul of the dead' (gandhabba, P.), the 'intermediate existence' (antarā-bhava, P.; chūu, Jap.), i.e. the one that first enters the mother's womb when conception takes place, is called the 'consciousness-body for rebirth' (paṭisandhi-viññāṇa, P.; kesshōshiki, Jap.), and it says that interdependence thus takes start. In a word, this means to say that conception actualizes as the three of the soul of the dead, the sexual connections of the parents, and the 'spermatic fluid' (utunī, P.) of the mother harmoniously meet together; that a child comes out of its mother's womb after 9–10 months; that in the days of childhood all the sense-organs (six spheres) grow up; that as growth continues, the sense-field (nāma-rūpa) of the 'five desires' (goyoku, Jap.) work influence; that then comes about the 'harmnious uniting' (touch) of the three of sense-organ, sense-field, and consciousness,

by which one comes to get attached to the sense-field of what one likes and to hate what one does not like; that thus the feeling (vedanā) of joy or sorrow or no joy comes about by the difference (to love or to hate) of one's attitude towards the sense-field; that as one welcomes this feeling and feels 'attached to it' (love), joy arises; that this joy is the 'cleaving' (upādāna); that this cleaving calls forth 'existence' (bhava); that this existence calls forth 'birth' (jāti); that this birth calls forth all the sorrow of the 'age-and-death' (jarā-maraṇa). But this system of causation differs from that of the Twofold Causation Extending to the Three Times.

Therefore, it is very wrong, we must say, if we take up what was explained in a parable as the only reliable material for explaining the doctrine of interdependence. But as the popular theory had gained a ground and as people began to view consciousness as a 'consciousness-body for rebirth', the mind-and-body, six spheres, touch, and feeling had also to be accepted as physiological and psychological functions that follow the consciousness-body for rebirth. This was how the theory had come about to explain the interdependence as an embryological system. We do not come across in sūtras any passage that says that the mind-and-body and six spheres are the conditions of a child while yet in the womb. This was only a fiction of the days of Abhidharma Buddhism.

Anyway, the five units of consciousness, mind-and-body, six spheres, touch, and feeling are the five fruits that belong to the present which had arisen out of the past two causes of ignorance and action, and from these arise the wrong actions of love, cleaving, and existence. The wrong actions of these units become the three wrong causes of the present and call forth the two fruits of birth and age-and-death of the future. Thus was it said. The Twofold Causation Extending to the Three Times come out as follows:

Twelve Links of Interdependence	ignorance	by-cause (indirect cause)	two causes of the past	Twofold Causation Extending to the Three Times
	action	cause (direct cause)		
	consciousness mind-and-body six spheres touch feeling	fruit	five fruits of the present	
	love cleaving	by-cause (indirect cause)	three causes of the present	
	existence	cause (direct cause)		
	birth age-and-death	fruit	two fruits of the future	

Of these, the ignorance and action that are the causes of the past are equal to the love, cleaving, and existence that are the three causes of the present; the consciousness, mind-and-body, six spheres, touch, and feeling that are the five fruits of the present are equal to the birth and age-and-death that are the two fruits of the future. The names differ, but the contents point to the same. Thus may things be accepted.

So far the Twelve Links of Interdependence. All refer to the interdependence that moves onwards towards transmigration, the course from which sorrow and worry arise. We have not touched upon the interdependence that moves backwards towards nirvāṇa, the course through which we emancipate ourselves from the sorrow and worry of birth and death. In regard to the interdependence that moves backwards towards nirvāṇa, the theory of the Twelve Links of Interdependence only says that by the extinction of ignorance action dies out, etc. . . . and by the extinction of birth the sorrow of age-and-death dies out. We see here no concrete exposition. Here too, if we say that when ignorance dies out action dies out, and when action dies out consciousness dies out, there is a danger, if superficially taken, of concluding that when ignorance dies out action and

consciousness totally die out. But if, by the extinction of ignorance, action and consciousness totally die out, it will lead to mean that our actions and the two functions of our cognition and judgment totally die out, and this will amount to negating our own existence itself. But it is not so. What is said here is that if ignorance dies out, the effect of wrong actions or the effect of wrong consciousness that had arisen out of wrong actions dies out. It is not that right action and consciousness too die out. With any sages who have done away with ignorance, there must as ever remain the action, consciousness, mind-and-body, six spheres, touch, feeling, etc. Only, on such occasions, what exist must be the actions, consciousness, mind-and-body, etc. that do not accompany ignorance.

Here we have only seen how statement is made referring to the interdependence that moves backwards towards nirvāṇa of the Twelve Links of Interdependence. As to the actual course of the interdependence that moves backwards towards nirvāṇa, minute discussion will be done in the section that follows.

5. Four Noble Truths

The law of interdependence mainly alludes to the interdependence that moves onwards towards transmigration. But the Four Noble Truths tell us about the one that moves onwards towards transmigration and the one that moves backwards towards nirvāṇa, but especially about the latter. And the law of interdependence is called 'sakkhi-dhamma' (P.; jinaishō-no-hō, Jap.), the 'dharma experienced in one's own self'. It was this that the Buddha had attained under the bodhi tree, and by meditating and fathoming the Truth, he became the Buddha. It was not to inform to others, but for his own personal comprehension and verification. It was for this that he had realized

this law of interdependence.

Against this, the Four Noble Truths were taught, so that others might understand the law of interdependence. Actually the Four Noble Truths were the Buddha's first sermon to others after attaining Light. Tradition says that the Buddha thought of passing away from life and not revealing what he had attained to others, as the law of interdependence was too difficult for them to understand and as his effort might after all end in fruitless labour. Fathoming the Buddha's mind, Brahmā appeared before him and begged of him to ' Turn the Wheel of Dharma ' (dharmacakra-pravartana, Skt.; tenbōrin, Jap.) and save the world that was on the brink of danger. This story of Brahmā's supplication may be a symbolical expression of what took place in the Buddha's mind. Yet if aptly delivered, parts of it, howsoever difficult, may be understood. Thus thinking, he made up his mind to preach. For seven weeks the Buddha sat in meditation. It was, no doubt, to enjoy the fruit of his attainment, but, possibly, it was also to ponder how to make things easy for others to understand this difficult law of interdependence. The system thought out was this teaching of the Four Noble Truths. Against the fact that the law of interdependence is throughout logical, this doctrine of the Four Noble Truths is both logical and practical; rather, to be practical was the main point. That is why we say that the law of interdependence is a doctrine for awakening and that the teaching of the Four Noble Truths is for explaining to others this law of interdependence. The Four Noble Truths that thus came out were delivered at the first sermon to the five bhikṣus. The circumstances are said to have been as follows.

The first thing that had flashed through the Buddha's mind was whom to reveal the dharma that he had attained. And there were Āḷāra-Kālāma and Uddaka-Rāmaputta who were once his

masters. Accomplished as they were in dhyāna and knowledge of a high grade, he thought that they would understand what he said. But they were no longer in the world. Next, he thought of the five bhikṣus who had served him during the past six years, in those of his penance, who had full wisdom, and who were now gone far west to Bārāṇasī (Benares), to the Deer Park (Mṛgadāva, Skt.; rokuyaon, Jap.), where there lived many Brahman ascetics. They left the Buddha because he suddently forsook the penance which he had so earnestly been undergoing and because he now washed his own body and took the milk-cooked porridge of rice (pāyāsa, P.) which the village girl had presented to him. They thought that he had now degenerated himself. They left him and were now practising the Way for themselves.

In order to teach them, the Buddha went to the Deer Park. The five bhikṣus saw from far off that the Buddha was coming. They did not know that he was now a Buddha; to them he was a degenerate, one who had succumbed to the hardships of penance. They exchanged promises that even when Gautama[1] came, they would not stand up and welcome him. They meant to leave him to his own choice and let him sit if he so willed. But as the Buddha came near, they were awestruck. They stood up. Some ran for water and washed his feet; some took from him the bowl and robe; some saluted; some made a place for him to sit. Even at that, they addressed him and said 'Friend, Gautama!' in a way as as if he were a comrade, a man of their level. The Buddha told them that he was now enlightened and that he was a Buddha; that they should not address a Tathāgata in a way one addresses an equal. But the bhikṣus did not believe him to be a Buddha.

So the Buddha said to the five bhikṣus:

1) The family name of the Buddha.

'O bhikṣus! You may be thinking that light will visit you by doing penance. But to be completely under penance, which gives one pain, is, like abandoning one's own self to a life of lust, a vain act. No true practice, no light will result. The right way for attaining light is to be away from such extremes as penance and lust; it is to stand on the Middle Path (majjhimā paṭipadā, P.; chūdō, Jap.), to be well balanced in body and mind. I threw away the fruitless course of penance and took to this rational one of the Middle Path, and I am now arrived at the right view of the world and life. I have thus attained an unshakable state of mind and am now a Buddha'.

So did he explain.[1] The Middle Path was the Eightfold Noble Path. After explaining the Eightfold Noble Path, a sermon was given on the Four Noble Truths.

'O bhikṣus! This is the holy truth about 'sorrow' (duḥkha, Skt.; dukkha, P.; ku, Jap.). Birth is sorrow; age is sorrow; illness is sorrow; death is sorrow; it is a sorrow to meet with ones whom one hates; it is a sorrow to part with ones whom one loves; it is a sorrow not to be able to get what one desires to have; after all, the clinging to body and mind is sorrow'.[2]

'O bhikṣus! This is the holy truth about the 'cause of sorrow' (samudaya, Skt., P.; jittai, Jap.). It is the thirsting-

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1) The story referring to the Buddha's first sermon after attaining enlightenment is given, e.g. in the (Pāli) *Vinaya* (the *Mahāvagga*, the *Mahākhandhaka*, *Chap. on Upasampadā*); also the *Majjhima-nikāya*, XXVI (the *Ariya-pariyesana-sutta*, P.); the *Chūagon*, 204 (the *Ramakyō*).

2) The four of birth, age, illness, and death are called the 'four sorrows' (shiku, Jap.); when the four of: 1) to meet with ones whom one hates, 2) to part with ones whom one loves, 3) not to be able to get what one desires to have, and 4) to cling to one's body and mind are added to the above 'four sorrows', we get the 'eight sorrows' (hakku, Jap.). All this is what one much talks about since of old.

love (tṛṣṇā, Skt.; taṇhā., P.; katsuai, Jap.), which leads one to rebirth, which accompanies joy and greed, and which here and there cries for joy. The phases are three of the sensual love (kāma-taṇhā, P.; yokuai, Jap.), the love of existence (bhava-taṇhā, P.; uai, Jap.), and the love of non-existence (vibhava-taṇhā, P.; muuai, Jap.).

'O bhikṣus! This is the holy truth about the 'extinction (nirodha, Skt., P.; metsu, Jap.) of sorrow'. This is none but the utter extirpation of, abandoning, emancipation from, and non-clinging to the thirsting-love.

'O bhikṣus! This is the holy truth about the 'way' (mārga, Skt.; magga, P.; dō, Jap.) to the extinction of sorrow. O bhikṣus! This is the Eightfold Noble Path made up of the eight items of right seeing, right thinking, right speech, right action, right living, right effort, right remembrance, and right meditation'.[1]

As will be clear from the above-quoted sermon, the Four Noble Truths (cattāri ariya-saccāni, P.; shishōtai, Jap.) point to the four of: 1) 'noble truth of sorrow' (dukkha-ariyasacca, P.; kushōtai, Jap.), 2) 'noble truth of the cause of sorrow' (samudaya-a., P.; kujūshōtai, Jap.), 3) 'extinction of sorrow' (nirodha-a., P.; kumetsushōtai, Jap.), and 4) 'way to the extinction of sorrow' (magga-a., P.; kumetsudōshōtai, Jap.); simplified, we say the 'Four Truths' (cattāri saccāni, P.; shitai, Jap.) of sorrow, the cause of sorrow, extinction of sorrow, and the way to the extinction of sorrow. These four, as has been said already, refer to the 'interdependence that moves onwards towards transmigration' and the 'interdependence that moves backwards towards extinction'. The two of dukkha and samudaya refer to sorrow and the cause of sorrow by which we repeat birth and death, and the two of nirodha and magga refer to nir-

1) See pp. 170 ff. (Tr.).

vāṇa, the sorrowless peace, which is away from transmigration, and the practice to attain this ideal. In other words, the two of dukkha and samudaya point to: 1) the actual situation of our life in which we do not as yet see the ideal of life and in which we have no self-realization and which is full of sorrow, and 2) the cause and reason for sorrow and worry. The two of nirodha and magga show one: 1) the state in which one is awake to the meaning and end of life, and to the ideal, and 2) also the cause and reason for the way that leads to this world of the ideal. This comes out to be as in the following:

Four Truths	dukkha-s.	...actual life in which there is no awakening and which is made up of sorrow and worry	.....result	Inter-dependence that moves onwards towards transmigration
	samudaya-s.	...cause and reason for the actual life	.....cause	
	nirodha-s.	...awakened ideal world	...result	Inter-dependence that moves backwards towards extinction
	magga-s.	...cause and reason for the ideal world	.....cause	

These four truths may be compared to the case of a doctor who cures a patient. What is first wanted is to see what illness he is suffering from and to find out rightly the conditions of the illness. The next step is to find out the cause of the illness. One may have, for example, a pain in the abdomen. But one must know clearly whether it comes from peritonitis or appendicitis. If not, no right treatment can be expected. We may be warming up when we must cool or cooling when we must warm up. Any wrong treatment will even make the illness worse. What is most needed for the doctor to do is to see rightly the illness and to know of the right cause.

What is next needed is to know the standard state of a healthy body, the right treatment, cure, and hygiene; and following

such knowledges, treatment can be given. Thus treated, the illness will subside and one may regain health.

So, the doctor must rightly know the four items of the state of illness, the cause of illness, the healthy state, and the cure. Equipped thus, a right measure can be taken. This is what is most important for a doctor to cure a carnal body. In the same way, for a man of religion who must curè man's mental illness, what is needed is the four truths of dukkha, samudaya, nirodha, and magga. These are the state of sorrow, the cause of sorrow, the ideal world where there is no sorrow, and the way for releasing one from sorrow. Acting thus, right treatment can be given. From this standpoint, the four truths of Buddhism are compared to curing illnesses.[1)] This system can be applied not only to medicine, but also to all the practical way of seeking realization of an ideal world. All will end in the way of the Four Noble Truths. For example, even in science, this is applicable. The first thing one needs to have is to arrive at the right knowledge of the object of study by looking into the actual state of things. Next, one must know how the existing state has come to be thus and how changes are taking place. Thus, testing and looking into all the phenomena of rise and fall and change, we come to know that under the same conditions and causes the same results come about and we find that the law of causality and other definite scientific laws underlie all phenomena. Thus, to find out the law that underlies the object of search itself is the first thing in the scientific way of study. We say that the object of science is to get to

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1) The *Zōagon*, XV (sūtra 389): ' There are the four perfections. A great doctor is one who has with him what a doctor must have. What are the four? First, he knows well the illness; second, he knows well the cause of illness; third, he knows well how to cure the illness; fourth, he knows well the cured state of the illness. All come out well and the illness does not come out again, etc. '.

truth. It is none other than to arrive at the discovery of this law. This law answers to the law of causality that underlies the two truths of sorrow and the cause of sorrow of the Four Noble Truths.

Now, we say that science studies for truth's sake. But the ultimate end must be to make the truth serve for the benefit of human life. So, when a law akin to truth is found out as a result of scientific research, the next step is to utilize and apply this law to practical purposes and call forth things and states which man desires to have. This must be the second step of scientific research. This may not be the original mission of science itself, but one of application. But the tremendous development of material civilization of the present age owes much to the practical application of the truth and law revealed by the pure research of science in the direction of what man needs and for attaining his ideal. For example, the discovery of the law of mathematics led to the discovery of astronomy; by the discovery of astronomy, we have come to know more minutely about matter and element. Then followed the development of the atomic physics. But in the application of the fruits of study of atomic physics, we have arrived at the atomic bomb and the utilization of the atomic energy for motive power. In the field of scientific civilization of today we see that the discovery of scientific laws and the application of these laws are interchanged and joined together in an extremely complicated way. Even a simple tool or utensil is but the crystalization of manifold effort and search into truth and its application.

Science finds out laws and applies these to life, and calls forth the ideal states and things man needs. The same process goes on in Buddhism, in the law of the Four Noble Truths. We learn here the law of movement of the phenomenal world and how sorrow comes about; we again learn about the

ideal world where there is no sorrow, and realize rightly the way to arrive at it. Following the method of realization of this ideal world, we make effort. Viewed thus, we may say that the religious method of salvation in Buddhism, through its Four Noble Truths, is similar to that of scientific research of today by which man attains cultural advancement. It is because of this that Buddhism is called rational and scientific. Being rational, the Buddha delivered the Four Noble Truths and, consequently, the law of interdependence which were not yet discussed so far. Actually no religion of the world can pride in a doctrine as rational as that of Buddhism. And the Four Noble Truths and the law of interdependence are, as thought patterns, not peculiar to Buddhism alone; they are, as stated already, universal and rational truths like those of medicine and science. It is because of this that the law of interdependence was said to be an eternal and unchangeable law that would persist whether Buddhas had appeared in the world or not.

Of the two truths of ‘ sorrow ’ and the ‘ cause of sorrow ’ of the Four Noble Ttuths, we have already entered into details in the part referring to the law of interdependence, dealing with that which moves onwards towards transmigration. So, we may not need much to say further about it. As to sorrow, allusion has been made in section two of the previous chapter, relative to the Three and the Four Characteristics of the Buddhist teaching, under the caption ‘ all is sorrow ’ (duḥkha, Skt.; dukkha, P.; issaikaiku, Jap.). Now, we say, ‘ duḥkha-satya ’ (truth of sorrow), which means that sorrow is the truth of life. But could we really so accept things? Needless to say, the truth of sorrow does not particularly refer to actual sorrow itself; it points to the general unawakened state of actuality where there is no ideal. So it does not necessarily mean sorrow

itself.[1]

But from the religious standpoint, especially from that of Buddhism, we call the unawakened state of life where there is no ideal sorrow (duḥkha). But the sensing of sorrow or happiness is by nature subjective. Everybody may not necessarily feel the unawakened actual state as sorrow. We talk about ' Sixty-two Heresies of Life ' (dvāsaṭṭhi-diṭṭhigatāni, P.; rokujūniken, Jap.). One of the views holds that ' what man actually enjoys in life is nirvāṇa ' (diṭṭhadhamma-nibbāna, P.; genpōnehansetsu, Jap.). This is a decadent thought in which one alleges that the carnal pleasure arising out of the five senses is a paradise in life. Any age has this epicurean view of life. From this standpoint, the unawakened present is no sorrow but pleasure. As none will unconditionally accept this doctrine of the Four Noble Truths as truth, Buddhism, before expounding the Four Noble Truths, prepares the mind so that people might rightly accept it. About this, allusion was already made.[2] This was to make people first accept the karma theory, a common sense of the day. For none who negate the law of causality will accept as truth the actual fact of sorrow or the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths. So, first, the three discourses of ' dāna '

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1) In the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, XXII, 57 and the *Zōagon*, II (sūtra 42), in the *Shichishosangangyō*, we come across a passage which says: ' One meditates on rūpa, the cause of rūpa, the extinction of rūpa, and the way for the extinction of rūpa '. Here we see that sorrow, the cause of sorrow, the extinction of sorrow, and the way for the extinction of sorrow are not taken up. Instead, actual things are recounted. ' Sorrow ' is here made to stand for the actual state of things. Because ' sorrow ' points to an actual, unawakened state. In the same way, there are often cases in which allusion is made to illusion (āsrava; ro, Jap.), the cause of illusion, the extinction of illusion, and the way for the extinction of illusion. For example, see the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, V, 65.

2) See pp. 158-162 (Tr.).

(giving), 'sīla' (moral precepts), and 'saggakathā' (birth in heaven) were given. This was to make one recognize rightly the law of causality, the good which results from good and the evil which results from evil. When one could believe the law of causality, the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths was for the first time given. Because when one could see the actual facts of good and evil and accept that good and evil call forth their just results, such could with a good grace take in the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths. And when the fact of causality could be taken in as a truth, one could for the first time understand that a state devoid of the ideal is after all sorrow. It is because of this that Buddhism makes the law of causality the first step for entering the teaching.

What is most important in the teaching of the Four Noble Truths is the two truths of the 'extinction of sorrow' and the 'way' to it, which two are the practical phases of application. 'Extinction' is the state in which the sorrow, worry, and apprehension of an unawakened state of the actual world are extinct. This is nirvāṇa, the ideal world of the Buddhists. As to the nature of this ideal world, almost no explanation is given in Primitive Buddhism.

In the texts of Primitive Buddhism we do not much come across explanations regarding the state of nirvāṇa. But in the *Theragāthā*, we often find joy sung by the Buddha's disciples who had attained Light, which refers to the ideal state attained by them. Also, the act of selflessness, about which allusion will be found in section 7, in the part referring to the 'wisdom of prajñā and the practice of selflessness', may also be said to speak of the state of nirvāṇa, though we do not meet with the actual word of nirvāṇa. In the days of Abhidharma Buddhism, we come across two terms such as 'sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa' (nirvāṇa with remaining taints; uyoenehan, Jap.) and 'nir-upadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa' (nirvāṇa with no remaining taints; muyoene-han, Jap.), by which they began to explain nirvāṇa. As we come to the days of Mahāyāna Buddhism, we see further the addition of two

more of ' nirvāṇa ' (nirvāṇa pure in itself; jishōshōjō-nehan, Jap.) and ' apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa ' (nirvāṇa of no resting on nirvāṇa ; mujūshonehan, Jap.). Thus there were four nirvāṇas. But these are rather more formal in the way of explanation, by which the deep signification of nirvāṇa itself loses its true quality. Only the apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa seems to be true of the nirvāṇa in Primitive Buddhism. This is none but the act of selflessness about which statement will be given in section 7.[1]

The fact that sugar is sweet can never be made known however minutely we may try to explain physically, chemically, physiologically, or psychologically. Only by actually tasting it can one know that it is different from the sweetness of honey, from that of liquorice, or from that of persimmon. In the same way, the so-called sweet manna of nirvāṇa can never be described howsoever one may try to explain. Unless one actually practises the Way, perfects one's own personality, and attains this state, one cannot be one with the equanimity and happiness of nirvāṇa. In order that one may experience and feel it for oneself, the explanation of extinction is almost not at all given in the texts of Primitive Buddhism.

But to attain this ideal state, one must actually do the practice for oneself. That is why the explanation about the practice is given very fully. The greater part of the texts of Primitive Buddhism refer to this. As the ' truth of the way ' (mārga-satya), i.e. the system of practice, of the Four Noble Truths, we have the Eightfold Noble Path.[1] In this connection, we should know that the word ' ariya ' (noble, holy) contained in such terms as catvāri āryasatyāni (Four Noble Truths) and āryāṣṭaṅgika-mārga (Noble Eightfold Path) speaks of the illusionless, supramundane world to which a sage belongs. The Noble Eightfold Path is made up of: 1) right view, 2) right thinking, 3) right speech, 4) right action, 5) right living, 6) right effort,

1) See p. 1 (Tr.).

7) right remembrance, and 8) right meditation. Commonly we call it ' Eightfold Noble Path ' (hasshōdō, Jap.).

Eightfold Noble Path Explained The ' Noble Eightfold Path ' (āryāṣṭaṅgika-mārga, Skt.; ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga, P.; hasshōdō, Jap.) means the ' noble (holy) way made up of eight parts '. It is shown in the singular, which means that the eight parts make up a single holy path and that they are not separate. By the cooperation of the eight, the single end of perfecting one's personality is to be gained. For example, the first ' right view ' is the one that accompanies the other seven, and the ' right thinking ' is the one that accompanies the other seven. In the same way, the final ' right meditation ' does not stand alone; it must be the right meditation that accompanies the other seven from ' right view ' down to ' right remembrance '. Because to have full working of right meditation there must be the cooperation of the other seven.[1] We shall now explain the eight ways one by one. What is important to note is that all stand on such a relation to each other. This interrelation is not only to be found in the Eightfold Noble Path but also in all Buddhist items of practice. Such a relation is called, according to the Buddhist technical term, ' saṁgraha ' (sōshō, Jap.), i.e. ' mutual inclusion '.[2] It is as in the case of the law

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1) E.g., the *Zōagon*, XXVIII (sūtra 787 & 788), says that the right view well calls forth the other seven items. Also, the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, VII (42), says that the seven extending from right view to right remembrance are of help to right meditation. This tells us that there is an inseparable relation between ' right view ' and the other seven, and the ' right meditation ' and the other seven.
2) In the *Daibonhannya** and the *Daihannya*,* Book II, we come across such a term as ' rokudosōshōhon '. This tells that each of the six pāramitās stands on the relation of mutual inclusion. Also, in the case of the ' Threefold Learning ' (tisraḥ śikṣāḥ, Skt.; sangaku, Jap.) of śīla (moral precept), samādhi (meditation), prajñā (wisdom), these→

of interdependence which stands on a 'one and all' (issokuissai, Jap.) relation.

1. **Right View** (samyag-dṛṣṭi, Skt.; sammā-diṭṭhi, P.; shōken Jap.) 'Right view' means 'right comprehension', the 'right way of seeing things'. It points to the right view of the world and life of a Buddhist. In a word, it is wisdom concerning the law of interdependence, the Four Noble Truths, etc. As the Eightfold Noble Path is spoken of as 'ariya' (noble, holy), the right view must at least be the wisdom of a sage who has perfected the Buddhist right view of the world and life. But with those of us who are only common mortals and who attend to the need of our daily life too, the right view is extremely necessary. With one who has not yet attained right wisdom, 'right view' comes out as 'right faith'. He can have faith in the person who has the right wisdom, and if he believes in the right wisdom, nothing lacks in life. And as he comes to know and experience why it is the right wisdom, it becomes the right wisdom of his own. As it is the wisdom of a sage, we call it 'right view'. When it contains the wisdom of a common mortal, we might well term it 'right faith' (shōshin, Jap.).

Further, not only in religion but also in our everyday life too, we need, whenever we do anything, the right object to any plan and we must have some general knowledge. This can be the 'right view'. Without the right view and plan and without the right knowledge of the whole, nothing can be taken up or done; and there can be no hope for perfection. Whatever the case, the first thing we need to have is the right view and knowledge

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(Cont. from p. 170, note)
are not things different from each other, but stand on a mutual inclusive relation, and are indivisible so that each helps the other and stands on an inseparable relation to the other.

of the thing concerned.

2. **Right Thinking** (samyak-saṁkalpa, Skt.; sammā-saṅkappa, P.; shōshiyui, Jap.) This is the right way of thinking and the right resolution. This is to think well about one's own position and to think about what is needed in an act and to have the right attitude of mind. We need to think well under right wisdom and have always right thought and to think about how one must act and how one must best act it. The actual content of right thinking comes about spontaneously as one thinks calmly under right wisdom.

As to 'right thinking', the texts of Primtive Buddhism say that one ought always to be wary so that no anger, no mind to kill or harm or no worldly mind raises its head; always to be mindful as in the case of the priestly who walk the path of life with a softened mind, a compassionate and loving mind, a pure mind that is devoid of taints.[1] If one is a student, one is always to be on guard against a mind that is unlike a student, and to think always in a way fit to a student; if a salaried man, he is to realize his own position as a salary man and the employers and capitalists are always to think of their own positions and actions in right ways: such will be right thinking or right resolution.

3. **Right Speech** (samyag-vāc, Skt.; sammā-vācā, P.; shōgo, Jap.) By right view and right thinking we arrive at the fundamental concept of all things. If not fully established

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1) As to how to understand and explain the Eightfold Noble Path, allusion is made in the *Zōagon*, XXVIII (sūtra 785); in the *Chūagon*, 189 (the *Shōdōkyō*); in the *Majjhima-nikāya*, 117 (the *Mahācattārīsaka-suttanta*). Of the explanation of right thinking, it is stated that it refers to the three of: 1) abandoning the worldly life, 2) not to become angry, and 3) not to harm.

in right wisdom towards any plan or object and not equipped with the right sense and attitude of one's own situation, one can have no fundamental basis to act. If one has a fixed plan, what one needs to do is but to follow it, carry it out, and attain the end unfailingly.

'Right speech' means 'right oral action'. The oral action that follows right view and right thinking becomes naturally right. As actual instances of right speech, one is told to refrain from 'telling lies', 'ill-speaking', 'double-tongued slandering', and 'loose word' (irresponsible speech). But positively, it will mean such right oral actions as rightly to lead and teach others, to praise others, to address others with true words, to use words fit for the occasion. At least, the right oral action that can work out the peace and happiness of others and society must be the right speech. Such terms as 'loving word' (aigo, Jap.) and 'harmonizing word' (wago, Jap.) will also fall under this category. There are not a few cases in which disharmony, quarrel, antipathy, and suspicion arise out of wrong oral actions. In whatever society, it is extremely necessary that we understand each other in good part through right oral actions.

4. **Right Action** (samyak-karmanta, Skt.; sammā-kammanta, P.; shōgō, Jap.) 'Right action' means 'right bodily action'. When the mental action of will (mano-kamma, P.; igō, Jap.) seeks external expression, it necessarily takes oral action (vacī-kamma, P.; gogō, Jap.) or 'bodily action' (kāya-kamma, P.; shingō, Jap.). So, from the mental actions of right view and right thinking come about such oral and bodily actions as right speech and right action. As instances of right action, we are told to refrain from such wrong bodily actions as harming or killing, stealing, and lust-seeking (adultery). But this will positively express itself in the forms of saving others' lives, of

such works of charity as giving out wealth, etc., of acting and letting others act rightfully in life. Any such illegal acts that appear in newspapers as burglary, homicide, violence, cheating, quarrel, and all such wrong actions are against the above-said right action and right speech. If wrong action and wrong speech are made away with and if right action and right speech are resorted to, there will be no misfortune in life; peace and happiness will reign.

5. **Right Living** (samyag-ājīva, Skt.; sammā-ājīva, P.; shōmyō, Jap.) 'Shō' means 'right', and 'myō' 'living'. Needless to say, we must forsake wrong speech and wrong action, and take to right speech and right action. Such a right mode of life is right living. This is not to live an evil way of life which one is told not to, and not to get connected with wrong professions. It is to live the twenty-four hours of each day regularly. For a student, there must be a routine course for him to follow, from the time when he leaves the bed up to the time at which he goes to bed—when to get up, when to take breakfast, not to leave the lessons early, etc.[1] . . . As to the right living of a priest, the routine is set forth as to how he should live on the offerings of the faithful and how to live through the day.

6. **Right Effort** (samyag-vyāyāma, Skt.; sammā-vāyāma, P.; shōshōjin, Jap.) 'Right effort' is also 'right courage'. We need right effort in carrying out the preceding four items of right thinking, right speech, right action, and right living as well as those of right remembrance and right meditation that come after. Nothing can be done without full effort and cour-

1) Here about 11 lines are omitted. Considered not quite necessary (Tr.).

age. The texts of Primitive Buddhism explain it in four ways. Now, what adds to attaining the objective is called ' good ' and what goes against is called ' evil '. And right effort is discussed from the four angles referring to these categories of good and evil: 1) to make effort so that the good that is in hand should all the more be augmented, 2) to make effort so that the good that is not in hand should be gained, 3) to lessen or make away with the evil that is in hand, and 4) to make effort so that the evil that is not yet in hand will not arise. If effort is made from these four angles, good will augment and evil lessen, and advancement is sure to come about to the individual as well as to the society, and a day of progress and brightness will unfold itself.

7. **Right Remembrance** (samyak-smṛti, Skt.; sammā-sati, P.; shōnen, Jap.) By ' right remembrance ' is meant that one should keep in mind one's own self and what surround one. This ' nen ' (to think about) of ' shōnen ' is not the one that clings to one's own self, but one that always knows and keeps in mind the position of one's own self and what surround one, so that all the items from right view down to right meditation could rightly be executed. It may well be called ' right consciousness ' or ' right reflection '. It is also to look back on one's own self and act positively with full responsibility; it is the contrary of being careless and unmindful. The wrong that we commit mostly arise morally and, in the execution of daily duties, out of our unmindfulness and carelessness.

This right remembrance is ordinarily alluded to in Buddhism along with ' right knowing ' (sampajāna, P.; shōchi, Jap.). Right remembrance and right knowing point almost to the same mental state. By ' right remembrance ' is meant that one has always in mind the fact that all that surrounds one is im-

permanent, full of sorrow, selfless, not pure, etc. and not to forget it. This is to say that one is not one moment away from the Buddhist way of right thinking in regard to all things. Right knowing means that one is always conscious of and is awake to what goes on in one's everyday action and attitude.[1]

8. **Right Meditation** (samyak-samādhi, Skt.; sammā-samādhi, P.; shōjō, Jap.) This is right dhyāna. It is to have one's mind always in a controlled state. It does not necessarily mean meditation in a sitting posture. It is to throw one's whole self into a state as if one were in samādhi in everyday life. In explaining right meditation (sammā-samādhi), the orthodox explanation names four grades from the first dhyāna (shozen)[2] up to the fourth (daishizen).[3] But such dhyānas can only be attained by specialists. But even the lower grade of mental control is helpful and even necessary in life. By meditation we gain a mental control by which we become minute-minded. Quietly to ponder over or call things back to mind, the mind must be in a controlled state. Any such mental state as that of an unclouded mirror or of the surface of an unmoving water, or any such calm state of mind as that which we call the emptied mind or thought can only be gained

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1) 'Right remembrance' is, as will be explained later, identical with the 'four remembrances' (catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni, Skt.; shinenjo, Jap.) and 'right knowing' is explained as: 'to have consciousness when one steps ahead or draws back, to have consciousness when one bends one's body or stretches it out, to have consciousness when one is holding the robe or the bowl, to have consciousness when eating, drinking, biting, or tasting, to have consciousness when one relieves nature or makes water, to have consciousness when going, stopping, sitting, sleeping, walking, talking, or keeping silent'. So is it explained. See, e.g. the *Dīgha-nikāya*, II (the *Sāmaññaphala-suttanta; the Shamongakyō*, Jap.), sect. 65.
2) See pp. 201 ff. (Tr.).
3) See pp. 201 ff. (Tr.).

through right meditation. Without meditation, no controlled state of mental action can result. We do not particularly need to train ourselves in right meditation. By throwing in our own whole self into a thing, we, as a matter of course, arrive at right meditation. Detailed allusion will be made later.[2)]

6. Actual Practice of the Way

In Buddhism what is most important is to practise the Way that leads one up to the ideal. So, the texts of Primitive Buddhism allude to it in many places in several ways. Abhidharma Buddhism took up these methods of Primitive Buddhism and systematized them into thirty-seven kinds, the system which now goes as 'saptatriṁśad-bodhipākṣikā-dharmāḥ' (Skt.; sattatiṁsa bodhipakkhiya-dhamma, P.; sanjūshichi-bodaibun, Jap.), i.e. the 'thirty-seven parts for attaining bodhi'. These are:

Four Remembrances (catvāri smṛtyupasthānāni, Skt.; cattāri satipaṭṭhānāni, P.; shinenjo, Jap.) It is translated also as 'shinenjū' (Jap.), which is rightly to call to mind and not to forget the four of: 1) 'body' (kāya, Skt.; shin, Jap.), 'feeling' (vedanā, Skt.; ju, Jap.), 'mind' (citta, Skt.; shin, Jap.), and 'element' (dharma, Skt.; hō, Jap.). This is to call to mind that the body (carnal body) is impure, that the feeling is sorrow, that the mind is impermanent, and that the element is selfless. The right remembrance of the Eightfold Noble Path corresponds to these four remembrances.

Four Right Efforts (catvāri samyakprahānāni, Skt.; cattāri sammappadhānāni, P.; shishōgon, Jap.) It is translated also as 'shishōdan' (Jap.), which is the right effort of the Eightfold Noble Path. This is to bring forth the good which is not yet in hand, to augment the good which is already in hand, not to

let the evil arise which is not yet come about, and to make away with the evil which is already in hand.[1]

Four At-will-nesses (catvāro ṛddhi-pādāḥ, Skt.; cattāro iddhipādā, P.; shinyoisoku, Jap.) It is translated also as 'shijinsoku' (Jap.), which are the 'four at-will-nesses' of: 1) wish (chanda, P.), 2) effort (viriya, P.), 3) mind (citta, P.), and 4) consideration (vīmaṁsā, P.). This is to say that the desire for right ideal, the effort, the meditation with full control of the mind, and the wisdom of consideration are all to work unmolested and as one wills.

Five Faculties (pañcendriyāni, Skt.; pañca-indriyāni, P.; gokon,* Jap.) These are the five faculties of: 1) faith (saddhā, P.; shin, Jap.), 2) effort (viriya, P.; shōjin, Jap.), 3) remembrance (sati, P.; nen, Jap.), 4) meditation (samādhi, P.; jō, Jap.), and 5) wisdom (paññā, P.; e, Jap.). 'Kon' (indriya, Skt., P.) means the 'free-working ability'. It points to the abilities of the 'faith' that works towards the Three Treasures of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha, and of the 'effort', 'remembrance', 'samādhi', and 'wisdom' that work towards the ideal.

Five Powers (pañca-balāni, Skt., P.; goriki, Jap.) These are identical with the 'five faculties'. But whereas the five faculties refer to abilities, the 'five powers' refer to abilities of a superior quality. The difference may be said to lie in the grade of activity.

Seven Bodhi Elements (sapta bodhyaṅgāḥ, Skt.; satta sambojjhaṅgā, P.; shichikakushi, Jap.) These are the seven elements of: 1) remembrance (sati, P.; nen, Jap.), 2) selecting-wisdom (dhamma-vicaya, P.; chakuhō, Jap.), 3) effort (viriya, P.; shōjin, Jap.), 4) joy (pīti, P.; ki, Jap.), 5) brightness

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1) See pp. 170 ff. (Explanation of the Eightfold Noble Path) (Tr.).

(passaddhi, P.; kyōan, Jap.), 6) meditation (samādhi, P.; jō, Jap.), and 7) undisturbed equanimity (upekkhā, P.; sha, Jap.). What is meant is that these are the seven elements that lead one to enlightenment. Of these, 'chakuhō' (dhamma-vicaya) points to wisdom that discriminates, thinks about, and studies the elements of truth; 'ki' (pīti) points to spiritual satisfaction and joy that one meets with before attaining the yet higher grade of meditation; 'kyōan' (passaddhi) points to the lightened and brightened state of body and mind which one enjoys before attaining the yet higher grade of meditation; 'sha' (upekkhā) points to a state of mind which is away from all thoughts of 'to take in', 'to abandon', 'to hate', and 'to love', and which is not biased, and in which the equanimity of mind is not disturbed.

Eightfold Noble Path (āryāṣṭāṅgika-mārga, Skt.; ariya aṭṭhaṅgika magga, P.; hasshōdō, Jap.) About this, allusion has already been made in the preceding section.[1]

The above-quoted seven categories give us the thirty-seven items. But each of these seven categories constitutes its own system of practice, and there are often cases in which the practice of the system itself is enough on its own.

So, even the texts of Primitive Buddhism say that the practices of the 'four remembrances' and the 'four at-will-nesses' are all of the 'one-vehicle path' (ekāyana* magga, P.; ichijōdō, Jap.).[2] By 'ekāyana magga' is meant the path by the practice of which only can one attain the ideal state of enlightenment. Also, it is said that by the practice of

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1) See pp. 170 ff. (Tr.).
2) The sūtras that make it that the practice of the 'four at-will-nesses' is the one-vehicle path are, e.g. the *Zōagon*, XXI (sūtra 561); the *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, LI, 15, etc.

the ' four remembrances ', the ' five faculties ', the ' seven bodhi elements ', and the ' eightfold noble path ', the ' four different kinds of enlightenment ' (four fruits; shika, Jap.) of a sage could be attained.[1]

This being the case, it is not necessary for one to practise all the seven categories containing the thirty-seven items. That several categories are shown for the same purpose of practice probably comes from the fact that the Buddha gave his disciples the ways of practice in accordance with their born qualities and abilities. For example, the categories of the five faculties and the five powers both start with ' faith '. Faith is dosed out for those low in mental grade. It is so shown so that one may attain the ideal by just trusting in the Buddha or one who guides one. So, we may say that the five faculties and the five powers were the ways for beginners. And the system of seven bodhi elements contains in it much which concerns meditation. This tells that this was for attaining the end by practising meditation. This tells us that one may follow any system of practice which satisfies one. By ' ekāyana ' is meant that by practising but one system one comes to practise all systems, beginning with one for beginners and reaching up to that of the highest grade.

Here we may digress somewhat from the main line of the

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1) The sūtras that make it that the practice of the four remembrances is the one-vehicle path are, e.g. the *Zōagon*, XIX (sūtra 535), XXIV (sūtra 607); the *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, XLVII, 18 & 43, etc. As to the sūtra that makes it that by the practice of the four remembrances one gains the four fruits, we may quote, e.g. the *Zōagon*, XXIV (sūtra 618). As to those that make it that the four fruits can be attained by the practice of the five faculties, we may quote the *Zōagon*, XXVI (sūtras 652 & 653); the *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, XLVIII, 18, etc. The sūtras that make it that the fruits could be attained by the practice of seven bodhi elements are the *Zōagon*, XXVII (sūtras 734 & 735), etc. The sūtras that make it that the fruits can be attained by the practice of the Eightfold Noble Path are the *Zōagon*, XXVIII (sūtra 796); the *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, XLV, 35, etc.

subject and state that the texts of Primitive Buddhism give two methods of practice. This is evident when we look into the above-quoted seven categories or those in which yet bigger numbers of items of practice come about. One is the case in which one follows the same method of practice from the start to the end; the other in which one proceeds step by step, from the lower up to the higher. And this is the Buddhist system of education, so to say. Now, as we look into the general method of education, we see that in learning and art it was often the case in the old days that the same things were taught from the start to the end. When learning the *Analecta Confucius* it was usual to read it a hundred or a thousand times, and this was for the purpose of cultural education. In the study of penmanship, it was to practise the *Senjimon*[1] hundreds and thousands of times. So doing, one grew up in knowledge and skill, so that one could write spontaneously any other letters not given in the *Senjimon*. Against this, the modern method of education is to go by steps, going up grade by grade. Take the case of counting. In the primary school stage, we learn arithmetic; in the middle school, the use of abacus and the easy stage of synthetic arithmetic; in the high school, analysis and geometry; in the yet higher grades of university education, we study the yet higher grade of mathematics.

Now, in the texts of Primitive Buddhism we come across cases of non-gradual course in which learning goes the same from the outset to the end, as in the practices of the 'four remembrances' and the 'four at-will-nesses' pointed out

1) A textbook of penmanship of the Chin. characters, containing in it a thousand model characters, done by a master hand. People just copied it hundreds and thousands of times mechanically. By so doing, they gained the general idea of the structure and style of the Chin. characters. It was thus that people learned to write the Chin. characters in olden days (Tr.).

already as of the one-vehicle path, and also in that of meditating on the five groups (pañca-skandha) and the Four Noble Truths.

If we take the case of the practice of meditating on impermanence, sorrow, and selflessness of the five groups, we see that we are taught to meditate on the five groups all through, even when one is merely a common mortal. So does one meditate on the five groups when looking up for the enlightenment of a srotāpanna. Or even when looking up for the enlightenment of a sakṛdāgāmin, or when looking up to the enlightenment of an anāgāmin, or even when looking up to the highest enlightenment of arhatship, the five groups are always to be meditated on. Or even when one has attained all that one has to attain, even after attaining emancipation, one is still to meditate on and think about impermanence, sorrow, and selflessness.[1]

The same also goes with the practice of meditation of the Four Noble Truths. It is necessary to meditate on the Four Noble Truths in order to attain the fruit of srotāpanna. So, also, to attain the fruit of sakṛdāgāmin, the fruit of anāgāmin, and the fruit of arhatship one must as truly meditate on the Four Noble Truths. Further, to attain the enlightenment of pratyekabuddha one is to meditate on the Four Noble Truths; and thus, also, even after attaining the enlightenment of Buddhahood, the highest perfect knowledge, truly to meditate on and experience the Four Noble Truths.[2]

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1) As for the sūtra that tells us the single course of meditating on the five groups and that tells us even after attaining enlightenment one is to meditate on the five groups, such may be quoted as the *Zōagon*, X (sūtra 259); the *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, XXII, 122, etc.

2) The fact that one can attain various fruits of practice by meditating on the Four Noble Truths is alluded to in the *Zōagon*, XV (sūtra 393), etc. That the Buddha attained the cnglightenment of Bud-→

Viewing things thus, we come to the conclusion that each of the systems of practice is complete by itself. But there are also cases in which practice is carried step by step. The five bhikṣus attained the primary stage of enlightenment and gained the 'wisdom's eye for truth' (dharma-cakṣu, Skt.; dhamma-cakkhu, P.) by listening to the Buddha's first sermon, i.e. the teaching of the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Noble Path. But we are told that, later, after listening to the Buddha's sermon on impermanence, sorrow, and selflessness of the five groups and meditating on these five groups, they attained the Buddhist light of arhatship. There are also other forms of practice, one of which being to control the mind, which starts out from 'ānāpānasati' (anpannen, Jap.), the controlling of the inhaling and exhaling of breath. This goes further up to the meditation of the 'four remembrances' (cattāri sati-paṭṭhānāni, P.). When one has fully attained this, one gets into the practice of the 'seven bodhi elements' (satta sambojjhaṅgā, P.). When one is fully trained in the practice of the seven bodhi elements, one for the first time attains the 'wisdom of brightness' (vijjā, P.) and 'emancipation' (vimutti, P.), thus advancing into the enlightened world.[1]

The existence of these two larger categories may not necessarily mean that one should take either of the two. Actually there could have been cases in which both were practised at the same time. As we come to the days of Abhidharma Buddhism, we see that all the categories that we come across in the texts of Primitive Buddhism are synthesized into as many

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(Cont. from p. 182, note)
dhahood by the 'three times four' (triparivarta-dvādaśākāra-dharmacakra-pravartana, Skt.; santenjūnigyō, Jap.)* of the Four Noble Truths is stated in the *Tenbōringyō*.

1) As a sūtra that refers to this practice, we may quote, e.g. the *Zōagon*, XXIX (sūtra 810); the *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, LIV, 13.

as ‘ thirty-seven bodhi elements ’, or even adding to these, further, the ‘ four meditations ’ (catvāri dhyānāni, Skt.; cattāri jhānāni, P.; shizenjō, Jap.) and the ‘ four limitless minds ’ (catvāri apramāṇāni, Skt.; catasso appamaññāyo, P.; shimuryōshin, Jap.)[1)]* into over forty categories. But the items are generally repeated or are identical. In the case of the thirty-seven bodhi elements, the item ‘ effort ’ (viriya) corresponds to all of the ‘ four right efforts ’, and to the five cases of effort in the ‘ effort ’ of the ‘ four at-will-nesses ’, the ‘ effort ’ of the ‘ five faculties ’, the ‘ effort ’ of the ‘ five powers ’, the ‘ effort ’ of the ‘ seven bodhi elements ’, and the ‘ effort ’ of the Eightfold Noble Path. Thus, we get nine efforts in all. In the same way, in ‘ remembrance ’ (smṛti), we have all the four of the ‘ four remembrances ’, and the four cases of remembrance which are the ‘ remembrance ’ of the five faculties, the ‘ remembrance ’ of the five powers, the ‘ remembrance ’ of the seven bodhi elements, and the ‘ remembrance ’ of the right remembrance of the Eightfold Noble Path. Thus, we get here eight remembrances of the same category. In the case of ‘ meditation ’ (samādhi), we have the ‘ mind ’ (citta) of the four at-will-nesses, the ‘ meditation ’ of the five faculties, the ‘ meditation ’ of the five powers, the ‘ meditation ’ of the seven bodhi elements, and the ‘ meditation ’ of the ‘ right meditation ’ of the Eightfold Noble Path. Thus, we get five for the same category. In the case of ‘ wisdom ’, we have the ‘ thinking ’ of the four at-will-nesses, the ‘ wisdom ’ of the five faculties, the ‘ wisdom ’ of the five powers, the ‘ selecting wisdom ’ (dhamma-vicaya) of the seven bodhi elements, and the ‘ right view ’ of the Eightfold Noble

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1) Also called ‘ shibonjū ’ (catvaro brahma-vihārāḥ, Skt.). Made up of: 1) ‘ good-will ’ (maitrī; ji, Jap.), 2) ‘ compassion ’ (karuṇā, Skt; hi, Jap.), 3) ‘ joy ’ (muditā, Skt,; ki, Jap.), and ‘ sha ’ (upekṣā, Skt; sha, Jap.).

Path. Thus, we see it in five places. Viewed thus, the thirty-seven bodhi elements contain only twelve or thirteen independent categories, all others being the same.

But as said above, the system of the thirty-seven bodhi elements is none but a collection of independent systems of practice originally set forth to fit in with the intellect and the in-born quality of those who practised the Way. This being the case, there is no possibility of a single system of practice coming about even if these were all gathered up together. And though Abhidharma Buddhism had brought forth a category of ' thirty-seven bodhi elements ', it did not actually take this up as a system of practice. Each school wove out a new system of its own, which is different from others. The detailed systems of practice to be found in Pāli Buddhism and in the Sarvāstivāda School are the instances, about which we may not need to go into details here. But the precursor theories of the systems of practice of Abhidharma Schools are already to be detected in the texts of Primitive Buddhism.

These theories we see already in the *Chūagon*,[1] a work that belongs to the later part of the days of Primitive Buddhism, in which some glimpses are seen of Abhidharmic taints. Here the whole course of practice that leads up from the very outset up to the final stage of enlightenment is described, not directly but independently and systematically graded. For example, the *Bayūkyō* of the *Chūagon* (182) or the *Bayūdaikyō* (the *Mahā-assapura-sutta*) of the *Majjhima-nikāya* (39) gives the system of practice arranged in seventeen grades,[2] as :

1. Hirottappena samannāgata (P.) Zangigusoku (Jap.)

1) The Chin. trsl. corresponding to the *Maijhima-nikāya*.
2) The *Chūagon* does not as clearly give these seventeen as in P. texts. Parts in them are even omitted and are not full. Here given, following the P. texts.

2. Parisuddha-kāyasamācāra (P.)	Shingyōshōjō (Jap.)
3. Parisuddha-vacī-samācāra (P.)	Gogyōshōjō (Jap.)
4. Parisuddha-manosamācāra (P.)	Igyōshōjō (Jap.)
5. Parisuddha-ājīva (P.)	Katsumyōshōjō (Jap.)
6. Indriyesu guttadvāra (P.)	Shugokonmon (Jap.)
7. Bhojane mattaññū (P.)	Ojikichiryō (Jap.)
8. Jāgariyam anuyutta (P.)	Keigoshōjin (Jap.)
9. Sati-sampajaññena samannāgata (P.)	Shōnen-shōchigusoku (Jap.)
10. Vivitta senāsana, pañcanīvaraṇa-pahāna (P.)	Dokujūonri, gogai-shadan (Jap.)
11. Paṭhamajjhāna (P.)	Shozen (Jap.)
12. Dutiyajjhāna (P.)	Dainizen (Jap.)
13. Tatiyajjhāna (P.)	Daisanzen (Jap.)
14. Cattuthajjhāna (P.)	Daishizen (Jap.)
15. Pubbenivāsānussati-ñāṇa (P.)	Shukujūzuinenchi (Jap.)
16. Sattānaṁ cutūpapāta-ñāṇa(P.)	Tengenchi or Ujōshi-shōchi (Jap.)
17. Āsavānaṁ khaya-ñāṇa (P.)	Rojinchi (Jap.)

Needless to say, these seventeen refer to a system of practice of the world-fleeing group. Of these, the first, the 'hirottappena samannāgata', is to feel ashamed at the world at large and one's own self. It is to have a right conscience. For the world-fleeing, the first prerequisite is to possess a healthy conscience. The second 'parisuddha-kāyasamācāra' answers to the 'right action' of the Eightfold Noble Path. The third 'parisuddha-vacī-samācāra' answers to 'right speech', the fourth 'parisuddha-manosamācāra' to 'right thinking', and the fifth 'parisuddha-ājīva' to the 'right living' of the same. The sixth 'indriyesu guttadvāra' and the 'bhojane mat-

taññū' too belong to right living. Of these, 'indiriyesu guttadvāra' is 'to guard the sense-organs'; it is, on the occasion of sensing and knowing, not to get attached to the outer field (object) of cognition and not to become a prey to indolence and shamelessness. The 'bhojane mattaññū' means that one should know one's own limit and not overeat or overdrink. The eighth 'jāgariyam anuyutta' answers to the 'right effort' of the Eightfold Noble Path. This tells that one should not fall a prey to drowsing while sitting in meditation but to make the effort with all intent.

The above-quoted eight grades mainly concern the control of body and mind, to make them fit for sitting in meditation. They may answer to the category of the 'śīla' of the Threefold Learning (tisraḥ-śikṣāḥ) of 'śīla', 'samādhi', and 'prajñā', to which allusion will be made later. The categories from the ninth to the fourteenth answer to the 'meditation' of the Threefold Learning, and the last-coming three items of 'wisdom' answer to the 'wisdom' of the same.

The ninth 'sati-sampajaññena samannāgata' answers to the 'right remembrance' of the Eightfold Noble Path. The tenth 'vivitta senāsana, pañcanīvaraṇa-pahāna' answers to the preparatory stage just before entering meditation. 'Vivitta senāsana' means 'to live alone in a quiet place which is fit for entering meditation'; 'pañcanīvaraṇa-pahāna' means 'to forsake the five illusions of: 1) greed, 2) anger, 3) drowsing, 4) the disturbed mind and repentance, and 5) doubt, which are all hindrances to right meditation. When all these five illusions are made away with, one is at last in a state to enter into the four dhyānas[1)]* of the rūpadhātu grade, those from the first to the fourth.

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1) As to the difference between 'dhyāna' and 'meditation' → Glossary (Tr.).

By ' right meditation ' the mind becomes controlled and from a controlled mind comes about an unbiased wisdom, and one attains the last stage of enlightenment of arhatship. The three of the fifteenth ' pubbenivesānussati-ñāṇa ', the sixteenth ' sattānaṁ cutūpapāta-ñaṇa ', and the seventeenth ' āsavānaṁ khaya-ñāṇa ' are called ' Three Brightnesses ' (tisro vidyāḥ, Skt.; tisso vijjā, P.; sanmyō, Jap.). When one attains the enlightenment of arhatship, one is said unfailingly to gain these. Śākyamuni Buddha too gained under the bodhi tree these ' Three Brightnesses '. Enlightened, he became the Buddha. As to the ' Three Brightnesses ' and the ' four dhyānas ', allusion will be made later.

Anyhow, by the end of the days of Primitive Buddhism such a unified and graded system of practice began to be discussed. Needless to say, this was no arbitary invention of the latter-day people of the days of Primitive Buddhism. Each beginning is partly traceable somewhere in the texts of Primitive Buddhism of early days. So, all must go back to the Buddha. And those existing in part must have been later collected and woven into a system of seventeen. As we come to the days of Abhidharma Buddhism, we see things stated more minutely. Take the case of sitting in meditation. To gain the best effect of the control of mind, the method of sitting must differ with persons. There must be one who is greedy, one fretful, one dull, one who finds it hard to calm down, one who can easily trust others, or one who is suspicious. To each of such different characters, a way is shown, as, for example, to meditate on impurity, or on compassion, or on the interdependence of existence, or to count the breath, or to meditate on the differences of elements[1] that constitute the human body and arrive at

1) The traditional concept of the four elements of earth, water, fire, and wind.

selflessness. The texts of Primitive Buddhism do not contain anything like these. But what is possible is that such systems were already in existence since the days of Primitive Buddhism among the bhikṣus who had been practising meditation.

What were said so far concern the system of practice of specialists, the world-fleeing group who could well carry on such a rigid training. But an upāsaka with wife and children and with worldly duties could not well practise the way like the case of the world-fleeing group. Those practices shown to the layman were, as alluded to before, the three of 'dāna-kathā', 'sīla-kathā', and 'sagga-kathā', such as to give alms, to do charitable works, and to observe moral precepts, etc., all of which being within the range of the householders to accomplish. By carrying on what were practicable, the faithful awoke to the Buddhistic world-view and grasped the principle of the Four Noble Truths. When the Four Noble Truths were understood logically, the faithful gained the 'dhamma-cakkhu', the 'wisdom's eye of the dharma', and attained the lowest stage of sageship. And there were cases in which they further practised the Ways allotted particularly to upāsakas. Only the texts do not give us the details in concrete terms. And further, there were not a few who actually entered the order and practised the Way as regular priests.

The texts of Primitive Buddhism tell us about one thing more of the practice of the upāsakas. This is the teaching of the 'four indestructible purenesses' (cattāro aveccappasāda, P.; shi-fuejō, or shi-shōjō, Jap). 'Aveccappasāda' (fuejō, Jap.) is 'absolute pure faith'. It is the Buddhist faith which gets established so that it can no more be disturbed by anything that may happen. For an upāsaka, faith is important. And this faith is for those who have not yet attained Light but who be-

lieve as infallible the words of those such as the Buddha and his disciples who had attained Light and experienced it as absolute truth both theoretically and practically. So, it is applicable to those who have not yet arrived at truth; with those who have attained it, it is Enlightenment itself. The case being thus, if what is believed in is wrongly-grounded, it is a blind belief or superstition. Thus, what is to be believed in must be an unshakable truth.

The Buddhist doctrine is, as stated repeatedly, extremely rational. To believe in it in the right way is no blind belief or superstition. And what do we believe then when we talk of the faith of an indestructible pureness? This is to believe in the four of the Buddha, the dharma, the sangha, and the holy śīlas. This is to trust in the Three Treasures and the moral precepts as the most surest of the sure. One who had already taken refuge in the Three Treasures when becoming a Buddhist had faith already in the Three Treasures. But that could well have been a mere matter of formality. The faith in the Three Treasures of the indestructible pureness is to believe and not to doubt that the Buddha is the guide of the world truly worthy of the ten names of merit that he has,[1] that

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1) The faith in the Buddha Treasure means to believe and think that the Buddha possesses such Buddha virtues as signified in the 'ten names'* of: 1) arhat (alms-deserving; ōgu, Jap.), 2) samyak-saṁbuddha (all-enlightened one; shōhenchi, Jap.), 3) vidyācaraṇa-saṁpanna (all-accomplished one; myōgyōsoku,* Jap.), 4) sugata (well-gone; zenzei, Jap.), 5) lokavid (all-knower; sekenge, Jap.), 6) anuttara (unsurpassed one; mujōshi, Jap.), 7) puruṣadamyasārathi (best trainer; jōgojōbu, Jap.), 8) śāstā devamanuṣyāṇām (teacher of heaven and earth; tenninshi, Jap.), 9) buddha (butsu, Jap.), and 10) bhagavat (blessed one; seson, Jap.). The faith in the Dharma Treasure is to believe and think that the Dharma (teaching of what the Buddha had said) is what is best said, what one can see well, what simultaneously embosoms the result (akālika),* what one may well experience, one that leads one to the ideal, one→

the Dharma is one that could be the eternal truth at any time and at whatever locality, and that the sangha is a perfect group one could trust as a guide representing the Buddha. Further, as to the moral precepts too, one is firmly to believe and not to doubt that to uphold the moral precept is most vital to the Buddhist teaching, and it is necessary that one upholds the precepts and never acts against them. This is the indestructible pureness in respect of the holy precepts. That one attains the four indestructible purenesses means, in other words, to gain and not to doubt the Buddhistic view of the world and life. This is, after all, to have undestood theoretically the principle of the Four Noble Truths. So, as one who had gained the world-view of the Four Noble Truths was called a sage of the lowest grade, one who had attained the four indestructible purenesses was

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(Cont. from p. 190, note)
that every man of intellect will well know of, and one that is the universal and rational truth. The faith in the Treasure of the Sangha means to believe that the Sangha is a group of the 'eight alms-deserving beings' (aṭṭha-puggalā dakkhineya, P.; shisōhachi-hai, Jap.)* who have rightly practised the Way, and to believe that they are the unsurpassed 'field of weal' (puñña-khetta, P.; fukuden, Jap.) which the world should respect and to which one should do offerings, and thus to believe and think of. As to the holy faith in śīla, one is to believe that the precepts one upholds are those impeccably sacred, which the learned praise, and which call forth right meditation. The category of the 'four indestructible purenesses' is one made up of the sīla added to the Three Treasures, making it complete and perfect. When the two more categories of 'dāna' (giving) and 'sagga' (birth in heaven) are added, we get the 'six remembrances' (cha anussatiṭṭhānāni, P.; rokuzuinen, Jap.). This answers to the Three Treasures to which are added the three categories of 'dāna', 'sīla', and 'sagga'. These were what the lay followers of the faith had to guard against and be mindful about. We may well say that the thought of Nembutsu is a development of such a thought. As to the explanation of the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha, see, e.g. the *Zōagon*, XXXIII (sūtra 931), and the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (P.), VI, 10, etc.

looked up to as a sage of the lowest grade. Such a sage of the lowest grade was, in the terminology of Abhidharma Buddhism of later days, the sage of the darśana-mārga (kendō, Jap.). 'Darśana-mārga' means the Way by which one attains the principle of the Four Noble Truths.

Thus, when one arrives at, under whatever system, a theoretical understanding of the Buddhist view of the world and life, the next step is for both the world-fleeing and the lay to try to see that the principles of the Four Noble Truths and the law of interdependence actualized not only in theory but also in one's life's experience, in one's own actions. Against the fact that the practice of darśana-mārga is intellectual in quality, the practice that follows is emotional. What is understood by the intellect is not always so experientially. We well know the ills of intoxicating drinks and tobacco intellectually, but we cannot easily make away with the use because of our habit which is emotional. We know it is good to get up early, but what we feel emotionally is to stay as long in bed as we wish.

The phase in which we set aright what our wrong emotional habit prompts us to do is called, according to the terminology of later days, 'bhāvanā-mārga' (shudō, Jap.). This phase of practice is what one needs after completing the darśana-mārga.[1)]

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1) According to the teaching of Abhidharma Buddhism, there are two kinds of illusions that stand in the way of practice in our daily life for attaining the ideal. These are: 1) intellectual illusion (darśanamārga-prahātavyānuśaya, Skt.; kenwaku, Jap.) and 2) emotional illusion (bhāvanāmārga-prahātavyānuśaya, Skt.; shuwaku,* Jap.). The intellectual illusion dies out as soon as the theoretical content is made known to one. What is made away with by the darśana-mārga is this darśanamārga-prahātavyānuśaya, i.e. the intellectual illusion. Against this, the emotional illusion cannot be made away with unless our attitude towards life and habit is mended. To get out of this, we require a long time of practice and effort. The→

And the Buddhism of later days classifies the sages who have perfected the two phases of darśana-mārga and bhāvanā-mārga into eight grades.

Srotāpatti-pratipannaka (shudaon (or yoru) dō, Jap.)	......Darśana-mārga (kendō, Jap.)	Śaikṣa (ugaku, Jap.) = One who yet needs to learn*
Srotāpanna (shudaonka, Jap.)	Bhāvanā-mārga (shudō, Jap.)	
Sakṛdāgāmi-pratipannaka (shidagon (or ichirai) dō, Jap.)		
Sakṛdāgāmin (shidagonka, Jap.)		
Anāgāmi-pratipannaka (anagon (or fugen) dō, Jap.)		
Anāgāmin (anagonka, Jap.)		
Arhat-pratipannaka (arakankō, Jap.)		
Arhat (arakanka, Jap.)..		Aśaikṣa (mugaku, Jap.) = One who no more needs to learn*

As we have already seen, the five bhikṣus listened to the words of the Buddha as he delivered his first sermon on the Four Noble Truths and gained the end of the darśana-mārga and the dharma-eye (dharma-cakṣu, Skt.). Later, after listening to the Buddha's sermon on the selflessness of the five groups, they sat and meditated on impermanence, sorrow, and selflessness of the five groups. Personally experiencing, they perfected their practice of the Way and arrived at the holy stage of arhatship. The texts of Primitive Buddhism do not say in any concrete terms what one should think about or how one

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(Cont. from p. 192, note)
reason why there are so many stages of practice comes from this fact. In the teaching of Mahāyāna of later days, they set this period of practice at three asaṁkhyas and a hundred kalpas, an uncountable length of time. Abhidharma Buddhism discusses to the detail these intellectual and emotional illusions. But in the texts of Primitive Buddhism we only see but the beginnings of such considerations.

should meditate on the practices of darśana-mārga and bhāvanā-mārga. According to the 'Three-round Expositions of the Four Noble Truths' (ti-parivaṭṭa-dvādasākāra, P.; santen-jūnigyō-no-hōrin, Jap.) that is stated in the '*Tenbōringyō*' (*Dharmacakra-pravartana-sūtra*), Śākyamuni Buddha himself meditated on the Four Noble Truths and experienced his way up through the three stages of darśana-mārga, bhāvanā-mārga, and samyak-saṁbodhi. First, the Four Noble Truths were put forward, just as they were, to the theoretical comprehension of the items:

> 'One knows this to be sorrow, this the cause of sorrow, this the extinction of sorrow, and this the way for the extinction of sorrow'.

As the second, it is stated that one should as truly practise and experience the Four Noble Truths:

> 'One should fully know of sorrow; the cause of sorrow should be abandoned and cut off; the extinction should actually be evinced; and the Way is actually to be practised'.

Lastly, as the third stage, the perfection of the practice and experience of the Four Noble Truths is given:

> 'I have fully seen sorrow and abandoned and cut off the cause; I have actually shown the extinction, and the Way was perfectly practised'.

Of these, the first is, needless to say, the darśana-mārga, the second the bhāvanā-mārga, and the third the stage in which 'one no more needs to learn' (aśaikṣa), the stage of enlightenment.

Thus, when one desires to attain the highest perfection of personality, one necessarily has to pass through three such

stages. This is not only peculiar to Buddhist practice, but also with any branch of human art. Where human perfection is sought through education, all go like this. What matters is not only the education in intellect, but also in that of moral and emotion. Rather the latter phase is more important . . .[1] As a matter of fact, education in man's habit and emotion is exceptionally important, and most items of education in Buddhism rest on this aspect. In the doctrine of the Twelve Links of Interdependence, the ' ignorance ' and ' thirsting-love ' are shown as the cause of sorrow of birth and death and transmigration. And it is shown that by the extinction of ignorance and thirsting-love, sorrow too dies out. The Four Noble Truths too put forth, as in the case of the Twelve Links of Interdependence, thirsting-love as the cause of sorrow. But as the way leading to the extinction of sorrow and for attaining the ideal, what is presented here is not just to extirpate thirsting-love and ignorance, but to practise such various ways as the Eightfold Noble Path, etc. Now, as the cause of sorrow is ignorance and thirsting-love, it would seem that what is needed for the extinction of sorrow is but the extinction of these causes. But actually the accumulated wrong experiences of the long past remain with us as latent and emotional habits. Unless this evil habit is made away with, we cannot make away with ignorance and thirsting-love. That is why, as practice, such various items as the Eightfold Noble Path are given us, to enable us to make away with the emotional evil habits. The same can be said regarding the categorical items of the thirty-seven bodhi elements.

7. Ways of Practice—Threefold Learning

Thus, Buddhism has various systems of practice by which

1) Two lines deleted (Tr.).

one may travel the ladder up to the ideal. But at times these are presented as the Threefold Learning (tisraḥ śikṣāḥ, Skt.; san-gaku, Jap.) of: 1) śīla (sīla, P.; kai, Jap.), 2) samādhi (Skt., P.; jō, Jap.), and 3) prajñā (paññā, P.; e, Jap.). The texts of Primitive Buddhism already made much reference to these. All the items of practice can be reduced to one of these three categories.

Of these, **Sīla** is one that especially sets aright emotional and habitual evil and that makes one look forwards towards good. The word 'sīla' means 'habitual character' or 'habit'. Good or evil, any habitual action is called 'sīla'. But, commonly, whenever evil is meant, we say such as 'sīla-vipatti' (hakai, Jap.), the 'breaking of moral precepts', or 'dussīla' (akkai, Jap.), 'bad moral precepts'. When we singly say 'sīla', it refers to 'good habitual actions'. Popularly it may mean 'moral actions'. Because 'sīla' means 'moral' or 'ethic' in English.

Defined in the Buddhist way, 'sīla' may mean 'to condition one's body and mind'. It is for attaining samādhi and wisdom. 'Samādhi' is translated as 'tōji' or 'zanmai'. It is to control and concentrate the mind, to hold it balanced and equal in state, to hold it in a concentrated state, so that it does not move about. For nothing can be brought to perfection with the mind not concentrated.

To have the mind concentrated, one's body and mind must previously be in a state for such a concentration. If anything hinders the condition—as when the body is unfit by lack of sleep, overwork, overeating, overdrinking, illness, wound, neurasthenia; or if the mind is in an ill-condition because of worry and apprehension through immoral or ungrateful acts, the control of one's mind is difficult. To make the mind easy to concen-

trate, the body must first be in a sound state and the mind balanced. Thus, to condition one's body and mind is called 'sīla' (kai). So, sīla does not necessarily mean ethical or moral good; it also includes in it the healthiness of one's body. The well-conditioned state of body and mind is 'sīla'. When the sīla is perfect, we easily gain samādhi in a perfect state.

Samādhi is no object itself. It is what is done to gain right wisdom, the end of the Buddhist teaching. Among the tīrthakas, those of other teachings' (gedō, Jap.) of the Buddha's day, there were not a few samadhists who had regarded samādhi as the final object of practice and alleged that when samādhi was gained, one had already attained the ideal state of nirvāṇa. Those two ṛṣis, whom the Buddha had once looked up to as teachers of the Way when as yet practising penance, and some of the sixty-two heathens had insisted that such states of samādhi (dhyāna) from the first to the fourth were nirvāṇa itself. Possibly uneasiness and sorrow may not exist when in samādhi, when one's mind is concentrated, but when the samādhi is gone, the same uneasiness and worry will raise their heads. This can be the case with any other ordinary persons. So, with the samadhists, the absolutely sure world of ideal with no taint of uneasiness and worry can exist only after death when the flesh and blood is gone. But to have the ideal realized after death is like having eternally had no ideal realized. We must arrive at the ideal state and live an ideal life in this life. It must be the end of religion to call forth, both for one's own self and for others in this life, an ideal society, and there to live in such society. This end could not be attained by samādhi only. It was because of this that the Buddha was not fully satisfied with the superior samādhi of the two ṛṣis and left them on account of this flaw.

The ideal world attained by the Buddha must be one which exists not only during the hours when any specially concen-

trated state of mind is gained but also in one's everyday life too in which there exists absolutely no uneasiness or worry. Such a state cannot be attained by samādhi only; it first comes about when the right view of the world and life is established in one's everyday life and when life is wholly one with this right view. The activity of mind which realizes this right condition of the world and life, the mind that sees the law of interdependence and the Four Noble Truths, is called 'prajñā' (wisdom) in Buddhism.

Paññā (prajñā, Skt.; e, Jap.) is translated as 'hannya'.* We say 'hannya-no-chie' in Japanese, which means the 'wisdom of prajñā'. This prajñā is no simple storing of knowledge in the head, but one that is evidenced by the personal experiencing of this knowledge as actuality. To attain this wisdom, it is considered that one needs samādhi as a preliminary step. It was in a state of samādhi that Śākyamuni Buddha sat under the bodhi tree and saw through the law of interdependence. To attain right wisdom, the mind must be as concentrated as coolness itself. In order that the wisdom must be high in grade and pure, the samādhi that aims at wisdom must be extremely pure and concentrated. Thus, samādhi is not only needed for gaining superior wisdom (prajñā), but also for actualizing to the highest degree the wisdom and experience that were attained. We may have gained superior wisdom and experience, but if the mind is not concentrated and is not in a cool state, it will be difficult to experience fully the wisdom and experience thus gained. A well-prepared student may even fail in the examination if his mind is not in good order and condition when actually sitting for an examination.

Thus, we see that the state in which the body and mind get well-conditioned is 'sīla'. When the sīla is in good state, we gain the concentrated right state of samādhi. By right samādhi,

we arrive at full wisdom or the full-fledged work of wisdom. In a wordly life too, the perfection of the Threefold Learning of sīla, samādhi, and paññā is indispensable.

Then, what are the contents of the Threefold Learning? We have already seen the relation between the seventeen grades of practice stated in the *Chūagon* and that of the Threefold Learning. If we classify the Eightfold Noble Path from the standpoint of the Threefold Learning, we see that right speech, right action, and right living answer to the learning of sīla, that remembrance and right samādhi equal the learning of samādhi, that right view and right thinking answer to the learning of wisdom, and that right effort belongs to any of the three learnings. However, the three of sīla, samādhi, and paññā are mutually inclusive. The sīla contains in it samādhi and paññā; samādhi contains in it sīla and paññā; paññā can become perfect only when assisted by sīla and samādhi. So, it is difficult clearly to segregate the three. Our mind always possesses, to a degree, the three of sīla, samādhi, and paññā. Only we take up the outstanding points and say sīla, samādhi, or paññā.

Now, let us examine the contents of the Threefold Learning in accordance with the ways of practice named in the Eightfold Noble Path and the Seventeen Bodhi Elements. First, we take sīla. Here we are told to condition our body and mind. This fact is shown as the purity of body, the purity of speech, and the purity of mind. This means that one must refrain from such wrong bodily actions as killing, stealing, and adultery, such wrong oral actions as telling lies, ill-speaking, double-tongued slandering* and vain talk, and such wrong mental actions as greed, anger, and wrong-view; the right speech and the right action of the Eightfold Noble Path answer to these. If we think

about or act immoral deeds, the mind gets embroiled, consciousness pricks and the mind is in a disquieting state. And after an evil deed, there is no end of mental uneasiness because of the internal commotion of repentance and fear and the apprehension for attacks, reproaches, or punishment from without. So, to gain mental peace and to make away with uneasiness and worry, one must forsake such immoral actions as evil speech and evil action, and take to such good actions as right speech and right action.

Further, to lead a regulated life and keep a balance in clothing, eating, and living is the 'purity of living' (parisuddha-ājīva) and 'right living' (sammā-ājīva). Further, the 'indriyesu-guttadvāra' is to take care of the activity of the five sense-organs, to refrain from over-dosing of sensual joy, and not to lose one's attention to the outside world. The 'jāgariyam-anuyutta' is not to lose one's self in sleep, but always rightly to continue effort. The 'bhojane mattaññū' is to take food and drink to an apt degree, so that full practice can be had. Therefore, all the above items too fall under the category of right living and the purity of living. As the texts of Primitive Buddhism give these as separate items, the system of the seventeen grades takes up the items separately and gives minute explanations. As may be known from all the above-stated items connected with sīla, by sīla our bodily and mental states become well-conditioned both physiologically and psychologically. And all is now ready for meditation.

Now, we come to samādhi. The items of 'right remembrance' and 'right consciousness' of the seventeen grades are identical with the 'right remembrance' of the Eightfold Noble Path; the 'vivitta senāsana, pañcanīvaraṇa-pahāna' refers to the direct conditioning of body and mind for gaining right meditation. When the sīla of the indirect conditioning of

body and mind is gained, when further the direct conditioning of body and mind is in hand, and when the environment for meditation is gained, one can now enjoy right meditation. Anybody well-trained in meditation may get into mental concentration under whatever circumstances, not having all such conditions fulfilled. But, at least, for beginners, such preparatory conditions are desirable. As meditation forms, we commonly have four that go up from the first dhyāna to the fourth, a system adopted from the tradition of Indian samadhists who had such systems previous to the days of Buddhism. The four are the stages of mental concentration which deepens by degree. But previous to these, we have yet a preliminary stage of meditation called 'kāmadhātu-samādhi' (yokkaijō, Jap.), a state of mental concentration not rightly to be regarded as true meditation. Almost all mental concentrations that we experience in our everyday life belong to this kāmadhātu-samādhi. In our everyday life, such four rūpadhātu-samādhis as those from the first dhyāna to the fourth, or those four of the arūpadhātu-samādhi that are yet higher in grade cannot directly serve the purpose. But those well-trained in meditations of a higher grade can enjoy the same mental state of concentration even in everyday business as of the 'world of desire' (kāmadhātu). And why is it that intense and concentrated meditation does not come about directly in our daily life? This comes from the fact that a great amount of worldly thought comes in between our everyday mind of the kāmadhātu-samādhi. In the higher-level meditation this mental function totally dies out.

Now, in the kāmadhātu-samādhi we come across a large proportion of worldly thought. But when we get into the true state of meditation, it is said that in the first dhyāna (shozen, Jap.), some taints of the five senses and worldly thought yet remain. So, up to the first dhyāna, one sees or hears the

outside world. But in the second dhyāna, there now remains, so is it said, no trace of worldly thought. Further up in the third and the fourth dhyāna, there now remains no trace of the sense of sorrow or happiness, no trace of the influence arising out of the five senses; what there is is the purified state of introspection. The fourth dhyāna is called the balanced state of 'śamatha-vipaśyanā' (shikan, Jap.). 'Śamatha' (shi, Jap.) is the mental state of ceasing and quietude, one in which one attains a state of mindlessness and thoughtlessness. 'Vipaśyanā' is a functioning of thinking and intuition by a concentrated mind. So, in the fourth dhyāna one sees a well-proportioned state of quietude and the activity of thinking and intuition, the state best-suited for meditation. In the 'arūpa-samāpatti' (mushikijō, Jap.) where exists a mindless and thoughtless state of ceasing, we see no functioning of thinking. And in a state of meditation as in the first dhyāna where there is but thinking, we cannot as yet say that we have attained the quiet state of mental concentration. In the fourth dhyāna between these two extremes, we find the balanced state of 'ceasing' (śamatha) and 'thinking' (vipaśyanā), the state which is best-suited for mental activity. It is also in this fourth dhyāna that one gains such phases of 'divine knowledge' (abhijñā, Skt.; jinzū, Jap.) as the 'past-seeing wisdom' (shukumyōchi, Jap.)* and the 'future-reading wisdom' (tengenchi, Jap.),* and it is said that it was also in the state of this fourth dhyāna that the Buddha had passed away from life. There is there full consciousness and is not yet as when one is in the arūpa-samāpatti, in which there is no play of consciousness or in which consciousness is in a weakened state.

Buddhism has, above the four stages of meditation of arūpa-samāpatti, yet another samādhi called 'perceptionlessness-samādhi' (nirodha-samāpatti, Skt.; metsujinjō or metsujusōjō,

Jap.). Here the workings of vedanā (functions of the sensing of happiness and sorrow) and saṁjñā (functions of notion and symbolization) die out, bringing about the true state of mindlessness and thoughtlessness. It is here that, it is said, such superior sages as arhat and one in the state of anāgāmin only can enjoy the samādhi. Away from worldly illusions, one now enjoys, in this nirodha-samāpatti, a purely spiritual state of bliss.

We may well conceive that the arūpa-samāpatti, a samādhi of mindlessness and thoughtlessness, can be of no use in actual life. But as stated already, one well up in the arūpa-samāpatti can easily abide in a mindless and thoughtless state even in the kāmadhātu-samādhi, a meditation condition in the ordinary mental state of everyday life. And in order to have the brain act unerringly, the mind must be as bright and transquil as when in a quick and mindless and thoughtless state. It is said that Śākyamuni Buddha had, even in ordinary days when he was not particularly in dhyāna, a controlled mental state of mindlessness and thoughtlessness. 'Nāga (the Buddha) is always in samādhi'. So it goes.[1] As a matter of fact, Śākyamuni Buddha was perfectly trained in meditation.

The Buddhist legend tells us that the Buddha, as yet a boy, in the days of palatial life, entered without any difficulty into a state of dhyāna, on the occasion of a national festival of agriculture, by which he won the wonder and respect of the king and

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1) The *Theragāthā*, nos. 696–7; the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, VI, 43: 'The Nāga is in meditation even when walking; the Nāga is in meditation even when lying; the Nāga is in meditation even when sitting'. The *Chūagon*, 118, the *Ryūzōkyō*, puts this part as: 'The Nāga is in meditation in both walking and stopping; also sitting or lying, he is in meditation; the Nāga is in the state of meditation at all times; this is the ordinary way of the Nāga'.

ministers.[1] In those days of penance after abandoning the palatial life, it is reported that he easily gained the highest meditation of arūpa-samāpatti, which was the ideal of the two ṛṣis. This tells us that Śākyamuni Buddha by nature had a physical fitness and a mental aptitude towards meditation and could easily attain mental concentration. It was in a state of meditation too that he had attained enlightenment. Even after attaining it, he is said to have been in meditation for seven weeks. It seems that he often entered into dhyāna in the latter half of his life as a Buddha. The texts of Primitive Buddhism, for example, say that he sat in dhyāna for half a month, or two months, or, even, three months, and that, when in dhyāna, he met none other than one who carried food to him.[2] His disciples too sat much in meditation.

As we now look into the right mode of living of a bhikṣu, we see that a day (day and night) was divided into six parts. A bhikṣu slept only in the four hours of midnight (10 p.m.–2 a.m.). In the latter part of the night (2–6 a.m.), he sat up in dhyāna. In the morning hours (6–10), he aroused himself from dhyāna, washed his face, cleaned the place, and went out for alms-begging. In the noon hours (10 a.m.–2 p.m.), he took a meal before noon, and finishing it, he took rest or sat in dhyāna. In the evening hours (2–6), he sat in dhyāna, or getting up from dhyāna, went out to preach to other bhikṣus or to the

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1) The Buddha legends of all schools go into details about this point. Such texts of Primitive Buddhism as the *Chūagon* (the *Mizōuhōkyō*), (the *Nyūnangyō*); the *Majjhima-nikāya*, 36 (the *Mahāsacchakasutta*) states about this point in simpler ways.

2) The fact that Śākyamuni Buddha sat in meditation for half a month is stated in such sūtras as the *Zōagon*, XVII (sūtra 481); the *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, XLV, 11, etc. As to the case of two months, the *Zōagon*, XXIX (sūtra 807); as to that of three months, the *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, XLV, 12 and LIV, 11.

faithful. In the early part of night (6 p.m.–10 p.m.), he sat again in dhyāna.[1] Thus seen, we see that a bhikṣu sat the greater part of a day of 24 hours in meditation. When living together in a group, what they had to do was, it is said, to spend the hours in 'holy silence' (ariya tuṇhī-bhāva P.; shōmoku, Jap.) and 'talks about dharma' (dhammī-kathā, P.; hōdan, Jap.).[2] Of these, 'ariya tuṇhī-bhāva' is a 'holy silence', which is none but 'dhyāna' (meditation). 'Dhammī-kathā' is 'talks about Buddhist truth'. The 'worldly chat' is called 'tiracchāna-kathā' (chikushōron, Jap.).[3] This was strictly forbidden the bhikṣu. The bhikṣu, if he talks, must always talk about dharma; if not speaking, he must abide in 'holy silence', which is dhyāna. The duties for a bhikṣu to observe the 'holy silence' and to abide in 'dharma talks' were identical with 'meditation' and 'wisdom'. What was most important for a bhkiṣu to do was to attain right dharma and wisdom.

The tradition of meditation existed in the days of Primitive Buddhism after the Buddha's death and, of course, in the days of Abhidharma Buddhism also. And among the bhikṣus were those who had specialized in meditation. These were called 'jhāyin' (zenji, Jap.); later still, they were called 'yogin'

1) About this, allusion is made already in the item 'jāgariyam anuyutta' of the seventeen grades. See, e.g. the *Zōagon*, XVIII (sūtra 502); the *Saṁyutta-nikāya*, XXXV, 120; the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, III, 16, etc.

2) Allusion to 'dharma talks' and 'holy silence' is made often. See, e.g. the *Chūagon*, 204 (the *Ramakyō*); the *Majjhima-nikāya*, 26 (the opening part of the *Shōgukyō*). The *Ramakyō* says: 'When the bhikṣus sit in groups, they should do two things. One is 'to talk about dharma' and the other 'to keep silence'.

3) Referring to the 'worldly chat' (tiracchāna-kathā), allusion is made in such as the *Dīgha-nikāya*, I (the *Bonmōkyō*); the *Dīgha-nikāya*, 2 (the *Shamongakyō*); the *Jōagon*, 21 (the *Bondōkyo*, 20 (the *Amachū-kyō*), etc. In P., it goes as the 'twenty-eight kinds of worldly talks'.

(yugashi, Jap.) or 'yogāvacara' or 'yogācāra' (yugagyōja, Jap.). The 'jhāyin' stood in contrast to 'suttantika' (kyōshi, Jap.) and 'dhamma-kathika' (hosshi, Jap.) and others. One who specialized in memorizing and transmitting such sūtras as the *Āgamas* was the 'suttantika'; one who was well versed in vinaya and who strictly observed the moral precepts was 'vinaya-dhara'; one who was good at the doctrine and learning was 'dhamma-kathika' or 'ābhidhammika' (ronji, Jap.). This tells us that specialists grew up in the Buddhism of later days.[1)]

In China, a Buddhist school specializing in meditation came out to be, which was called 'Zenshū' or 'Zen Buddhism'. This school may not have handed down the Indian tradition direct from India. What is possible is that indirectly it must have grown up under the influence of a tradition that specialized in meditation which goes back to India. The Zen Buddhism that took start in China is regarded as one that makes sitting the primary object of the teaching. But sitting was not the object itself as was never the case with Buddhism. It was to gain right wisdom by sitting which was the final objective. In the Zen Buddhism of China, such terms as 'to attain enlightenment' (satori o hiraku, Jap.) or 'to develop the wisdom's eye'

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1) In the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, I, 14 and in the *Zōichiagon*, III, we see that a bhikṣu good at meditation is called as the highest of the jhāyins. In the *Vinaya*, II, p. 75 and in the *Setsuissaiububinaya*, XIII, we come across such terms as 'suttantika', 'vinaya-dhara', 'dhamma-kathika', and 'jhāyin'. Here the term 'jhāyin' stands in parallel with those of other specialists. The yogin about whom reference often comes in the *Daibibasharon* are also those who specialize in meditation. The sūtra such as the '*Shugyōdōjikyō*' is one of the meditation sūtras made by them and which is one of the so-called '*Yogacārābhūmi-sūtras*'. The 'Yugagyōha' of later days, one of the schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism, must have been one which grew up from among such jhāyins or those who specialized in meditation.

(chiken o kaihotsu suru, Jap.) prevailed. This was the end of the teaching. This tells that the aim was not meditation itself but to attain the wisdom that led to enlightenment. The meditation talked about in Buddhism must not be, under whatever circumstances, the one talked about by samadhists, belonging to the non-Buddhist teachings (tīrthaka), but the means to arrive at wisdom, prajñā.

As to the 'learning of wisdom' (paññā-sikkhā) that comes as the last, we see the three in the case of the seventeen-grade practices which are those of the 'past-seeing wisdom', the 'future-reading wisdom', and the 'illusion-extinguishing wisdom' (rojinchi, Jap.). In the case of the Eightfold Noble Path, we have the two of 'right view' (shōken, Jap.) and 'right thinking' (shōshiyui, Jap.). One who has practised the Eightfold Noble Path and who has attained the enlightenment of an arhat, gains, we are told, the 'ten learninglessness dhammas' (dasa asekhā dhammā, P.; jūmugakuhō, Jap.), which are the two of 'right wisdom' (sammā-ñāṇa, P.; shōchi, Jap.) and 'right emancipation' (sammā-vimutti, P.; shōgedatsu, Jap.) added further to the Eightfold Noble Path. And these 'right wisdom' and 'right emancipation', too, belong to the 'learning of wisdom' (adhiprajñā).

8. Divine Powers and Miracles—Three Brightnesses and Six Powers

The three of the 'past-seeing wisdom' (pūrva-nivāsānusmṛti-jñāna, Skt.; shukumyōchi, Jap.), the 'future-reading wisdom' (divya-cakṣur-jñāna, Skt.; tengenchi, Jap.), and the 'illusion-extinguishing wisdom' (āsravakṣaya-jñāna, Skt.; rojinchi, Jap.) are the 'Three Brightnesses' (tisro vidyāḥ, Skt.; sanmyō, Jap.). It is said that the Buddha gained these Three

Brightnesses when he attained enlightenment under the bodhi tree. Also, it is said that generally when one becomes an arhat, one gains these. Because when one attains the enlightenment of an arhat, one does not only gain wisdom for one's own self but also, at the same time, a power to teach and guide others. The word 'arahan ' (arhat, Skt.; arakan, Jap.) is translated as ' one who deserves alms to be given ' (ōgu, Jap.). This is to say that an arhat is one who is worth receiving the alms of clothing, food, abode, etc. from the faithful. By receiving offerings from others, an arhat shoulders an obligation to bestow on others great benefits and guide them to peace and happiness. So, one becoming an arhat must be armed with an ability most adeptly to guide others. The ability needed for guiding and teaching are the knowledges to enable an arhat to perform heavenly acts of miracles, which are the ' Three Brightnesses ' and 'Six Powers ' (ṣaḍabhijñā, Skt.; rokutsū, Jap.). The term ' Six Powers ' (rokutsū, Jap.) means ' six divine powers ' (rokujinzū, Jap.). By adding to ' Three Brightnesses ' the three more of ' divine-foot power ' (ṛddhiviṣaya-jñāna, Skt.; jinsokutsū, Jap.), ' mind-reading power ' (para-cetaḥ-paryāya-jñāna, Skt.; tashintsū, Jap.), and ' divine-ear power ' (divya-śrota-jñāna, Skt.; tennitsū, Jap.), we gain these ' Six Powers '.

To the rational-thinking people of today, it may appear as most unlike the rational characteristics of Buddhism that the Buddha and Primitive Buddhism should, to such lengths, talk about miracles and divine powers such as the ' Three Brightnesses ' and the ' Six Powers '. And there are scholars even today who would have it that no such things could exist in Primitive Buddhism and that they were the impurities that had newly slipped in in the days of Abhidharma Buddhism. But when we remember that Buddhism is no science, ethic, or cultural thought but religion, we must know that such divine

powers and miracles have values of their own and are rather needed.

As far back as some 2,500 years ago, Buddhism was already no less rational and ethical than in the age of science of today. But rational and ethical qualities alone cannot make any religion. The wisdom talked about in Buddhism no doubt contains in it the rational aspect. But there must be the actual practice of all-void and selflessness to be experienced by one's own self. The religiosity of Buddhism lies in one's actual practice of the all-void and selflessness. The Three Refuges and the four indestructible purenesses of the Buddhist rest on the faith and practice of all-void and selflessness. As religion stands on faith, the respect for and the faith in the Three Refuges and the faith in the absoluteness of the four indestructible purenesses are the first and last of the religious concept of Buddhism. The 'right view' that heads the list of the items of the Eightfold Noble Path begins with faith. One gains faith in the Three Refuges and upholds sīla and meditation. Now, we say we experience in this life the bliss of dharma by meditation. This is, as will be seen from the explanations given to the 'nirodha-samāpatti' (perceptionlessness samādhi), to get away from worldly turmoils by meditation and to taste the pristine manna of ecstasy and joy. This also shows the religious phase of Buddhism.

What has been stated about so far refers to the personal side in which one experiences religious faith or ecstasy. Next, as one comes to the question of imparting this to others and making them believe, and guiding and benefiting others, the end can be attained by such divine powers and miracles as the Three Brightnesses and the Six Powers. Cases are many in which religion spreads through divine powers and miracles. This is because true salvation results from the religious miracle of communication through inspiration. The divine powers and miracles

are the means of conversion that is found in almost all religions. The recent upshoot of new Buddhist sects in Japan, the so-called 'Shinkō-Shūkyō', are ready examples. There may be cases of doubtful superstitions. Yet, cases are not few in which wonderful spiritual powers are enacted that are beyond the mental range of ordinary people. Buddhism was no exception. It is possible that there are extreme cases of exaggerations and fictions of later days in regard to the divine powers and miracles ascribed to Śākyamuni Buddha. But we cannot deny such powers of wisdom as the Three Brightnesses and Six Powers that the Buddha must have had in his own person. And most of the so-called founders of Buddhist sects, too, must have had powers, more or less, that had outstepped the world of ordinary people.

Now, there are two kinds of what we may call 'divine powers' or 'miracles'. One is the miracle that outsteps the boundaries of natural law which is absolute and boundless. The other is the one which is, though within the range of natural law and which is done rationally in a superb way no other ordinary people can do. The former is against natural law and is irrational. The case in which we are told that Brahmā and Īśvara control the universe and man's life as they will, falls under this category. It was this kind of ātman (self,* god) which Buddhism denied. Also, in the miracles talked about in the Christian teaching, there are not a few such cases.

The miracle that Buddhism talks about belongs to the latter category, which, though natural and rational and though nothing new to one who performs it, is still, by the gap of intellect, a thing beyond comprehension to ordinary people. We are told that once the savages of Formosa could not understand the aeroplane and took it for a god, no matter how much explanations were offered them that it was none but a machine driven

by man. The case is the same with jugglery and magic, which, though exceptionally inconceivable, could no more be of any wonder when explained. What were said or done by such as the Buddha and arhats whose intellect stood beyond the range of ordinary people would, by this difference in intellect, at times sound or look something beyond. Should the intellect improve and when there exists communication of intellect, there can be no miracle but commonplace event. The modern conveniences, the product of civilization, are all of a wonder. But to those who have invented them, they are nothing but things carried out rationally. If it were that the radio and television were presented, all of a sudden, to the people of a hundred years ago, what miracles they would be? As knowledge advances, the miracles of the past will gradually fade away.

What, then, are the so-called Three Brightnesses and the Six Divine Powers talked about in Buddhism? Of the six, the first 'divine-foot power' (jinsokutsū or jinpentsū, Jap.)* particularly seems to include in it the miracles that go against natural phenomena. We are told that one flew in the air, walked on water, hid under the ground, passed through walls and rocks, made one's body big or small, made it into many or many into one, or hid one's bodily form. The sūtras say that Śākyamuni Buddha crossed a big river with his disciples without a ship or made one present but not to be seen by others.[1] It is doubt-

1) According to the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra** in Chin. (the *Jōagon*, the *Yugyōkyō*), it is said that the Buddha, on his way to Vajjī to the north, crossed the Ganges, whose water was full to the brim, flying, with many of his disciples, without the use of a ship or raft. Also in the Pāli *Vinaya* (the *Mahāvagga*, the *Mahākhandhaka*, *Chap. on Upasampadā*), it is stated that when Yaśa's father came to the Buddha to call on his own son, the Buddha made Yaśa not to be seen by his father and preached to his father instead.

ful if such things actually took place. We cannot think of such miraculous acts other than some mechanical appliances or implements of civilization.

The second, which is the 'divine-ear power' (tennitsū, Jap.) points to an uncommon aural power, which can hear any far-off or slight voice. When one concentrates the mind and trains one's own self, one may be able to hear any small voice which may be beyond the reach of ordinary people. This is not a thing impossible to think about. Further, the divine aural power may also refer to wisdom, not to any power by which one may actually hear any slight ordinary voice said above, but to one which can fathom the internal meaning of the voice uttered, to know under what circumstances and why the voice was uttered, and how to meet it. It may point to wisdom which hears what the world speaks about, considers what the movements of the world refer to, which considers what the movements of the world are, what the world thinks about, and guesses before all others what actually can happen in the world. What we ordinarily call 'quick-eared' may fall under the category of the divine-ear power. The wisdom within this category, to judge the general situation through the voices and rumours that go, is not only necessary for those who must fare in the world, but is also prerequisite to those in religious circles who must guide and save the world. There is no doubt that this kind of wisdom gets deepened by experience and training. The state heightened to the uttermost degree may well be the 'divine-ear power'.

The third 'mind-reading power' (tashintsū, Jap.) is the wisdom that fathoms the minds of others. By the attitude, speech, and look of others, one can easily read the mind and feeling of others. This is what generally happens in the world. One may look at the hand and appearance and foretell the for-

tunes of other persons. This may at times be part of the mind-reading power. The wisdom to be able to read the mind of others is needed in trade and diplomacy. Those connected with religion and education may also require such a wisdom, to guess the mind and feeling of others and to give fit injunctions or guidances, so that one may be able best to guide others. It is quite natural that the arhat whose position is to guide others will need such wisdom.

The fourth 'past-seeing power (or wisdom)' (shukumyōtsū,* Jap.) is a wisdom by which one can know the fortunes or situations of one's own past or that of others. The sūtra says that it is one that can look back to one's own fate for several generations, the days before one was born in this world. This kind of thing cannot ordinarily happen; it is impossible to explain it scientifically and rationally. Yet, looking at the present state of a person, one may roughly guess at and say that such characters or attitudes go back to the actions and experiences one must have had since the day of birth in this world or in past lives. As we can roughly guess at, we cannot totally negate that there are people with such an ability who can read the past. One fully experienced may fairly accurately judge, from what there is, one's past experiences. To ordinary people, this power to know the past may possibly appear to be a miracle.

The fifth 'future-reading power' (tengentsū, Jap.) is also called the 'power to read man's birth and death' (ujōshishōtsū, Jap.). It is a wisdom that can divine what may come about in one's future. As in the case of the 'past-seeing power' (shukumyōtsū), by seeing what there is in one, one may be able to know what possibility there can be for one to act and what destiny one will have in the future. For one experienced, a fairly accurate guesswork can be possible. There are sūtras that tell us that Śākyamuni Buddha prophesied the fortunes of

his lay and world-fleeing disciples. This could be because of the future-reading power of the Buddha. Especially, the religious practice of a Buddhist is, in relation to what is considered to come out in the future, something of a law. As the disciples often asked the Buddha about one's fate after death, he said that an act would be met by a certain issue after death, explaining the situation as a matter of law. This was made to serve as a 'mirror of the law' (dhammādāsa, P.; hōkyō, Jap.) and said that there would now be no need of asking the Buddha each time about one's future and that each should judge things for one's own self.[1]

The powers and miracles stated above are all indispensable for those who are in a position to guide and teach others. It is natural that an arhat, one with a high degree of enlightenment, must possess such miraculous powers. Thus an arhat can have several such miraculous powers. But the Buddha had strictly warned those who had attained arhatship never to resort to these miraculous powers other than on those occasions when they were in a position to guide or save the world; never, for example, to use them just to show pride in one's own greatness, to look for the respect of others, and to covet a larger amount of offerings,—absolutely never to resort to them other than for the benefit of the law and its signification.[2]

The sixth 'illusion-extinguishing power' (or wisdom)' (rojintsū, Jap.) is a wisdom that can extinguish the fire of 'illusion' (kleśa, Skt.; kilesa, P.; bonnō, Jap.) which hinders the perfection of man. This is the 'prajñā', the 'wisdom' in the right sense of the term in Buddhism. Other powers

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1) The *Jōagon*, 2 (the *Yugyōkyō*, I, 1,310); the *Dīgha-nikāya*, 16 (the *Daihatsunehangyō*, ND VII, pp. 93 ff.).
2) E.g.: The *Vinaya* (the *Cullavagga*, V, the *Shōjikendo*, ND, IV, p. 172).

may well be attained by any other than the Buddhist, so it is said, even by demons and beasts. But this illusion-extinguishing power is what is peculiarly of the Buddhist—one not possible of attainment by any other than one rightly possessing the world-view of a Buddhist, the law of interdependence, the principle of the Four Noble Truths, and by one who has not actually experienced all these. That Śākyamuni became a Buddha comes from the fact that he had gained this 'illusion-extinguishing power'. The other five wisdoms (powers)* and such other mental brightnesses as the 'past-seeing power' and the 'future-reading power' are but those needed for one who is in a position to guide others. They are, so to say, expedient or applied wisdoms.

9. Prajñā and the Practice of Selflessness

Explanation has been given in regard to selflessness in section 2 of this chapter, under the head of 'anātman'. There we have mainly dwelt upon the theoretical side of 'non-ātman'. By 'theoretical' is meant that no element (dharma) has any fixed nature of its own. There anātman was explained as a term identical with 'element', possessing no intrinsic nature of its own. This is to say that there is no existence in the world which is absolute, isolated, and self-standing, that all are in states relative, interdependent, and cooperative. This fact can best be understood by the law of interdependence. This is anātman, seen from the theoretical side. But it has its own practical side. And the end of Buddhist practice stands on this actual experiencing of selflessness. And we may say that this experiencing of selflessness is attained by prajñā and that the perfect attainment of this selflessness is 'enlightenment'. The reason why Buddhism is called a teaching of selflessness

comes from the emphasis it puts, other than the theoretical side of anātman, on the actual experiencing and perfection of self-lesssness in life.

Seflessness as a way of life can be realized from the theoretical plane, too. It is an unshakable truth to say that an element (dharma) has no fixed nature of its own. But we are prone to think that what we actually see before our eyes is a thing fixed, eternal, and unchanging. We may not do so consciously; but unconsciously we so take it and think of it as unchanging and ever-existing. Or we wish it to be so and we are prone to entertain a loving or clinging thought about it. Though clearly a futile clinging to the eyes of others, the person himself clings to it right or wrong, and does not wish to part with it. Theoretically, the element is selfless, but we cling to self and wrongly regard a thing 'to possess a self' (uga, Jap.). As we wrongly cling, the result is never all-satisfying. Theoretically, one knows one is wrong, yet the emotional force or inertia of habit calls forth a clinging and we will have a thing ever in our own hand. Things often go thus. The blind illusions of avidyā and tṛṣṇā of the Twelve Links of Interdependence are none but this clinging. The practice alluded to in section 6 relative to 'bhāvanā-mārga' is to make away with this emotional clinging. We say that the stage of bhāvanā-mārga lasts long. This comes from the fact that this clinging is unconsciously moulded into one's self as habit and that we require a long time to unmould this wrongly-begotten habit and rectify it.

What, then, is the selflessness that one is to experience? The texts of Primitive Buddhism do not clearly tell about it. This lack of allusion in the texts of Primitive Buddhism may come from the fact that explanation is equally lacking in regard to nirvāṇa itself which one is to experience by practising the Way. It is also natural that allusion is lacking in regard to the experience

of selflessness because it is to become one's own at the moment prajñā gets perfected in one, because it is a thing one who practises the Way must experience for oneself, and because the uttermost state of selflessness which one experiences is the state of nirvāṇa itself. And as one progresses in the practice of selflessness, there comes about the two of the 'unattached state of selflessness' (mushūjaku-no-muga, Jap.) and the 'unhindered and unmolested state of selflessness' (mugejizai-no-muga, Jap.). What we can say is that the term 'anātman' mainly occurs in the writings of the days of Primitive Buddhism and Abhidharma Buddhism. In the days of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the same is expressed by the term 'śūnya' or 'śūnyatā' (Skt.; all-void), which means almost the same as selflessness. Primitive Buddhism, too, has the word 'suñña' or 'suññatā' (P.). But there the conception is as yet not as in Mahāyāna.[1] So it is difficult to regard this term as the synonym of 'śūnya'. Mahāyāna, too, uses the term 'anātman', but 'śūnya' or 'śūnyatā' is found more often.[2] With Mahāyāna, 'śūnyatā' is used to show that the

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1) Among the texts of Primitive Buddhism, there are such as, e.g. the *Chūagon*, (the *Shōkūkyō* (190); the *Daikūkyō* (191)); the *Mijjhima-nikāya* (the *Shōkūkyō* (121), the *Daikūkyō* (122)). In these, the 'kū' (all-void) is taken up. Also, the 'three gates to emancipation' (trīṇi vimokṣa-mukhāni, Skt.; sangedatsumon* of all-void (kū, Jap.),* formlessness (musō, Jap.),* and desirelessness (mugan, Jap.)* are talked about, which are the three samādhis. Here 'all-void' is not the first principle as in Mahāyāna as stated in the *Hannya-gyō*.* The 'void' (kū) in the texts of Primitive Buddhism means 'nothingness' (kūmu), as, for example, 'earth is devoid of water' or 'water is devoid of earth'; or it may mean 'to turn to nothingness'. The 'nothingness' in the latter sense partly means 'all-void of ungainedness and unattachedness'. The 'void' in the case of the three samādhis is in this sense.

2) Abhidharma Buddhism classified the 'void' into 6 or 10 kinds. But the Mahāyāna *Hannyagyō* classified it into 16 or 18 kinds. All this was to enable one to detach one's own self from all possible clingings to self. It was to experience the void in one's own actions→

'selflessness' (muga, Jap.) put forward is different from the one in Hīnayāna (Abhidharma Buddhism). But actually there can be no difference between 'muga' (selfless) and 'kū' (śūnya). The *Hannyagyō* (*Prjñāpāramitā-sūtra*) of Early Mahāyāna contains such an expression as 'hannya-no-kū' (all-void of prajñā). This refers to the selflessness that arises out of the wisdom of prajñā. So, from the standpoint of Mahāyāna, the two kinds of selflessness (muga) taken from the standpoint of the actual practice of the Way might well be called the 'all-void of ungainedness and unattachedness' (mushotoku-mushūjaku-no-kū, Jap.) and the 'all-void of unhinderedness and unmolestedness' (mugejizai-no-kū, Jap.). That is why we say that there are the two kinds of 'kū' (all-void) of 'ungainedness' (mushotoku, Jap.) and 'unmolestedness' (muge, Jap.).

Now, the 'selflessness of unattachedness' means that one clings to nothing. Needless to say, one must not cling to what one must not cling to; it is even not to cling carelessly to what is worth clinging to. What is said is that one must not cling to what is evil; it is even not to cling to what is good.[1] This is what we often experience when we take part in an

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(Cont. from p. 217, note)
of selflessness. From this standpoint we may say that the 18 voids of prajñā may be taken to mean the 'all-void of ungainedness'. As to the 'all-void of unhinderedness', no explanation is offered in all documents. But if the 'void of ungainedness' is perfected, it at once will become the 'all-void of unhinderedness and unmolestedness'. The *Hannyashingyō* (*Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya-sūtra*) says: 'As there is nothing to gain, one is a bodhisattva; as he depends on the prajñāpāramitā, his mind meets with no hindrance; as there is no hindrance,. . .'. This tells that one steps forward from the stage of ungainedness to the unhindered stage of void.

1) Such works as the *Majjhima-nikāya*, 22 (the *Alagaddūpama-sutta*); the *Chūagon*, 200 (the *Aritakyō*); the *Zōichiagon*, XXXVIII, contain the 'parable of a raft'. This is about a man who has crossed a big river riding on a raft and thereby got rid of danger. But as he→

athletic game or when we appear in an examination. If we worry too much about the result of the game or if we think too much of the marks we get, we rather lose the game or we are not much good at the examination. Needless to say, one must be well-trained in the game in one's everyday life and on the night before the game one must have proper sleep and play the game in a composed attitude. This is the secret of winning the the game. The same can be said regarding the examination. What is needed is the mindlessness which one experiences in meditation. The 'unattachedness to self' rather carries one well in a game or examination. What one requires is the 'unattached selflessness'.

In this case, the unattached selflessness may mean not to get attached to what one must be mindful of or to keep onself aloof from a thing about which one must be mindful. It is no doubt wrong to take things in this light. But, at times, there are cases in which this kind of wrong seflessness is needed. People at times say religion is opium. From the rational ground, one must rightly view things and take a correct measure to meet a situation. Against this, one at times behaves like one who has taken opium and forgets one's own self, in howsoever a miserable position one may be in, and is not able to see things objectively, not caring a whit about the situation. One's reason

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(Cont. from p. 218, note)
was saved by this raft, the man, even after landing, still shouldered the raft because the raft had saved him from the danger. In the same way, if one who has got himself rid of sorrow by listening to the sermon of the Buddha still sticks to the teaching given, this is not good. It says: 'Dhammā pi pahātabbā, pag'eva adhammā' (The good law may even be thrown away; why not the law that is not good?). 'The law given one by me is for one to gain emancipation; it is not for one to cling to it'. 'Mayā dhammo desito nittharaṇatthāya no gahaṇatthāya' (M., i, p. 135).

looks totally to be out of gear. It is thus at such a time. A subjective religion that lacks rationality may possibly have this phase of sickliness. The Buddhist teaching seeks to be away from this subjective phase; it will view things objectively. But at times, just to distract one's self or to change the mental mood for the time being, we come across such a phase in actual life.

It is not seldom that religious salvation calls for such a subjective mental distraction. For, by this, one often rids oneself of sorrow and this enables one to make a new start. Looked at thus, a religious faith of opium worth is not quite useless. The unattached selflessness may at times tend to lead one to this channel of subjectivity almost like taking opium. But Buddhism never says that one should always be in a state of selflessness and forget everything. On the one hand, it stresses also the introspection, a positive awakefulness to one's own self. Allusion has already been made to the fact that there are the two of ' śamatha ' and ' vipaśyanā ' in meditation. The ' śamatha ' (ceasing) is the selflessness and the forgetting of one's own self; the ' vipaśyanā ' (perception) is introspection. By the ' ceasing ' in meditation, the mind sinks down to the dead-calm of a mindless and thoughtless state, and by ' intuition ' one arrives at the prajñā (wisdom) of retrospection and introspection, which then works out its potentiality to the utmost. In the athletic game or examination, one is all-awareness itself in the everyday heat of training. This is a positive result of retrospection. The wisdom and experience gained by this all-awareness comes out in the form of selflessness or unattachedness on the day of tournament or examination. To review if selflessness was actually put into practice or if there ever lacked anything is the work of all-awareness. A new training or further study is gained by re-

trospection. The selflessness on occasion of the actual play or examination is also further checked and studied. All this is part of all-awareness. When preparation is complete through this all-awareness, the selflessness realizes the wisdom and experience that were gained by all-awareness. Thus, all-awareness and selflessness go in pairs as in the case of the wings of a bird or the wheels of a cart, the cause and the result mutually interchanging the place and each working as cause or result, and advancement is gained, which leads to perfection. In other words, all-awareness accumulates wisdom and experience, and again looks back to selflessness. This reflection augments the rationality of all-awareness. The selflessness actualizes the theory and knowledge, making actualization apt and right. All-awareness and selflessness going in pairs and changing places, science and art advance and a perfect man comes about. The Buddha in the days close to his death spoke to his disciples: 'When I am gone, make truth the standard and awake to your own self'.[1] This is to say that one should always measure one's own self by the standard of truth. Repeating and interchanging all-awareness and selflessness, one was to walk towards the utmost ideal and goal, the perfection of one's own self. This was, so might we know, what the Buddha said.

Thus, the unattached selflessness always accompanies rationality and all-awareness. The selflessness talked about in Buddhism is no nihilistic, despondent, or irresponsible state

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1) The *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* in both Chin. and P.: 'Make thine own self thy lamp and make the Dharma thy lamp; do not make others thy lamp. In taking refuge, take refuge in thine own self and in the Dharma; do not take refuge in others'. The term 'dipa' is taken to mean 'lamp'; in P., it stands for 'island', the sure ground which never gets washed away by the waves of illusion and birth-and-death.

of abandonment. At times, some Western scholars are extremely wrong in their notion of 'śūnya' and 'anātman'. This comes from the fact that they do not see well the relation between the 'śamatha' and 'vipaśyanā' in meditation and the one between 'uga' (all-awareness to self) and 'muga' (selflessness). Here Buddhism differs from other religions which could be classed as superstitions and which have an effect like opium. It is here that Buddhism can be called extremely logical, yet not losing the claim of religion. It is here also that Buddhism could well be called a most advanced religion, seen both religiously and philosophically.

There are many texts of Primitive Buddhism that talk about unattached selflessness. As one, we may quote the gāthā '*A Wise Man of a Single Night*' (*Bhaddekaratta*, P.). This gāthā is quoted in several places of the sūtras of the *Majjhima-nikāya*, both in Chinese translations and in Pāli.[1] It goes:

> 'Do not look back at what is gone, seek no future.
> What is gone is gone, the future is yet to come about.
> Only see what there is as it is. Do not waver, do not be perturbed; know of it and learn.
> Make every effort for what there is today; who knows but death might come to one tomorrow?
> For, indeed, it is not so that one meets not that great army of death.
> One who works thus day and night and who is not indolent, is called the 'one-night wise', the 'all-peaceful', the 'all-silent'.

This tells us that one ought not needlessly pine at what is

1) The *Majjhima-nikāya* (sūtras 131–4) contains the gāthā *Bhaddekaratta*; the three sūtras of the *Chūagon* (sūtras 165–7) speak about this. This tells us that this must have been very famous.

gone and needlessly to look to the future, but to make the present moment worth having. This talks about the practice of the unattached selflessness that does not cling even to the present. There are not a few sūtras that write much about this.[1)]

And there are many sūtras that refer to non-attachment even when one is seeing and experiencing the present. For example, the '*Daigishaku*' (*Mahā-Niddesa*, P.) says:

> 'The eyes see things, but do not covet what one may well covet. Do not look daggers at what one may well look daggers at, do not be blind at the gloom, be not angry at what one must be angry at, do not be soiled by what one may well be soiled by, do not be arrogant at what one may well be arrogant at. The ears hear the voice, the nose smells fragrance, the tongue tastes the taste, the body feels the touch, the mind is conscious of the mental object. But one does not covet what one might well covet, one does not look daggers at what one must well look daggers at, one does not become blind at the gloom, one does not become angry at what one might well become angry at, one does not get soiled by what one may well be soiled by, one does not become arrogant at what one might well become arrogant at.
>
> 'Leave what one has seen as one has seen it, leave what one has heard as one has heard it, leave what one has become awakened at as one has become awakened at it, leave what one has become conscious of as one has become conscious of it. One does not get attached to what one

1) As to such sūtras that tell one not to pine at the past and not to look to the future, but to fill up the present, see, e.g. the *Zōagon*, XXXVI (sūtra 995); the *Saṁyuttaya-nikāya*, I, 1, 10. It goes: 'No worry about the past, no picturing of the day to come. Following what there is at the present moment, one rightly knows and abides in it'.

> has seen, one does not get attached to what one has become awakened at, one does not get attached to what one has become conscious of, one does not get attached to what one has seen. One does not depend upon, one does not get bound by; one leaves, one becomes unbound, and lives with a mind unhindered and free. One does not get attached to what one has heard, to what one becomes awakened at, and to what one has become conscious of. One does not depend, does not get bound up. One leaves, one becomes unbound, lives with a mind unhindered and free '.[1]

The selflessness of unattachedness has its other half, which is the all-awareness in thinking and meditation. And the all-awareness and the selflessness change places one after the other and thus advancement goes in all-awareness and selflessness. But actually all-awareness and selflessness must exist simultaneously. For what there is is actually to think and meditate with all-awareness abiding in selflessness. All-awareness and selflessness melt into each other. When perfection results, we call it the selflessness of unhindered freedom. This is the highest stage of selflessness, the utmost end of the Buddhist ideal. That the sūtra says: ' With no attachment one abides in the unhindered and unmolested state of mind ' must mean this.

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1) The *Mahā-Niddesa*, p. 242 (ND, XLII, 364). Furthermore the *Zōagon*, XIII (sūtra 335, the *Daiichigikū-kyō*), states: ' When the eye comes about, there is no place from where it comes about; when it dies, there is no place whereto it goes. Thus, the eye comes about with no place to come about. Born, it must die out. There is the karma effect, and no maker'. So it goes, and this is what alludes to the selflessness. Further, as to what refers to the unattachedness to death, we may quote, e.g. the *Theragāthā* (1,002), which says: ' I am not pleased at death; I am not pleased at birth. I shall rightly know and rightly remember. And I would throw this body away '.

So far we have looked into the process of advancement gained by the mutual working of all-awareness and selflessness. Here we will see this in terms more concrete. And all this goes in gaining wisdom and experience, in science and art. Take, for example, the case of learning calligraphy. Th eteacher gives a sample sheet as a model to work upon; the student imitates. This is the phase of all-awareness. One learns how to write the Chinese characters by this all-awareness of practice. Through all-awareness one learns how to write. One so trained now writes characters, which accord with the rule and form. But the characters written by all-awareness only and not by selflessness lack charm and dignity. It may even look hateful. Against this, there may be letters done by a hand whose technique is not up to this level. But if done by a selfless and unattached mind, they carry forth depth and charm, not easily expressed in words. The case may be seen in the pictures or characters done by Zen priests, in which we meet with primitiveness. The same can be said in the case of the game of 'go'. One may be good at the game itself. But there is a game of 'go' which, though strong in itself, is somehow hateful and cunning. And there is one which, though weak, is yet noble, and full of personal charm. In anything done, the person will reveal and show whether one is all-aware and all-attached or whether one is selfless and unattached.

What should be most desirable in life is that the all-awareness and selflessness attain the highest development, in science and art, and in the person as a whole. This is to say that the highest grade of all-awareness (wisdom and experience) is actualized in life by the highest grade of selflessness. This perfect actualization of selflessness is called the 'unhindered selflessness' (mukeige-no-muga, Jap.) or the 'unhindered all-void' (muge-no-kū, Jap.). 'Unhindered'

(muge, Jap.) means 'to be unmolested and free'. This means that whatever is rational and all-aware is full and complete, and works unmolested, free and unhindered. A master-hand of calligraphy writes, without any mental stress or labour, the Chinese or Japanese letters, and yet whatever done is in accord with the law of penmanship. Confucius said: 'At seventy, I do as the mind wills and yet the action does not go beyond propriety'. This mental state too may well point to an unmolested state of selflessness. Needless to say, the Buddha and arhats, perfect in personal accomplishment, must have been in this state.

This highest state is 'not to be attained by the all-present mind, and not to be attained by an empty mind'.[1] It must be the 'all-present mind of the all-empty mind' and the 'all-empty mind of the all-present mind'. The *Hannyashingyō* (*Prajñāpāramitā-hṛdaya-sūtra*, Skt.) says that the 'form* is all-void' (shiki-soku-zekū) and the 'all-void is form' (kū-soku-zeshiki), all of which embosoms this signification. Here is a unison of what is perfectly rational and what is perfectly religious. It is the ultimate of science as well as the ultimate of religion. For, it is the last end of personality.

10. Characteristics of Buddhism

Rationality and the Rejection of Superstitions The Three Characteristics, the Law of Interdependence, the Four Noble Truths, and the Threefold Learning which we have gone through tell us about the rational structure of the Bud-

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1) Dōgen: '*Gakudō-yōjinshū*'. The Zen Buddhism of China and Japan often talks about this most commonly. This stands on the thought of 'prajñā' stated in the *Kongō-hannyagyō* (*Vajracchedika-prājñāpāramitā-sūtra*, Skt.).

dhist doctrine. No trace whatever of the irrational and superstitious do we come across. Also, as the ways of practice are set rationally and systematically, one advances step by step in orderly progression, the equals of which one sees in no other religions. Actually, the words and actions of the Buddha that one finds in the texts of Primitive Buddhism are all modern and rational. Even in the way of expression do we never come across any antiquated, childish expressions of parables. Compare Buddhism, for example, with the *Upaniṣads*, the highest peak of the philosophies of ancient India, and see what this latter says regarding the oneness of Brahman-Ātman and the doctrine of karman. No doubt, the *Upaniṣads* are some two to three hundred years older than Buddhism. But the doctrine and theories are all old and hoary, frequented by childish and mythological parables. Rarely do we come across there any doctrine which is purely theoretical and notional.

Against this, the teaching of the Buddha completely extricate itself from the realm of mythological parables and contains in it all but thoughts logical and notional that are of the modern world. From this angle too, we may say that the teaching of Primitive Buddhism stood on an advanced ground.

The Buddha did best, in thinking and action, to reject whatever was irrational and superstitious. The fact can at once be seen as we look into the texts of Primitive Buddhism. It was common in those days to depend on astrology and see the good and ill of the day or if the direction was a lucky one in doing anything. But Buddhism refused to fall in the way, thus to decide one's action by day or direction.* And food and drinks people chose superstitiously. Some food could be taken and some not. A certain school of ascetics refused to take whatever was given by others, or to take food and drinks direct from

bottles or dishes, or to take anything placed inside the threshold, anything that stood between staffs, or anything given by a pregnant woman, or any food when a dog should stand close by. Such rules seem to have existed.[1]

Also, *Manu's Law* stipulates variously about things which one may eat or may not. Among these, there are not a few that look as of superstition. For example, one was not to take onion and fungus, or whatever was offered to gods, or the milk of a cow that was not giving milk to a calf.[2] Other than for religious reasons, no sane reason exists here that there should be such rules of life for ordinary people. The book, further, says that one should not jump over a rope to which is tied a calf, that one should not look into one's form as reflected in the water, that one should not take food with one's wife, that one should not make water or answer the call of nature facing the north in daytime and facing the south at night, that one should not take food, leave for a journey, or sleep, close to daybreak, that one should not talk with a woman in the menstrual period, that one should not cut one's nails and hair, that one should not tread on hair, ash, bone, fragments of the earthenware, the cotton seed, or the husk of rice: all such things are stipulated.[3] And all these customs may have been followed by the people of India up to very recent years. Further, the *Manu* says that if one takes food facing the east, one gains longevity; if the south, fame; if the west, happiness; and if the north, righteousness.[4] These cannot be regarded as other than superstitions.

Also, among the ascetics of the day, there were not a few

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1) So are things stated about referring to the teachings of the tīrthakas, for example, in the *Dīgha-nikāya*, 8, the *Kashōshishikukyō*; the *Daigishaku* (ND, XLII, pp. 129 ff.).

2) *Manu's Law*, chap. V, sect. 4–37.

3) „ „ IV, „ 38–91.

4) „ „ II, „ 52.

who used only certain kinds of food and clothing and those who imitated the life of a dog, the life of a cow, the life of an elephant, and those who lived as these animals lived. They thought they would gain happiness after death. Further, charms and fortune-tellings seem to have been fairly much in vogue. And the Buddhists were strictly warned not to take to such a way of life.[1]

It is not because one takes ill-smelling meat and fish that one becomes defiled. But superstitions said thus. The food has nothing to do with the purity or impurity of man. Only how and what one does makes one clean or defiled. This was what Śākyamuni Buddha taught.[2] It was thought that if one bathed in the sacred river and cleansed the body, one at once became purified, and that by this one could gain the heavens after death and enjoy happiness. This was what was thought by the Brahmins of the day. And this is what is widely believed and done even to this day among the Hindus. From religious angles, it was not only in India but also in all places that

1) For example, the *Mahā-Niddesa*, p. 89 (ND, XLII, p. 131). The śramaṇas and Brahmins who took things in wrong ways thought that it was a pure act to imitate an elephant, a horse, a cow, a dog, a hen, a crow or any demon, and that such an act would lead one to emancipation. One who took a vow to live like an elephant lived and walked like an elephant, stood, sat, slept or made water or responded the call of nature just as an elephant did. The same went with others who took such vows.

2) The *Sutta-nipāta*, II, 2 (the *Āmagandha-sutta*, P.; the *Shūekyō*, Jap.) says: 'It is an act of defilement to kill an animal, to beat, to hash, to bind, to steal; to use careless words, to cheat, to get things by fraud, to learn crookedness, to befriend other people's wives. But it is not so to take flesh' (the *Sutta-nipāta*, 242). 'It is the ill-smelling and a defilement to be rude and rough, to be cold in heart, to speak things at the back, and betray one's friend, not to have any sympathetic heart, to act proudly, to be miserly, and not to give to others. But it is not because one takes flesh' (*Sutta-nipāta*, 244).

bathing in water was thought to purify one. In Japan too it was so thought. But Buddhism taught that spiritual sins and defilements could not be washed away by anything like water, but that repentance and the right practice of the Way[1] only could.

What people thought in those days was that anything like illness was the work of a devil or demon. So, people tried to drive away these by prayers and charms. But there are cases in which an illness arises out of the mind. Because of this, even in Primitive Buddhism, at times things were done to cure spiritual illnesses. But for ordinary illnesses it was stipulated that one should resort to scientific cure by using medicines appropriate to the illnesses and causes. This is actually so stipulated in the *Vinaya*.[2] When Śākyamuni Buddha himself was ill, he was treated by Jīvaka, and the sangha too depended on the treatment by this famous doctor. But those other than of the royal family of Magadha and the sangha could not expect any treatment by Jīvaka. So, not for the faith or the Way, but just for curing diseases, people sometimes, it is said, entered the order.[3]

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1) The *Zōagon*, XLIV (sūtra, 1,185); the *Majjhima-nikāya*, 7 (the *Vatthūpama-sutta*, P.; the *Fuyukyō*, Jap.). Further, the *Therīgāthā* contains such as the following, in which it speaks against the superstition of the Brahmins, saying that the water of the river cleanses one's sin and defilement.
'(If it is that the river water cleanses the sin and defilement), the frogs, tortoises, nāgas, crocodiles, and all those in the water must go to heaven?' (241).
'If it is that these rivers are to carry away the ills you did, they would also carry away your fortune and good acts and you shall be one who has nothing to pride in fortune and good acts' (243).
2) For example, the *Vinaya* (the *Mahāvagga*, VI, the chap. on medicines) contains all kinds of medicines known in the day. Also, the medicines and the ways are shown in accordance with illnesses.
3) For example, the *Vinaya* (the *Mahāvagga*, the *Mahākhandhaka*,* §39). It is said that people entered the sangha in order to cure the→

Anyhow, the stipulations given in the *Vinaya* in regard to the curing of illnesses must have been the most rational and scientific treatment of the day. We can well guess how advanced must have been the way in which illnesses were cured in the Buddhist teaching of the day when we compare things with what are going on among some of the so-called 'Shinkō-Shūkyō'* of Japan in which people even today reject the medical and scientific treatment of illnesses.

Respect of Personality and the Negation of Caste So much for what was rational with Buddhism. Further, Buddhism stood on humanistic liberalism and highly regarded the personality of man. It even respected the lives of animals. Here too was modernity. The Brahmanistic teaching of the day saw the value of man by caste and family. The Brahmin was by birth a god on earth and was a sacred existence to be respected by others. Whatever was on earth belonged to Brahmins. They were the highest and the best; they were entitled to receiving all things. Even when sinning, no punishment was meted out to them or the punishment meted out was far lighter than that meted to other castes. In all, the Brahmins enjoyed privileges and stood in advantageous positions.

But with Buddhism, such privileges of caste were regarded as totally meaningless and irrational. This does not come from the fact that Śākyamuni Buddha was no Brahmin by birth and that he was of a kingly family. With Buddhism the worth of a man did not rest on caste, birth, family, or profession. A man of any caste or profession was good and was to be respected if only the mind was pure and if only the action was right and in

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(Cont. from p. 230, note)
five kinds of difficult diseases and that when the diseases became cured, they left the sangha.

accord with the law. The worth of a man rested on the action he did.

It is not that one is low by birth,
It is not that one is a Brahmin by birth.
By deed becomes one low in grade;
By deed becomes one a Brahmin. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 136)

The personal and family names one has
Are but for worldly callings.
They are those handed down;
They are given one when one is born.
(*Sutta-nipāta*, 648)

By birth is one not a Brahmin;
By birth is one not a non-Brahmin.
By deed is one a Brahmin,
By deed is one a non-Brahmin. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 650)

By deed is one a farmer,
By deed is one an artisan,
By deed is one a merchant,
By deed is one a servant. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 651)

By deed is one a robber,
By deed is one a warrior,
By deed is one a priest,
By deed is one a king. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 652)

So, in the Buddhist sangha, anyone of any caste or profession was admitted if only the mind was pure. Needless to say, many Brahmins and men of princely families became Buddhists. There were cases in which even the candāla, those of the lower castes living on butchery, fishing, and hunting, and even prostitutes and the worst of robbers too became Buddhists. Just as the waters

of great rivers, when they get into the ocean, lose their former names and become one and taste one, anyone of any caste or profession, when they became Buddhists, lost their former castes and became one.[1] The rank in the sangha was determined not by caste or profession, but by the years after becoming a Buddhist monk, or by the grade of merit of Buddhist practice actually attained.

Regarding this point, there was a clear difference in the house of Brahmanism. Only the upper three castes were permitted to learn the *Vedas* and carry on religious rituals. The people of lower castes of slaves were treated like cows and horses. They were strictly not allowed to hear or learn the *Vedas*: they were prohibited the marriage, social intercourse, and even to take meals with the people of upper classes together. Totally different from it, Buddhism saw all people (and even animals) with an equal eye and preached the Buddha's gospel to all and prayed for the peace and happiness of all. In order that they might well understand the teaching, the Buddha's sermons were given, not in the difficult languages of the *Vedas* and Sanskrit which the Brahmins were using since of old, but in the popular tongues of the people which went in their everyday life.

The two brother bhikṣus who were come of a Brahmin family

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1) The *Zōichiagon*, XXI (xxix, 9), says: ' The people of four castes shave the hair and the faith is strong. As they leave their homes and learn the law, they forsake their original names and call themselves the disciples of Śākyamuni Buddha '. Also, the eight virtues of the sea are compared to the eight virtues of the Buddhist sangha. As all waters flow into the sea, they become one in taste. So, when all castes become Buddhists, they are all called the disciples of the Buddha. There are not a few sūtras that allude to this. The *Chūagon*, 37 (the *Senpakyō*); the *Aṅguttara-nikāya*, VIII, 20; the *Udāna*, V, 5; and other *Vinayas*.

once spoke to the Buddha: 'It spoils the sanctity of your holy teaching when it is given in the inferior popular tongue which does not even go quite in accord with grammar. You should hence give your teaching in the beautiful Sanskrit which accords with grammar'. At this, the Buddha sternly said that it should not absolutely be in Sanskrit, the language current only among a small circle of people of intellectuals and that it must go in the tongue of every locality and in the everyday language of the people.[1] With the Buddha himself and with his disciples, and even after the death of the Buddha, it became the custom for the teaching to be given in the local tongues of the people. The Pāli language that now goes in the South, was no language of the Buddha himself. It was a tongue that came out under influence of the local tongue as Buddhism spread to West India.[2] It would seem that the sermon of the Buddha was delivered in the language of the mid-Ganges, the ancient tongue of Magadha.[3] But this language is not extant to this day.

Primitive Buddhism grew up into Abhidharma Buddhism. And Buddhism had now broken up into eighteen or twenty schools. As it spread in and out of India, in various places,

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1) The *Cullavagga*, V (the *Zatsujikendo*); The *Gobunritsu*, XXVI; the *Shibunritsu*, LII; the *Jūjuritsu*, XXXVIII, etc.

2) According to the tradition of the south, it was thought that Pāli was Māgadhī, the tongue which the Buddha used in his everyday life. But the fact is that the ancient tongue of Magadha was carried over to West India, where it had become one near the idiom of Ujjayinī (Skt.; Ujjenī, P.). This was the Pāli language. Therefore, in this tongue of Ujjain, we see still the influence of the tongue of Magadha. See also, the author's *Pāli Grammar*.

3) This may be so presumed from the fact that the Asokan pillars that remain to this day are done in the tongues of the east, the northwest, the west, and the southwest. Even the Indo-Aryan language of India too is divided into the groups of several localities.

the texts were compiled, so it would seem, in the popular tongues of the places. India is a large country and was divided even in those days into the four or five of the east, the middle, the northwest, the west, and the southwest.[1] These were further divided into smaller groups, having called forth many daily tongues of the people. So, the languages of the Buddhist texts differed by the difference of the locality where Buddhism flourished. So would it seem. What are extant are those of some schools.[2] All are of different tongues. Tradition tells us also that all these were written in different idioms.[1] When Buddhism spread to foreign lands, it was common also to translate the texts into foreign tongues. The texts in the several tongues of India were rendered into those of Central Asia. Further, from these, directly or indirectly, translation was done into Classical Chinese and we now see an enormous size of the tripiṭaka in Classical Chinese. What we can infer is that most of the texts of Primitive Buddhism of the early days of Abhidharma Buddhism were in the local idioms of India.

Anyhow, the fact that Buddhism disregarded, since the day of its founding, the caste system peculiar to India was the reason why it was welcomed by the intellectuals whose heads

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1) The texts of Abhidharma Buddhism extant in the Indian tongues are those of the Theravāda of the South, which are in Pāli, those of the Sarvāstivādins, which are in Sanskrit, those in Buddhist Sanskrit—the dialectical Sanskrit—in which the Buddha-legend *Mahāvastu* of the sub-school Lokottaravādins of the school Mahāsaṁghika is done, and the Prākrit *Dhammapada* done in a dialect called Gāndhārī whose school is not known.

2) According to Tibetan tradition, the four representative schools of the eighteen schools had their texts in different languages, which were those of: the ' Paiśācī of the Theravādā, the Apabhraṁśa of the Saṁmatīya, the Sanskrit of the Sarvāstivāda, and the Prākrit of the Mahāsaṁghika in which the grammar is loose. From what we see in the texts extant, what is stated here is generally true.

were rational and why it was accepted by lower castes and supported by all people. As may be judged from what we see in the ancient inscriptions, most of the donations to the temples and the sangha given during the period of from about the third century B.C. down to about the second and the third century A.D. were for Buddhism, to be followed by those for Jainism and Ājīvikas. Jainism too stood against Brahmanism and disregarded, like Buddhism, the caste system. So, it must have gained the support of the general public. But the teaching was not as rational and the attitude too not as penetrating as in Buddhism. Against this, Buddhism rejected the traditional custom of the Indian populace, by which it could effect a superficial and factual support of the populace, but had no such power as to change or remould the habit and custom. Then came the revival of Brahmanism, followed by the weakening of the Buddhistic influence itself, and the faith of the populace in Buddhism too, so it would seem, gradually waned.

Against the fact that Janism compromised, in later days, with the habit and custom of India, Buddhism did not, to the end, change its attitude towards its own principle of all-equalness of the four castes. This was one of the reasons why Buddhism could not sustain life in India and why it had died out. Unlike the degenerated leftist Tantrism that was mixed up with the popular faith of the general populace and lost its traces in the sands of Indian thought, Buddhism held its banner clear above to the end. This caused death, a death, possibly, of honour. And because of this, the Buddhism of India had now stepped out of the land, growing up to be World Buddhism.

Tradition and Renovation From the very outset, the Buddha did not seem to found any new religion. The religions and philosophies of the day were full of incongruities, lacking

ethics and containing imperfections. At this juncture, the Buddha struck out a perfect Way of life, both rational and ethical. He may have felt an incentive to guide and save the world with this noble teaching. The Buddha seems to have sat on the time-old ideal and will of a wise Brahmin. He must have thought of raising the standard of the way of life. The thought of the Brahmins of the day was not perfect; their actions were full of greed and anger; they were corrupt and did not possess the personality and attitude of the Brahmins of the old days who were the guides of India. He alleged that it was he who had inherited the ideal of a true Brahmin of old days. The differences between the Brahmins of the days gone by and those of the day are explained as in the following:

The ṛṣis and ascetics of old days
Controlled their own selves well.
They forsook the sensual lust;
They did their own duties. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 284)

Those Brahmins had no flocks;
They possessed no gold, no wealth, no cereals.
The recitation of the holy texts was their wealth and cereals;
They guarded the storehouse of Brahman (ideal).
(*Sutta-nipāta*, 285)

For forty-eight years
They held celibacy.
Thus, the Brahmins of old days
Sought principles and practices. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 289)

The Brahmin did not marry any of other tribes;
He did not buy his wife.
Loving and associating,
He enjoyed a married life with his wife.
(*Sutta-nipāta*, 290)

Non-adultery, observance of moral laws,
Honesty, softness, penance, and effort,
All-surrenderedness, non-harming, forbearance:
These the Brahmins applauded. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 292)

The hands and feet had grace, the body was large,
The features fine, the name known,
Right in actions:
The Brahmins were
Zealous in good deeds and in ceasing evil.
They so lived and people were happy.
(*Sutta-nipāta*, 298)

As ages had passed, the Brahmins went astray,
Seeing the pleasures,
The grand livings of the kings,
And the ladies beautifully clad. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 299)

The full-pictured wagons, with margins painted,
And horsed with splendid steeds;
The large well-located mansions
With gates and gardens cross-crossed;
(*Sutta-nipāta*, 300)

The grand wealth of the wordly that have in hand
So many cows, beauties, and ladies:
All these
The Brahmins desired to have. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 301)

They made new scriptures,
And went to kings and said:
'Give to us, you have full wealth;
Give to us, you have much money. Then to you will
Money and cereals be plenty, in lives to come.
(*Sutta-nipāta*, 302)

Thus, the kings, the heads of four armies,

Exhorted by Brahmins,
Called forth horse-sacrificing or man-sacrificing festivals,
The staff-play festivals, the soma festivals,
And all festivals in which offerings were made,
And celebrating all such, they gave Brahmins wealth and money. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 303)

Then, gaining wealth and treasure,
They were glad and stored them up.
Caught up by desires,
The thirsting-love grew up all the more.
(*Sutta-nipāta*, 306)

In days gone by, there were but the three illnesses
Of desire, lack of food, and age.
Having massacred the domestic animals,
Now arose ninety-eight illnesses and desires.
(*Sutta-nipāta*, 311)

When, thus, the right dharma was lost,
Enmity arose among the slaves and populace,
The warriors and the royal families parted and fought,
The wives belittled their husbands. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 314)

The warriors, the royal families, and the Brahmins,
And the others who were guarded by the walls of caste system,
Did not regard much their own blood,
And lost themselves in lust and pleasures.
(*Sutta-nipāta*, 315)

And thus words go repeatedly that true Brahmins should be thus and thus. As quoted already, the Brahmins in this case are not the Brahmins by birth and blood, but the wise and the sage that stand on reason and ethical perfection.

I, also, do not call one come out of womb,
One just come out of mother, a Brahmin.
He is ' one who says: O friend! '
He is one who truly possesses,
One who owns nothing, one who clings to nothing,
Such a one do I call a Brahmin. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 620)

All illusions done away with,
One beyond clinging, one with no bondage,
One who has nothing to fear,
Such a one do I call a Brahmin. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 621)

Just as water does not stick to the leaves of water lilies,
Just as the mustard seed does not sit on the point of an awl,
One who does not cling to greed,
Such a one do I call a Brahmin. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 625)

One who is wise with deep wisdom,
One who knows well the way and the not-the-way,
One who has gained the highest end,
Such a one do I call a Brahmin. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 627)

One who from all living things that fear and tremble,
Or that strongly stand against draws back whips,
One who does not kill and who does not let others harm,
Such a one do I call a Brahmin. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 629)

One who is not rude, but is helpful,
Who but talks truth only,
Who does not make others angry,
Such a one do I call a Brahmin. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 632)

One who has abandoned in this world
Both good and evil and who goes beyond clinging,

One who has no apprehension, who is away from
illusion and is pure,
Such a one do I call a Brahmin. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 636)

One who is like a cloudless moon,
One serene, one who has no filth,
One who has thrown away all the pleasures of existence,
Such a one do I call a Brahmin. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 637)

One who throws away both joy and not-joy.
Who is cool and has no clinging,
One who is brave, one who has subdued all the world,
Such a one do I call a Brahmin. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 642)

One who had nothing to possess in the past, who will
possess nothing
In the future, and who possesses nothing in the present,
On who possesses nothing and who has no clinging,
Such a one do I call a Brahmin. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 645)[1]

By strong effort and pure learning,
By prohibiting rules and the wisdom that controls
one,
Becomes one a Brahmin.
This is the highest of the Brahmins. (*Sutta-nipāta*, 655)

If anything thought since of old was in accord with reason and ethics, the Buddha respected and, further, augmented it. So, he adopted the karma theory and the ways of practice and emancipation which India had before his days. Only he did not regard the thoughts of both karma and meditation as the most

1) The *Sutta-nipāta*, 620–45; the same as the gāthās of the *Dhammapada* (396–421).

lofty and final. He made the thought of karma a mere preparatory course to guide one in to the law of interdependence; the thought of meditation was adopted just because it fitted well as a practical way for gaining wisdom and for practical application. Thus, there were not a few cases in which, as can be seen in the gāthā quoted (No. 655), we encounter such terms as 'tapas' (kugyō, Jap.) and 'brahma-cariya' (bongyō, Jap.). But 'tapas', as the literal meaning of the word tells us, does not mean 'penance' but only 'utmost effort', which was what Buddhism meant; 'brahma-cariya', too, was not the 'brahma-cariya' of Brahmanism, but the practising of the Way in accordance with the Buddhist ideal. Thus, the thoughts or terms of other teachings were adopted in Buddhism to make them serve a purpose of its own, in a changed application, remoulding them into what were rational and ethical in sense.

Even at that, Buddhism rejected to the end whatever tradition that went against its own principle and that were irrational and immoral. Such were the three important principles of Brahmanism since the days of *Brāhmaṇas* and which were the thoughts of 'divine dispensation of the *Vedas*', 'all-in-all ritualism', and the 'absolutism of the Brahmins'. The Brahmins looked up to the *Vedas* as absolute truth and recognized its authority; they made it that rituals and prayers could dominate over all fates of man, and that the Brahmins were by birth the highest and gods of the earth. Buddhism negated the authority of all these. Because of this, Buddhism was badly hated by Brahmanism and this was one of the chief reasons why Buddhism had lost its own place in India. Further, the fact that the Buddha had negated the existence of Brahmā,[1] the highest of the Brahmanic pantheon, was also the

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1) According to the *Dīgha-nikāya*, 13 (the *Tevijja-sutta*); the→

cause of their antipathy.

From a purely logical standpoint, the Buddha negated thus the highest godhead of Brahmā or Īśvara, but in a popular sense, the Buddha even talked about Brahmā. We are told that Brahmā appeared before the Buddha when he had attained perfect enlightenment and asked of him to preach the gospel to the world. This is one instance. There are not a few cases in which the Buddha spoke about what were against reason if it was for popular understanding. He knew this could guide others. Be this as it may, the standard of action was with him always to be 'for the benefit of the dharma and its signification' (hō to gi to no nyōyaku, Jap.). So, what Buddhism took up had always what was rational and ethical (the benefit of the dharma) and what could help the world for advancement (the benefit of the signification). Anything that went against this standard was rejected, whatsoever the tradition.

Consequently, there are cases in which Buddhism made use of things however old if they did not go against reason and if they could be of help to the world. It was not only in the case of what concerned the doctrine such as the karma theory and the ways of practice and emancipation, but also in the case of the rules of the Buddhist sangha, that Buddhism had adopted

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(Cont. from p. 242, note)
Jōagon, 26 (the *Sanmyōkyō*), the Buddha exchanged talks with a Brahmin youth. He made the youth confess that no Brahmins of the day, none of their teachers, the ancestors going even seven generations back, not one had seen Brahmā or none had ever heard people say that they had seen Brahmā. The Buddha says this is against reason. He says that to worship and pray for Brahmā whom none have ever seen or about whom none have ever heard of any who has seen Brahmā is like longing for and loving a woman whose name or family one has never heard of up to so far and whose face or style one has never seen. The Buddha takes up many such parables and points out what is irrational.

and made good use of them.

The system of vārṣika which extended for three months and the poṣadha which was observed every half month for purifying the Buddhist sangha were those adopted and modified in Buddhist ways from what went in other religions of the day. Such rules of life for laymen as the pañca-śīlas (five moral precepts) and the 'eight prohibitions' (aṣṭāṅga-samanvāgatopavāsa, Skt.; hassaikai, Jap.) were also such institutions. Sometimes, the things that were being done just as a matter of course since of old were given new meanings and were newly practised. What the *Jōagon* states in its *Roppōraikyō* is a good example.[1]

According to this, when the Buddha was residing in Rājagṛha, at Veṇuvana, there was a young man of a rich family who awoke early in the morning and in the suburbs wetted his clothes and hair, folded hands, and worshipped the six quarters of east, south, west, north, and up and down. This was the routine. The Buddha once happened to meet him as he went on his way of

1) The *Jōagon*, 16 (the *Zenshōkyō*); the *Chūagon*, 135 (the *Zenshōkyō*, the *Shikaraotsuroppōraikyō*); the *Dīgha-nikāya*, 31 (the *Kyōkaishikarakyō*), etc. The Buddha delivers sermons variously as occasion arises. For example, when seeing a fire from a mountain top raging down below, he will say that the people of the world are being burnt by the three poisons of greed, anger, and ignorance. Seeing a big tree floating down the Ganges, he will say that this tree reaches the great sea and stays there calm and quiet, no more being washed down, if it does not get caught by the banks on both sides, not sinking in mid water, and so long as the inside does not get rotten. So, if a bhikṣu does not have any hindrance in and out of himself, he will unfailingly gain the great sea of nirvāṇa and there stay in peace and equanimity. Also, the daughter-in-law of Anāthapiṇḍada was always proud of her own birth and there was no end of quarrels in the family. The Buddha says to this woman that there are in the world seven kinds of wives from the worse to the most ideal. 'What kind of a wife do you yourself desire to be?' He asks her. By questioning this woman thus, he makes her desire to be a good wife (the *Gyokuyanyokyō*).

alms-begging, and asked him why he so worshipped the six quarters in such a manner.

The young man of this rich family said that he just did so, to be obedient to the words of his late father who at his death-bed had told him that he should worship the six quarters every morning; he said he did not know why he had to do so. The Buddha told the man that it was useless if he did not know the meaning. There must always be reasons, he said, for one's actions. Then, there could be sense in what one did. And he explained it.

Accoring to this sermon, the east was the parents, the south the teacher, the west the wife and children, the north the friend, the down the maids and servants, and the up the religious teachers such as śramaṇas and Brahmins. ' Six quarters ' were all those closely related in one's everyday life. So, praying at heart that the relations with those surrounding one should go amicably, that each will love and respect each other, that all will live in happiness, one should worship the six quarters. So did he say. The people of the six quarters have each a duty to do towards others. For example, the parents that are the east tell us that the children have five duties towards their parents and the parents too have five towards their children. What are the five of the children? These are to serve and look after their parents, do zealously what the parents did, not disrupt the family line of blood, guard well the wealth left behind by the parents, and do works of charity to others as their parents did. And the five duties of the parents are to love their children, make them forsake evil and good, give education in arts and science to them, look for an apt wife for the son, and give over, at an apt time, the estates to him to succeed.

The five duties are spoken of in the same way in regard to elders, wives, children, friends, menials, and religious teachers.

These are all extremely plain ones, yet apt and proper so that even we of today could adopt them as they were. Here we see the rational and universal character of the Buddhist teaching.

Universality of Buddhism What the Buddha taught stood on the universal ground of man. It stepped out of the geographical boundary of India, its caste and social environments. It sootd above the temporal limit of 2,500 years and above primitiveness and crudeness. That is why we always meet in what the Buddha taught an undying freshness and brightness that work as a torch to human life. Here rests the quality of the Buddhist teaching as a world religion. We see this kind of freshness also in the gospels of the Christian teaching. In this sense, the scriptures of the Buddhists and the Christians possess an eternal quality to walk together with man's life. But in respect of rationality and critical attitude, Buddhism stands above the Christian teaching. Evaluation may vary with persons. But viewed objectively, we may well say that the position Buddhism will occupy, as a rational religion, in the coming age in which rationality says much, calls for higher appraisal.

As Buddhism is rational and critical, it is not biased in any respect. It never hesitates to adopt whatever has law and signification. It is remoulded to play for better part and serve for the ' benefit of the dharma and the law '. An individual, a people, or a nation realizes and augments whatever it has for the better, led by rationalism and criticism, and sees also the better part of others. It reflects upon and examines its own self, abandons the weak points and takes whatever is better in others, and by gradual steps grows up. This is the right path of humanism. The Renaissance that had built up the modern civilization of the West was full of this spirit; the ages of Asuka, Nara, and the early part of Heian,

which best represent Japanese civilization, had also this critical approach to culture.

In the cultural history of India, the Buddhism of Śākyamuni Buddha was the only one that sat on the ideal ground of humanism. Of all the religions of India, it was only Buddhism which could step out of India and became the spiritual foodstuff of other people. Such Buddhist kings as Aśoka, Milinda, and Kaniṣka all sat on rational and ethical principles. They inherited the characteritic wealth of Primitive Buddhism; because of the noble quality of Buddhism they took refuge in it. King Aśoka called Buddhsim only by the single term of 'Dharma'. He did not make the Dharma the property of Buddhism alone, but for the peoples of the world of whatever religions so that all could regard it as the principle of man's life. That was why he exhorted all people to 'actualize the Dharma', because with him the principle of the Buddhist teaching was an ideal of human life. The concrete points of his ideal are given in the edicts he had promulgated. They are worth our copying even in this present age; they completely agree with the principle of Primitive Buddhism.[1] They point to us leniency, open-

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1) King Aśoka, like his forefathers, was steeped in the Brahmin teaching. He took to rituals, killed animals and men, and offered them to gods as was the custom. He regarded all this as a matter of course. But, at war, he massacred a great number of men and animals and made so many innocent people suffer. He greatly regretted this and took to Buddhism. He realized how sinful it was to kill living things. He not only stopped killing them, but also declared to all the world life must be cherished and protected. For that purpose, he caused hospitals to be built, had wells dug, let people cultivate medicinal herbs. He did not negate rites and rituals, but made it that the power of the Dharma had more virtue in this life and in the other world, and commended this to others. What were the wishes of the law? These were fealty to parents, harmony and peace among relatives, respect for religious teachers and offerings done to them, non-harming and protection of living

heartedness, and peacefulness. All these arise out of the critical, humanistic, and universal quality of Buddhism. And this stands on the Buddhist teaching of ' selflessness '.

Further, the characteristics of Primitive Buddhism could be seen in the *Vinayas*, a collection of the rules of life of the world-fleeing. For example, the rules of punishment and the way in which penalties were given, the solution of disputes, all contain rationality, ethical spirit, and critical attitude, even seen from the legal standpoint of the present day. But the world-fleeing group differs from the world at large of to-day. So, the description of the details we must dispense with here.

Further, the *Jātaka* which is a world literature contains in it the characteritcs of Primitive Buddhism. But this enters another field. We must take leave of the subject.

(Cont. from p. 247, note)
things, benefits to old lone people and orphans, and right actions towards one's menials. King Aśoka himself made away with the tyrannical attitude of former days and permitted ministers to come to him any time and anywhere and heard their words and appeals. He ruled the land by listening to the voice of the people. Especially did he make it that government officials should be impartial and should govern and judge fairly. He prayed that all people and all living things could enjoy peace and happiness. This is repeatedly stated in the Aśokan edicts. This was a thing not seen in the traditional Brahmanic India and is none but the result of Buddhism.

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1) See pp. 3 ff.